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 1. Introduction 
After the First World War, the League of Nation mandates were established as a 
solution to the problem of what to do with the former colonies of the defeated 
states. An internationalized administration was set up in 1919 by the Allied 
powers, who occupied the former German colonies and some Turkish territories. 
After the war, these territories were transformed into mandates. 
 The story, as it is conventionally told, about the origins of the mandates 
system is one of a triumph of enlightened internationalism. In the formulation of 
the rationale of the mandates system, the drafters of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations found sources of inspiration from history.1 Spanish theologians and jurists 
had written about trusteeship as a moral concept and the humanitarian obligations 
towards the colonies in the 16th century.2 In 18th century Britain the idea of 
trusteeship was discussed in the context of the slave trade in government 
proclamations and parliamentary discussions.3 By the late 19th century, 
humanitarian ideas regarding the colonies were already common.4  
 Humanitarianism derived not only from the anti-slavery movement and a 
more general idea of fairer treatment of natives, but colonial powers also realized 
that taking care of the welfare of the inhabitants would lead directly to greater 
productivity.5 For progressive colonial administrators the mandates system 
provided an opportunity for testing new ideas and new colonial practices. As 
much or even more than a system to promote the self-rule of the native peoples, 
the mandates provided the Allied states a means to avoid conflict that could have 
risen had they divided the spoils of war amongst themselves.6  
 Was there a difference between the old colonial administration and the 
mandate? Regardless of the growing importance of humanitarianism in the 
conventions7 regarding the colonies, the emerging humanitarian principles that 
guided the actions of the colonial states had no legal basis. They were, it has been 
argued, moral principles, based on Christianity and humanity.8 The mandates 
                                                      
1 Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems, 36. 
2 Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, 97; Chowdhuri, International Mandates and 
Trusteeship Systems, 35. 
3 Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, 97. 
4 Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 127–130; League of Nations, The Mandates 
System. Origin, Principles, Application, 8. 
5 League of Nations, The Mandates System. Origin, Principles, Application, 8. 
6 Knoll, The Legal Status of Territories Subject to Administration by International Organisations, 
69. 
7 See e.g. Final act of the Berlin Conference of 1885. 
8 Liszt, Das Völkerrecht. Systematisch Dargestellt, 5; Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise. 
Vol. I - Peace, 461–463. 
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system supposedly transferred those principles into international law, bringing 
with it supervision and a higher authority.9 
1.1 The Research Question 
The purpose of this study is to trace the emergence of rights language in the 
League of Nations mandates system throughout its entire existence, beginning 
from its establishment to the legal proceedings concerning the last mandate, South 
West Africa, in the International Court of Justice.  
 The main research question is how rights vocabulary operated in the League 
of Nations and when human rights notions appeared in the language concerning 
the mandates. I will look at the transformation of the language of rights, the 
emergence of human rights notions and the change of legal culture with regard to 
rights. The years under scrutiny are 1921-1971. I will follow this issue through the 
question of how non-European communities were treated in international 
institutions, in the mandates system of the League of Nations and the post World 
War II decisions concerning the mandates by the International Court of Justice 
and whether the novel rhetoric of human rights in the United Nations system was 
applied to the mandates. The crucial points of interest are when particular 
concerns that would later be articulated in rights vocabulary are discussed, such 
as freedom of religion, freedom from slavery and compulsory labour, property 
rights, women’s rights and minority rights. The underlying issue is not only the 
role of the mandates system in the history of human rights, but more precisely 
whether a discussion in the context of mandates is relevant and if so, in what way 
is it relevant. The aim of this study is to explore the process through which the 
rights vocabulary and ultimately human rights language emerged in the 
discussions over the mandates. Due to the complexity of the intellectual and legal 
currents that this study traces, it makes no claim to present a single explanation or 
a single cause.  Multiple processes and many different intellectual and political 
actors and acts were involved, so that sometimes findings are contradictory and 
the significance of events was often unclear to contemporaries. The language of 
rights appears elusive and especially in the early stages of development, even 
anachronistic. The question of the emergence of something as fundamental and 
large scale as human rights is by its very nature one of viewpoint and to claim that 
such rights have a tidy lineage, a single cause or clear implications is 
                                                      
9 League of Nations, The Mandates System. Origin, Principles, Application, 10; Anghie, ‘The 
Heart of My Home, Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case’, 456. “The 
mandate system was unique in establishing the principle of international accountability 
for the administration of the territory in question.” Anghie argues that the fact that the 
obligations were made “justiciable” in the different mandates treaties reveals that the 
mandates system was based on legal duties. However, this was not clear even to the 
International Court of Justice decades later and does not tell what the original drafters 
intended. The justiciability clause of the different mandates (eg. Art. 7 of the Nauru 




inappropriate. The struggle for rights is a matter of global development with a 
large cast of actors with often contradictory motives. Idealists, old colonial hands, 
politicians and international lawyers operated under rapidly changing global 
circumstances and public opinions in different countries negotiating, manipulating 
and bargaining through the epochal changes from the rule of colonial empires 
towards decolonization and rights.  
 This book is divided into three main chapters. In the first chapter I study the 
creation of the League of Nations mandates system and present its machinery. The 
central question of this chapter is what was the role of the conflicting ideas of 
tutelage and agency in the creation of the mandates system? On the one hand, 
there were old imperial ideals of civilization and humanitarianism and paternalism, 
and on the other new ideas of freedom, self-determination and development. For 
many of the statesmen and lawyers of the 19th and early 20th century who 
formulated the international legal system, Europe represented a universal 
standard of civilization. The “other” was welcome to join the international 
community when it was sufficiently similar to Europe.10 On paper at least, this 
applied to the mandates as well. Much of the establishing phase of the League of 
Nations can be seen as a direct continuation for the European-centred ideology of 
the late 19th century. In the words of Lord Lugard, a longtime member of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, “It was the task of 
civilization to put an end to slavery, to establish Courts of Law, to inculcate in the 
natives a sense of individual responsibility, of liberty and of justice, and to teach 
their rulers how to apply these principles; ...”.11 The duties of the mandatory states 
were described as “tutelage” and “trusteeship”, and these were seen as a moral 
responsibility towards the natives.12 It was said that the mandates system enabled 
the highest ideals of colonial doctrine and of advanced public opinion in civilized 
countries to be put into practice. Or, as Lugard described the mandates, they were 
“the latest expression of the conscience of Europe”.13 
 Despite these continuities from the colonial period, the people within the 
League of Nations stressed how the mandates system was a new and novel start. 
The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations wanted to 
emphasize that they were forming a truly unique system, instead of being another 
way of colonizing states beyond the borders of Europe. The mandatory powers 
were expected to take into consideration native laws and customs and to safeguard 
native rights and interests. 
                                                      
10 See, for instance, Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, 102; Westlake, International 
Law, Part 1, Peace, 41, 46; Liszt, Das Völkerrecht. Systematisch Dargestellt; Gong, The Standard 
of ‘Civilization’ in International Society., 6–9; Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 132–
136. 
11 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5. 
12 The term “native” is here used solely as a historical term as used by contemporaries to 
denote the indigenous inhabitants in opposition to European settlers. 
13 Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 50. 
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 The ultimate goal for the mandates was to “stand alone under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world”.14 The means to achieve this could, however, be 
considered colonial. The aim of the Mandates Commission was to educate and to 
civilize, but it often appeared to lack the belief that some peoples actually could be 
civilized. One of the aims of education was to teach the natives to be useful in 
their own communities. However, a willingness to improve their position through 
education too much was disapproved of. It was not proper for the economic or 
political ambition of the natives to approach that of the European.   
 In the first chapter, I have examined international legal literature from the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. This legal literature has a twofold role: on the one 
hand as research literature describing the changes in legal doctrine, on the other 
hand as a research subject illustrating the thinking of the period.  
 In the second chapter, I follow the emergence of the rights language in the 
minutes of the Mandates Commission during the years 1921-1939. Drawing from 
the discussions in the Permanent Mandates Commission, I will investigate 
thematically debates over issues that would later be articulated in rights language. 
The main perspective of this chapter is to show how these matters were 
formulated in the Mandates Commission through discussions echoing old 
colonialistic humanitarian paternalism but how there was also a gradual 
development of these discussions towards something new. The Permanent 
Mandates Commission discussed at length issues concerning freedom of religion, 
but privileged Christianity. They were concerned about the continuation of 
slavery but understood to some extent the need for compulsory labour. They 
discussed indigenous property rights but favoured economic progress. Issues 
concerning women’s rights were likewise of concern but only when non-Western 
customs like polygamy or child marriage were at issue. They had a concern for 
minorities in Iraq, but had to give in to Britain’s idea of an independent Iraq. 
Finally, I will study the issue of individual petitions to the Mandates Commission, 
which were authorized by the League of Nations in 1923. The system of petitions 
was not originally included in the mandates system and only later, did the League 
Council permit petitions from inhabitants from the mandated areas.15 The 
Permanent Mandates Commission considered petitions to be mainly a source of 
information, and deliberately did not turn itself into a court of appeals.16 However, 
in some mandates the petitions were a useful method of revealing grievances to the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, which was mainly dependent on the reports of 
the mandatories for information. In some cases, like petitions during the uprising 
in Samoa, they initiated processes that otherwise would have not taken place.17 
The right to petition has in retrospect been considered by some authors to be the 
                                                      
14 The Covenant of the League of Nations (1924), Article 22. 
15 Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations, 119. 
16 Ibid., 171. 





most important human rights feature in the mandates system. Hersch 
Lauterpacht, for instance, called the right of petition a natural right, and 
maintained that the “right of petition was regarded as a natural concomitant of the 
system established by the Covenant”.18 In his view, the hearing of petitions was 
one of the main features of the mandates system.19  
 When the League of Nations was established, the European-centred way of 
thinking transferred to the official discourse. In the second chapter on the rights 
language of the mandates system my main source is the minutes of the Permanent 
Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. In these papers the members of 
the Permanent Mandates Commission discussed in a detailed manner the 
relationship between the mandatories and the mandated territories, including the 
welfare (and rights) of the inhabitants. 
 In the third chapter I study the afterlife of the mandates, particularly the 
mandates cases in the International Court of Justice.  The issue is how and when 
the language of rights and the framework of human rights were applied to the 
mandates and how they transformed the understanding of human rights in the 
context of international law. While the relevance of the League of Nations ended 
with the founding of the United Nations and most of the mandates it had 
established were turned into United Nations trusteeships, the mandates continued 
their relevance in international law through the International Court of Justice 
Mandates cases. Of the three sets of cases (South West Africa, Cameroon and 
Nauru),20 I will limit my examination to the cases concerning South West Africa 
or later Namibia. In these cases, the International Court of Justice revisited 
several times the meaning and content of the mandates, finally approaching them 
through the language of human rights. In the third chapter the case law of the 
International Court of Justice has been used as the main source.  
 The chief contribution that I seek to make with this study is to show how 
complex and multifaceted the processes of legal and conceptual change are. In 
some of the recent literature on the history of human rights there has been a 
tendency to search for fixed dates or points of origin. My intention is the opposite, 
showing developments over a long period of time and the change of 
interpretations and vocabularies as a gradual process where contradictory new 
                                                      
18 Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 244. 
19 Ibid., 245. 
20 International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion of 11 July 1950; South 
West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South 
Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase Judgment of 18 July 1966; Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion of 21 June 1971; Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 
Preliminary Objections (Nauru v. Australia), Judgment of 26 June 1992; Case 
Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment of 2 December 1963. 
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and old ideas coexist and debates are held. In particular, my aim is to track the 
slowness of changes in legal understanding and argumentation and how gradually 
through both external and internal developments new interpretations and 
conceptual frameworks emerge.  
1.2 Rights Language 
My research aims to trace the “emergence of rights language” in the League of 
Nations mandates system. Thus, I need to determine what exactly is the language 
that I am looking at and looking for. The lack of a fully-fledged modern rights 
language during my main period of research forces me to look at other concepts of 
rights language. Rights and rights language are complicated. It is used in 
numerous different ways to make claims, to criticize power, and so on.21 An 
additional problem is introduced by the fact that rights language was not in use in 
the League of Nations. An author writing in a period where even laymen tend to 
see legal matters through a lens of rights constantly faces the risk of anachronism 
when studying an era where rights language was not used to conceptualize legal 
issues. William Rappard’s perplexity in a text written in the 1940s is revealing. 
For the first time, he, a scholar who had devoted a great amount of his life to the 
mandates system, was asked what he thought of mandates in terms of human 
rights. “Asked by the editors of this volume to discuss the ‘protection of human 
rights in mandated territories under the League of Nations’, I must first define my 
subject. And that I can do only in the light of their intentions … .”22 He reminds 
the reader that he has not visited the United States for years and has not had 
access to American literature. Thus, he could not “assess the true significance of 
the protection of human rights as provided for in the United Nations Charter”.23 
The concept was new and he was not sure what to make of it in relation to the 
mandates. In order to study “rights” language, I have had to liberate myself from 
searching for an exact language of human rights. In the absence of a modern 
vocabulary of rights language, I have examined discussions on land tenure, the 
obligations that newly-independent territories would have, the eradication of 
slavery, the issues of forced labour, the position of women and the liberty of 
conscience as arenas of proto-rights language. In these debates, issues that are 
currently understood as rights issues were discussed under concepts like 
guarantees, liberties, obligations, social problems, matters, questions, and, albeit 
                                                      
21 Koskenniemi, ‘Foreword: History of Human Rights as Political Intervention in the 
Present’, xvi–xvii. 
22 Rappard, ‘Human Rights in Mandated Territories’, 118; Yet, Rappard stated in 1933 
that “Greater equality – that is, less discrimination on grounds of race, of sex, of religious 
and philosophical creed and of social position.”... “Guarantees for the protection of the 
fundamental rights of man” were ideals which our forefathers had already fought for. 
Rappard, ‘Nationalism and the League of Nations Today’, 721. 




rarely, rights.24 As historical discourses, the languages of rights and colonial 
paternalism are intertwined and show parallel tendencies. One of the main 
justifications of European empires was that of the protection of the weak, for 
instance women and children. The similarities of language are often striking, while 
the aims, starting points and contexts were different. Thus, I have decided to use 
an ambiguous and open-ended concept of human rights.25 However, if one wants 
to find a common denominator for the rights that I am looking at, it could be the 
relationship between individual and administration, the League of Nations 
bringing an international element into this relationship. I have not sought for 
mentions of “human rights” until after the Second World War, when human rights 
began to be projected into mandates. One of the results of this research is to show 
that in legal practice mandates only became part of the human rights phenomenon 
in 1971. 
 An open attitude towards the concept of human rights helps us find, not 
perhaps predecessors or antecedents, but reasons and developments for the 
language of human rights becoming so powerful in the last decades of the 20th 
century.26 
 The way one determines what one means by human rights has a significant 
outcome on the results of the historical enquiry.27 The idea of progressive 
development is an inherent part of universal and indivisible human rights. When 
those who think of human rights in terms of natural law, interpret the history of 
human rights as the history of rights consciousness, a narrative of linear 
development is naturally formed.28 Research in their history interferes with the 
purity of the evolutive narrative of human rights. A clear linear development is 
disturbed by documents and historic texts revealing the absence  of the idea of 
human rights.29 The other end of the spectrum is represented by Samuel Moyn, 
who has looked at human rights as a “powerful transnational ideal and 
movement”, to be invoked to transcend the authority of the state. Thus, rights 
within the state have no room in his historical approach.30 He centres his 
examination on the international rights movement and maintains that human 
                                                      
24 Carter Mills uses “prevention of abuses”. Carter Mills, ‘The Mandatory System’, 55; 
while Fenwick uses “prohibition of abuses”. Fenwick, International Law, 101. 
25 See, similarly, Halme-Tuomisaari and Slotte, ‘Revisiting the Origins of Human Rights: 
Introduction’, 22. See also Cmiel, ‘The Recent History of Human Rights’, 119. 
26 See also Karlsson and Lindkvist, who maintain that “a critical reading of the reasons of 
human rights politics and practice is meaningful only when a realistic historical study 
helps us understand how the heterogeneous human rights language can act as 
emancipatory” (translation by author). Karlsson and Lindkvist, ‘Triumf, Tröstpris Eller 
Öppen Praktik? De Mänskliga Rättigheternas Historia’, 99. 
27 Rappard, ‘Human Rights in Mandated Territories’, 118. 
28 Koskenniemi, ‘Foreword: History of Human Rights as Political Intervention in the 
Present’, ix. 
29 Gearty, ‘Afterword’, 381. 
30 Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 7. 
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rights were a phenomenon of the 1970s.31 In the following, I will explore this idea 
using Philip Alston’s schematic on the approaches to the history of human rights 
as a starting point.32  
 The standard way of narrating the history of human rights in many textbooks 
has been to lead the reader through certain landmark documents, usually starting 
from the British Bill of Rights, the American Declaration of Independence, the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen33 (and sometimes even 
going back as far as the Magna Carta of 121534) and then continuing, through 
some setbacks and denials in the 19th and early 20th centuries to the establishment 
of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. However, most textbooks do 
mention some other documents along the way.  
 Some authors include certain fields of international law in their historical 
narrative that they consider to be close to human rights, such as humanitarian law 
or diplomatic protection, while not at the same time recognizing them as full 
human rights.35 
 There is variation in what documents and events are placed in the human 
rights narrative, but in many of these accounts the League of Nations and the 
mandates system have played a part in telling the human rights story.36  
                                                      
31 Ibid., 7–8. 
32 Alston, ‘Does the Past Matter?’ 
33 Asbjørn Eide discusses Abraham Lincoln’s campaign to abolish slavery within the light 
of the economic and social rights of the 19th century. However, the “cradle of discourse on 
rights” according to him goes even further back, to the “British, French and American 
thinking in the seventeenth century.” Eide’s narrative is linear by nature: “The way in 
which these issues have been addressed has matured over time, from initial, idealistic 
assertions of vague principles to the adoption of the comprehensive, international 
normative system now in existence.” Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as 
Human Rights’, 25–28. Olivier De Schutter also points out that human rights “already 
had a long history” before emerging “as part of international law in 1945”. In this context 
he lists the constitutions of the late 18th century and 19th centuries. De Schutter, 
International Human Rights Law, 3-8. 
34 Rhona Smith looks further back in her historical introduction, namely to the Magna 
Carta of 1215: “the existence of a body of basic rights can be traced back to the early 
thirteenth century in Europe”. After that, she follows the standard narrative, noting the 
late 18th century documents to be “modern equivalents in human rights instruments” and 
(after a mention of diplomatic law, humanitarian law, law of aliens, slavery, minority 
rights, ILO conventions) places the “launch of contemporary human rights” in the 
UDHR. Smith, Textbook on International Human Rights, 5, 22. 
35 De Schutter, International Human Rights Law; Nowak, Introduction to the International 
Human Rights Regime. 
36 Christian Tomuschat mentions the 1815 declaration on the abolition of slave trade; 
freedom of conscience and religion and the slave trade; arms traffic and liquor traffic in 
Art. 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; the fair and humane condition of labour 
for men, women, and children in Art. 23 as “some minimum guarantees”; and the 
“deficient” petition system and the minorities system and the ILO. Tomuschat, Human 
Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, 16–17; Nowak sees the importance of mandates in two 




 Philip Alston has described three different approaches to research on the 
history of human rights.37 Firstly, there is the narrative of linear development. By 
this he means researchers that have aimed to show that there is a linear progress 
that has gradually progressed into present-day human rights. These narratives 
have as their standpoint an evolution which has culminated with perhaps a few 
setbacks38 in modern-day human rights. Many of these studies start as far back as 
ancient history, for instance ancient Rome or even the Bible. An example of this 
kind of narrative is Micheline Ishay’s The History of Human Rights: From Ancient 
Times to the Globalization Era (2004), in which she draws a linear narrative from 
“early ethical contributors”, such as the Babylonian laws, the Bible, early Hebrew 
laws and the Quran39 to the present, emphasizing the role of those outside the 
realms of power.40 She describes her view on human rights as “[h]uman rights are 
thus seen here as the result of a cumulative historical process that takes on a life of 
its own, sui generis, beyond the speeches and writings of progressive thinkers, 
beyond the documents and main events that compose a particular epoch … .One 
                                                                                                                                                          
mandates system a role in this context. In addition, “mandates treaties … lay down 
minimum rights for the people living in the territories under mandate. Some of these 
minimum rights, such as the prohibition of torture [sic], were not unlike human rights”. 
Nowak, Introduction to the International Human Rights Regime, 17–20. He claims that the 
supervision and petitions can be seen as the beginning of the individual complaints 
procedures in human rights instruments. Nowak’s approach is also adopted in some major 
international law text books. In the earlier versions of his textbook, Ian Brownlie places 
both the League minorities regime and the mandates regime under the rubric 
“international protection of human rights”, but does not elaborate on the reasons for his 
classification. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 1998. However, from the 
sixth edition onwards, he notes that  “[t]he appearance of human rights in the sphere of 
international law and organizations is often traced to the era of the League Covenant of 
1919, and the Minorities Treaties and League of Nations mandated areas which were 
associated with the Covenant…”. However, “neither the Mandates system nor the 
Minorities regimes were representative in character”. Brownlie, Principles of Public 
International Law, 2003, 530; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 635. 
Brownlie also mentions the establishment of the League of Nations as an “important 
change”, noting particularly Article 22 of the League Covenant and the freedom of 
religion and duty to report in mandates, and Article 23 on just treatment of the native 
population of the territories in question. Shaw, International Law, 271; Buergenthal, 
Shelton and Stewart also note Articles 22 and 23 of the League Covenant as provisions 
that “bear on the development of international human rights law”. Buergenthal, Shelton, 
and Stewart, International Human Rights in a Nutshell. Buerghental maintains that the 
mandates system consisted of “rudimentary normative and institutional processes for the 
protection of the indigenous populations of some former colonies”. However, they did not 
result “in a comprehensive body of law that could be denominated international human 
rights law”. Buergenthal, ‘The Evolving International Human Rights System’, 783.  
37 Alston, ‘Does the Past Matter?’ 
38 On setbacks, see Ishay, The History of Human Rights from Ancient Times to the Globalization 
Era, 4. 
39 Ibid., 18–61. 
40 Ibid., 2. 
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may thus think of the history of human rights as a journey guided by lampposts 
across ruins left behind by ravaging and insatiable storms”.41  
 Similarly, Paul Gordon Lauren, in The Evolution of Human Rights: Visions Seen 
(1998) approaches the history of human rights through “visions” of human rights 
advocates in different eras.42 He claims that such visions over the centuries and in 
different geographic locations, though having resulted in many visions of human 
rights rather than one, unified one,43 have led to “what is now described with 
confidence as a ‘universal culture of human rights’”.44 His path to mapping the 
visionaries starts by describing the issue of human responsibility in the major 
religions of the world as well as philosophers in places and times as distant as 
China twenty-four centuries ago, ancient Babylon, Sanskrit writings from India, 
and the tenth-century Middle East.45 
 A different approach was taken by what Alston has called precise timeframe 
theories. Precise timeframe theories include research that has placed an individual 
event or moment as the starting point of human rights. Such moments include the 
French and American Revolutions46 or the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. However, the abolitionist movement of the 19th century and the 
prohibition of the slave trade have also been mentioned in this context, as well as 
the period of decolonization in the 1960s.47  
 Lynn Hunt claims that the two 18th century declarations, the US Declaration 
of Independence of 1776 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen of 1789 were based on a claim of the self-evidence of human rights and 
that this claim was “crucial to the history of human rights”.48 Thus, her aim to 
prove the existence of human rights in the late 18th century means proving their 
self-evidence in that period. When searching for human rights, she finds that they 
have three essential qualities: they must be natural, equal and universal.49 They 
must also have political content in a human society.50 She asks why self-evidence 
crystallized as human rights in the late 18th century. Lynn Hunt acknowledges 
                                                      
41 Ibid., 2-3. 
42 An approach similar to Ishay’s and Lauren’s has been taken by Ove Bring. Bring, De 
Mänskliga Rättigheternas Väg. 
43 Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, 2. 
44 Ibid., 3. 
45 Ibid., 5; Moyn leaves Lauren’s and Ishay’s book outside his scope of “professionalized” 
human rights histories announcing them “ultimately an idealist and decontextualized 
exercise in teleological conceptual accumulation”. Moyn, ‘Substance, Scale, and Salience: 
The Recent Historiography of Human Rights’, 127.  
46 Lynn Hunt and others. 
47 Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law; Jensen, The 
Making of International Human Rights. The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global 
Values. 
48 Hunt, Inventing Human Rights, 19–20. 
49 Ibid., 20. 




that as the claim of self-evidence is largely based on Western history, emphasizing 
self-evidence as central to the history of human rights risks such history becoming 
the history of Western civilization.51 
 Jenny Martinez claims to offer an alternative to the “standard account” that 
begins from the Second World War. She asserts that the prohibition of the slave 
trade gave a basis for present-day human rights, but admits that these rights did 
not yet resemble each other very much. She makes a straightforward move from 
the humanitarianism of the 19th century to the present day. She notes that the anti-
slavery movement used the language of humanitarianism (or even human rights 
on some occasions). Yet, she does not find the connection problematic, as she 
believes that the language of human rights is based on the same 
humanitarianism.52  
 Martinez correctly notes the gap in the many historical accounts in which the 
history of human rights makes a leap from the late 18th century to the mid 20th 
century.53 According to Martinez, pieces are missing from between these periods, 
and only now researchers are starting to find them. In her view, the prohibition of 
slavery is one of the pieces that has been missing.54 Martinez has also aimed to 
show that the abolitionist movement was a human rights movement because its 
members use the term “rights”. Martinez has replied to the criticism that she has 
received on the terminology having a very different meaning in the 19th century 
than it has now,55 noting that there are so many different meanings of human 
rights even now that the criticism is not valid.56 
 Roland Burke’s study of the post-colonial movement shaping the evolution of 
human rights cannot be considered a book about the origins of human rights as 
such, since he is not interested in the initiating processes, but rather, in the “vital 
years and forgotten voices that have been missing from human rights 
historiography”.57 He argues that the process of decolonization was essential to the 
UN human rights agenda, with, however, complex results.58 According to him, 
“the politics of anticolonialism both advanced and obstructed the progress of 
international human rights”.59 Similarly, Stephen Jensen maintains that in the 
recent human rights histories the 1940s and the 1970s have become 
overemphasized. Rather, he claims that the period between these decades is 
particularly important for the study of the history of human rights. In Jensen’s 
view, research has forgotten the importance of a human rights agenda by 
                                                      
51 Ibid., 20. 
52 Martinez, The Slave Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law, 134–139. 
53 Ibid., 148–149. 
54 Ibid., 149. 
55 Alston, ‘Does the Past Matter?’, 2051. 
56 Martinez, ‘Human Rights and History’, 224. 
57 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 2. 
58 Ibid., 4. 
59 Ibid., 6. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
12 
countries and actors from the South, such as Jamaica, Ghana, the Philippines, 
Liberia, Costa Rica and Senegal. He maintains that these groups left legacies still 
prevalent in human rights politics, in mechanisms such as fact-finding missions, 
national human rights commissions, regional human rights mechanisms etc. 
Moreover, these actors redefined international human rights around racial 
discrimination and religious intolerance. Jensen believes that current research has 
focused too much on international legal standards and has thus blurred the view of 
a more nuanced and pluralist understanding of the history of human rights.60 
 Reza Afshari has criticized viewing single-issue movements as human rights 
movements, since these movements did not see themselves as such in their early 
stages.61 For instance, liberating slaves, working conditions and land matters were 
much more important than human rights thought. These discussions did not aim 
to expand to include equality and common human rights.62 Afshari gives examples 
of how single-issue movements during the interwar era blurred human rights 
violations elsewhere. Those encouraging the self determination of nations were not 
too enthusiastic about the legitimacy of the same demand when it was forwarded 
by minorities in their own countries. When the Japanese aimed to have the 
League of Nations accept the equality of all races, they had no intentions to 
improve the human rights of people in the countries they had conquered.63 Of 
course, the same argument could be said elsewhere: the European Convention of 
Human Rights was meant to secure nations and people against an outside threat, 
and the parties hardly imagined having to be called in front of the Court 
themselves. (For this reason, Moyn leaves the establishing of the European 
Convention outside his scope of the history of human rights.)64 
 The next wave of history of human rights research Alston calls the “new 
revisionists”. The new revisionists claim that no continuation exists between 
earlier events (mainly those prior to the Second World War) and the human rights 
thought of the past decades. This strand of research started with the publication of 
Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (2010). While Moyn has 
been the most prominent historian to represent this group, others, such as Robin 
Blackburn (The American Crucible, 2011) and Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (editor of 
Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, 2011) should be included.  
 Samuel Moyn also finds a similar divide in research on the history of human 
rights. He divides the research on the history of human rights into three groups. 
In the current human rights studies, he finds substantive history in which the 
contents and meanings of human rights norms are examined. The approach in 
these studies is usually national, meaning that the origin of the norm is sought in 
                                                      
60 Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights. 
61 Afshari, ‘On Historiography of Human Rights: Reflections on Paul Gordon Lauren’s 
The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen’, 65. 
62 Ibid., 66. 
63 Ibid., 42–43. 




national documents.65 Moyn notes that such research is mainly conducted by 
international lawyers and is the most common approach in human rights 
textbooks.66 The earliest versions of this kind of research is from the 1970s. Under 
this group he also includes a subgroup, among them Lauren and Ishay, which he 
calls the “teleological historians”. Moyn describes them as idealistic, their work 
being an “exercise in teleological conceptual accumulation”, and to whom the leap 
from national to global is only achieved by “hope and striving”.67 
 Moyn, even when criticizing Lynn Hunt for her reinterpretation of late 19th 
century revolutions as human rights, gives her credit for her move “beyond a 
substantive account of the accumulation for instrumentalized precedents” and 
towards a salient analysis, according to which human rights are about political and 
social transformations.68 Moyn also credits Hunt for establishing the field of 
research, but criticizes her for not taking scale into account. Likewise, he agrees 
that Martinez could be right in her claim that opposing the slave trade was the 
first occasion when people other than a country’s own nationals were protected by 
international law, but that this would count as protecting human rights does not 
pass the “scalar test”. Of the mandates system he notes that even though it is 
related to matters that were later conceptualized as human rights, “[t]o analyze a 
remote past in light of what frameworks later crystallized around its problems is to 
join bandwagons rather than to write history.”69 Moyn praises those who 
emphasize the meaning of the 1940s in the birth of human rights (e.g. Brian 
Simpson) in that they take scale into consideration. However, he claims that these 
studies have a problem of sidelining “popular reception and political impact”.70 
Moyn believes that all of these approaches have something to give to the research 
of the history of human rights. However, one approach in isolation from others is 
not sufficient.71 
 Even though there has been a shift towards salience in studying the history of 
human rights, Moyn writes that precisely this has made those studying the 1940s 
wonder whether some other approach than human rights could be more fruitful.72 
For instance, the documents that have been established within the framework of 
the United Nations do not mean that human rights would be “salient” within the 
                                                      
65 Moyn, ‘Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human Rights’, 
126. 
66 Ibid., 127. 
67 Ibid., 127–128. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 132. 
70 Ibid., 128. 
71 Ibid., 129. 
72 Ibid., 132. 
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United Nations or outside it.73 Similarly, he denies the meaning of human rights in 
decolonization.74 
 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman draws a familiar line from the late 18th century 
revolutions to the post World War II era, pointing out to the reader however its 
disappearance from political and legal discourse from the 19th century onwards.75 
He notes, however, that human rights gained their meaning as the language of 
global morality only in the last two decades of the 20th century.76 He also criticizes 
the triumphalism of the recent historiography of human rights that distort the 
subject of its research (e.g. slavery).77 
 Philip Alston finds shortcomings in all of the above approaches. Firstly, 
according to him, the main problem in linear narrative approaches is that they are 
lacking in causal analysis. The researchers move from one historic event to 
another one without analyzing the causal connections between them. They 
emphasize coherence and continuity and marginalize alternative ways of looking 
at matters. Their research turns all history into human rights history, because all 
events receive a meaning and interpretation in the context of the history of human 
rights. On the other hand, Alston finds precise timeframe approaches problematic 
in their faith in a pure, mythical starting point. He also maintains that the fact that 
there are so many competing theories on what the actual starting point is, is in 
itself a sign that this approach is not a very fruitful point of departure for research. 
Alston applauds the “new revisionists” for bringing fresh air into the history of 
human rights discussion by forcing the field to re-examine many premises that 
have been considered self evident, e.g. a certain triumphalism common to many 
studies. However, he thinks that the revisionists’ ideas are lacking in nuance and 
that they are too polemical and too narrow in sidelining many rights narratives. 
First of all, they do not take into consideration the long history of human rights in 
national constitutions. Secondly, he believes that their tendency to count as human 
rights only those rights that are above and outside the states is too narrow. 
Thirdly, he questions the fact that Moyn does not view the establishment of the 
European Convention of Human Rights as a relevant part of the history of human 
rights. Alston also lists other factors that Moyn has not taken into consideration, 
including individual lawyers, researchers and activists who have worked to 
promote human rights, the movement against racism, minority rights, the labour 
movement, the women’s rights movement, movements promoting children’s rights, 
and other single-issue movements.  
 One of the main questions in Alston’s critique is how human rights are 
defined. He notes that the representatives of these different approaches to human 
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74 Ibid., 133; Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 84-. 
75 Hoffmann, ‘Introduction. Genealogies of Human Rights’, 1. 
76 Ibid., 2. 




rights history partly talk about different things. Martinez, for instance, looks at 
the legal and institutional features of the human rights system and searches for 
commonalities in earlier times. Alston is also critical of Martinez’s way of 
emphasizing the historical uses of “human rights”. In her book Martinez often 
refers to human rights as the starting point of 19th century abolitionists. Was the 
term human right (or even right) used in the 19th century?  And if in individual 
cases it was (as Martinez claims), what was meant by the term at that time? 
Alston finds Martinez’s examples of the usage of “human rights” merely anecdotal. 
Moyn, on the other hand, requires that human rights and the human rights 
movement are defined by those global norms that are driven by supranational 
movements. He does not accept the meaning of human rights unless they have 
achieved a certain status and a global reach.78 
 Alston questions whether there is a need for a genealogy of human rights in 
general. Does it matter if the origins of human rights can be traced back for 
centuries or not? Jenny Martinez believes that genealogy does matter, because to 
her genealogy has a role in how we think about human rights. She believes that 
the events of the 19th century have a significant influence on how we discuss 
human rights today. She even believes that her findings could change how we 
think about the entire field of human rights, and its origins, limitations and 
possibilities. 79 However, Alston notes that Martinez mainly leaves the conclusions 
on how this would happen to the reader. According to Alston, Moyn is correct in 
claiming that historical research of human rights by lawyers has been superficial, 
but wrong in maintaining that there was no human rights movement before 1977. 
At the same time, Alston criticizes the revisionists for claiming that genealogy has 
no meaning. In his view, the way that one generation uses a given term gives a 
basis for how the term develops in the usages of future generations. Terminology 
in different periods relates to the ways in which it is used by the following 
generations. The next generation does not develop terminology in a vacuum. Even 
when terminologies change, they are part of the same historical process. Alston 
believes that the discussion that has been taking place on the origins of human 
rights is the result of researchers being able to see the polycentric nature of human 
rights. He thinks that one cannot look at human rights through a single lens 
without seeing a distorted picture. Anne Orford, writing on genealogy, points out 
that for a lawyer tracing a certain concept historically does not only mean that one 
is trying to figure out and explain the past, but that law is “inherently genealogical, 
depending as it does upon the movement of concepts, languages and norms across 
time and even space”.80 When using law, one will encounter norms that have been 
interpreted in the past, and therefore the past is visible in legal actions today. 
According to her, the difficulty is in finding the precedent that make the acts of 
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today more understandable. In this research this has been apparent in the 
different ways in which the ICJ has interpreted the mandates system in different 
cases. 
 Common to all Alston’s critique is terminology. He criticizes all history of 
human rights research approaches by claiming that the chosen terminology leads 
the research to a predetermined conclusion. Thus, the choice of terminology 
defines the end result. There is a certain relativism to Alston’s approach. He does 
not believe in grand narratives or the possibility of finding a “truth”. Alston’s 
critique that the definition chosen by Moyn limits the end result should be taken 
seriously. On the other hand, Alston himself gives so many different options that 
there is a danger that they are not very useful in trying to determine the actual 
content and field of the research. Alston’s view on the polycentricity of human 
rights means that there is an unlimited number of discourses, institutions, 
documents, etc. that one could see (or not see) as some kind of an antecedent to 
what we see as human rights now. Thus, we will end up not saying very much. At 
the same time, there is a danger that one cannot approach the question of 
genealogy at all, as dangers linger everywhere. Also, Alston is unable to hide his 
distaste for the polemical style of the revisionists, and resorts to simplifying their 
arguments.  
 In conclusion, it is true that researchers in the history of human rights spend 
too much energy in attempting to outwit each other. In contrast, my aim is to step 
back from such grand explanations in order to investigate the complexities of legal 
change. What is most interesting about human rights history research is finding 
meanings, connections and differences in small streams, rather than yearning for 
large, overarching explanations. Anne Orford has made a similar claim when 
describing her method when working on International Authority and the Responsibility 
to Protect (2011). Contrary to her initial aims, she decided to start with practices 
and then move on to systematize them and articulate them in broader terms. She 
claims (relying on Foucault) that “only by understanding the relations that existed 
within a language or a society that it was possible to understand all the 
modifications that had to take place in order for one of the elements to change”.81 
Instead of searching for universal truths, she calls her working method 
“description”, maintaining that the “work of description (or re-description) 
requires an attention to facts and values, where both are understood as historical 
creations rather than timeless givens”.82 In my thesis I shall describe language and 
discussions from both the interwar years as well as the post World War II period. 
These descriptions reveal both continuities and discontinuities. For example, 
important matters did happen in relation to the slave trade in the 19th century 
(particularly the abolition of the slave trade), but yet, in the 20th century the 
abolition of slavery was slowed down by very practical and mundane matters, for 
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example paying compensations to former slave owners. Moreover, if rights were 
discussed, the point of view taken was that of the slave owners, not the slaves 
themselves.  On the other hand, slavery was at least discussed and attitudes very 
slowly changed. Then again, the language that derives from the interwar years 
was used by the ICJ for two decades after the end of the Second World War. One 
could think that smaller-scale research on the history of human rights focusing on 
different details would tell us more about the past of human rights than attempts 
at large, all-embracing syntheses. 
1.3 Mandates and International Law 
The legal side of the mandates has remained of little interest.83 Antony Anghie has 
studied the development of international law through colonial history and the 
mandates. His central thesis is that the colonies had an important effect on the 
development of international law and particularly the notion of sovereignty, and 
that imperialism has affected the entire field of international law. International law 
emerged from the need to develop a legal system that would regulate the 
relationships between European states and non-European areas during the 
colonial period. He maintains that this relationship is repeated in the different 
phases of international law, including the mandates period and in the relations 
between the Western world and third world countries after the Second World 
War. Both the civilizing mission and imperialism are themes that are relevant to 
the entire history of international law.84  Implicit was the division between the 
civilized and the non-civilized, where the latter could be removed from the sphere 
of international law and admitted inside the sphere only by accepting the 
conditions set by the Europeans. Having said that, Anghie considers the mandates 
to be an important innovation in international law.85 The contradiction within the 
mandates was that their aim was to further self-government, but at the same time 
they created a structure that replicated colonial relationships.86 The mandates 
system, for one thing,  brought new technologies to colonial administration,87 
challenging 19th century positivist ideas about sovereignty and introducing new 
ways to approach questions of sovereignty.88 On the other hand, international 
                                                      
83 Most notably Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law; and 
Anghie, ‘Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, 
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institutions had the task of creating sovereignty in territories where it had not 
existed before89 and the civilizing mission aimed at moulding non-European 
territories according to European legal thought.90 Anghie suggests that the notion 
of “well-being and development” had mainly an economic meaning and that the 
aim was to develop the mandates furthermost economically, which of course was 
on many occasions in conflict with the aim to increase the welfare of the natives.91  
 The League of Nations mandates system is not usually mentioned in 
connection with human rights; it is dropped from the human rights narrative, or if 
considered, regarded as uninteresting.92 However, some efforts have been made in 
trying to bring features of the mandates system into the human rights success 
story. One group of such efforts is to place some issues relevant to the mandates 
system, such as the freedom of conscience and religion, prohibition of the slave 
trade, etc., into the human rights narrative, or the petitions system established a 
few years after the establishment of the mandates system. On the other hand, the 
mandates have also been seen as a step in the right towards self-determination. 
This has been done by the International Court of Justice in the case of Namibia in 
1971, and this has been confirmed by several commentaries on the case.  
 The existence of the mandates system did not fully end with the Second 
World War, as there were three major continuities. First, some of the mandated 
areas continued their existence as United Nations trusteeships, which meant that 
the relevant articles of the United Nations Charter reflected the human rights 
language prevalent in the UN. Second, through the International Court of Justice 
and the impact its cases regarding mandates had over the formation of 
international law, the mandates system was integrated into the discussion on 
international law. Criticism over the South West Africa cases was strong and to a 
large extent influenced the Court to change its rhetoric and its motivations in the 
Namibia judgment and its later practice. In the 1971 Namibia case, the ICJ finally 
began to discuss human rights. As the Court itself has later referred to the case on 
numerous occasions, its impact has grown. Third, immediately after the Second 
World War human rights lawyers began to give the mandates meanings that they 
did not have during their actual administration and started to discuss mandates 
and human rights in the same context.93  
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 Duncan Hall saw the safeguard clauses in the mandates as parallels to the 
human rights clauses of the United Nations Trusteeship system. “In both periods 
of resettlement [i.e. after both World Wars], guarantees of the protection of racial 
minorities and ‘human rights’ were required in the area of Central Europe and the 
Middle East. The human-rights clauses of the peace treaties in the second world 
settlement, and in all the trusteeship regimes set up under the United Nations, had 
their parallels in the minority treaties of 1919-23 and in the minority and other 
safeguard clauses in the League mandates.”94 Hall’s book on the mandates was 
published in 1948, when the UN trusteeship system with its references to human 
rights was already in place. 
 In 1943 the American political scientist and professor of international law, 
Quincy Wright, connected certain aspects of the mandates with human rights. In 
providing his version of the history of “individual rights”, Wright found “certain 
underprivileged classes” to receive new protection by international legislation. 
Here he mentions the abolition of slavery, and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 and 
the Berlin Act of 1885 extending certain rights to minorities in Turkey and to 
aborigines in central Africa respectively. After World War I, he found the 
mandates, minority treaties and international labour conventions to produce 
“extensive codes of rights of native peoples; of religious, cultural, and linguistic 
minorities; and of laborers”, however, “limited in most cases to particular areas.” 
Nevertheless, “The theory of these treaties goes beyond the right to States to 
protect their nationals abroad and approaches an international recognition of 
human rights.”95 
 Hersch Lauterpacht would concentrate his human rights efforts on the 
establishment of an International Bill of Rights of Man, which kept him occupied 
much of the immediate years after the Second World War.96 While he was 
pessimistic about humanitarianism in the League era, he would promote the right 
to petition by arguing that it was a natural right already during the League 
period.97 
 In a more recent account, Judge Cançado Trindade, in his separate opinion 
on the advisory opinion for the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, gives a lengthy account of his ideas on 
the humanitarianism of mandates (and their relation to the Kosovo 
administration). He saw the mandates system as emerging from “human 
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conscience” as a reaction to “abuses of the past”.98 In his view, case law of the 
PCIJ (which does not have anything to do with mandates as such) showed that 
the principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination existed before the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which then broadened such principles 
also to those who did not belong to a minority or who were not an inhabitant of a 
mandated territory. “Yet, the formulation of the principle in relation to those 
pioneering experiments under the League of Nations (the minorities and mandates 
systems, this latter followed by the trusteeship system under the United Nations), 
contributed to giving universal expression to equality and non-discrimination. Yet, 
the principle of equality and non-discrimination was already engraved in human 
conscience.”99  
 These lawyers were in part creating the language of human rights and gave 
new significance to old practices. In this context certain treaties were interpreted 
as human rights treaties, for example the convention on the prohibition of slavery 
and the treaty banning forced labour. Even though the actual administration of 
the mandates had little or nothing to do with human rights, the mandates system 
could be seen as a more humane regime in comparison to traditional colonial rule. 
The mandates system was the first international institution where certain demands 
of humanity and the welfare of the people were written down into the system and 
were evident in the international regulation and administration of the institution. 
There were established controls over how the mandatories would fulfil their 
obligations concerning the well-being of the population of the mandated areas. 
Yet, for the mandatories, the mandates system appeared to be only a little different 
from the previous colonial administration and to some extent the Mandates 
Commission shared this view. 
1.4 Colonies and the Language of Humanitarianism 
Colonial ideologies for most of the 19th century circled around economic theories 
of market and trade. Colonies were taken for strategic reasons as part of power 
politics and to settle inhabitants from areas where there was overpopulation. One 
of the most important motives for colonialism, however, was the expansion of 
trade. Thus, the language of colonialism during this period was also the language 
of economics.100 
 The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 was a turning point in the language and 
the expressed ideology of colonialism. The conference was initiated at a moment 
when Germany and other countries joined Britain and France as colonial nations. 
Therefore, new rules were needed to deal with the possible differences between 
the colonial powers and to regulate trade amongst them. 
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 In addition to dividing colonial spheres of influence, the question of the legal 
personality of natives was discussed at the conference. The participants aimed at 
creating rules to regulate the effective occupation of colonial territories and to 
decide whether native consent was required or even could be required. Thus, a 
great part of the conference dealt with the question of the native character, which 
in turn defined the nature of their legal personality. In essence, natives were given 
a legal personality to justify various actions that were useful to the colonial 
powers, including the possibility to enter into treaties with native chiefs.101  
 The Berlin Conference changed the colonial ideology by introducing the 
language of humanitarianism. Humanitarianism as an ideology was combined with 
the language of trade and economics. Colonial policies could be justified with the 
combination of these two ideologies, humanitarianism and economics, “moral and 
material wellbeing”. Trade became an essential part of the civilizing mission, as it 
was believed that economic growth was in the interest of the natives. At the same 
time, native welfare justified the development of a trade system based on 
European interests and the spread of trade into the entire African continent. Also 
the prohibition of slave trade was part of the increased emphasis on 
humanitarianism.102  
 The First World War changed the political situation in Europe. After the war 
the keeping of peace and a need for peaceful ways to resolve conflicts brought a 
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need for new international institutions.103 The League of Nations provided a 
solution for such a need.104 The First World War also changed attitudes towards 
colonialism. The war had weakened the sense of moral superiority that had been 
such an important part of 19th century colonialism. The Allies had justified the war 
by claiming that it had been fought for freedom and the Allied armies had 
included fighters from the colonies.105 However, anti-colonial movements were 
developing and there was also nationalist resistance in many colonies. US 
president Woodrow Wilson strongly argued for the self-determination of colonies. 
He, as well as the American public, were opposed to colonialism in general and 
more specifically to the idea that war would be fought in order to gain colonies.106 
Under the supervision of the League of Nations a new, more ethical colonial 
policy was emerging.107  
 The League of Nations also changed ideas on sovereignty. Firstly, as 
international law necessarily required the consent of states, it was easy for states 
to express their consent within the framework of an international organization. 
Secondly, while the League of Nations was generally dependent on the sovereign 
will of its members, in the mandates system it had a task to create sovereignty in 
new territories and define the preconditions thereof.108  
 Antony Anghie argues that international law was universalized by 
colonialism. For a long time, international law had been a European venture. 
Now, however, European international law was affecting the colonies as well and, 
as a consequence, necessarily changing its shape. One of the tasks of international 
law was to justify the continued existence of colonies.109  
 19th century lawyers started to emphasize positivism in their writings as a 
contrast to the naturalism of earlier centuries. Positivism left the non-European 
world entirely outside the realm of international law and from there they needed 
to win their acceptance back.110 According to Anghie, the positivists recreated the 
international legal system so that international law became the product of 
sovereign will. Simultaneously, international lawyers created a gap between 
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Europe and rest of the world, between the civilized and the non-civilized. They 
created a technique, rules, with which this gap could be narrowed by dictating the 
conditions under which the non-European world  could be in contact with 
Europe. To those who were believed to possess more civilization a network of 
conditions was created which would grant them a part in the international 
community. The less civilized had a system created for them that would bring 
them under the protection of Europe.111  
 International lawyers used the concept of society to overcome difficulties 
posed by the concept of sovereignty. The problem was that many entities existed 
that had the characteristics of sovereignty, but that the Europeans did not want to 
define as sovereign. This dilemma could be solved using the concept of society. A 
society could include those who accepted the principles of that society. Thus, 
international lawyers would create cultural characteristics that would help to 
define different groups and their relationship with the international community 
and international law.112 One important feature was territory, a criterion that 
would also be met by states that were not considered civilized. The criteria of 
society could be applied to such states. States outside Europe were not considered 
sovereign, as they were not part of the “family of nations”.113 Anghie has 
distinguished non-European sovereignty from the sovereignty of European states 
by maintaining that the latter type of sovereignty set limitations to how much one 
could intervene in the inner affairs of a state, whereas the latter type of 
sovereignty meant that European states dictated to non-European states the 
criteria they needed to fulfil in order to become truly sovereign. Thus, the 
condition for sovereignty was that European states intervened in the inner affairs 
of these states and defined them as they pleased. Thus, sovereignty was moulded 
by a European worldview114 and international law became a science that created 
specific criteria to make such distinctions.115  
 The uncivilized could be left outside the realm of international law. Different 
criteria were created for different groups, the civilized and the uncivilized, and the 
civilized could determine which practices of the uncivilized were acceptable and 
what the real needs of the uncivilized were.116 After the First World War, 
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positivist international law turned into pragmatism. Here, the American jurists 
played an important role. These lawyers criticized positivism by bringing political, 
social and economic questions into the sphere of international law. One of such 
lawyers was Manley Hudson, who studied these questions in the context of the 
mandates system and discussed the system from the perspective of the individual 
rights of the inhabitants of the mandates.117 
 The views of the pragmatists were apparent in the mandates system.118  
Anghie describes the differences between the 19th century ideas and the mandates 
system by maintaining that while 19th century colonialism aimed at conquering, 
the mandates system aimed at protecting the natives. The positivists tried to leave 
non-Europeans outside the realm of international law, while the mandates system 
aimed at integrating them within the system.119 However, as I will discuss later in 
this thesis, the distinction was not as large, as there were many similarities 
between the mandates system and 19th century thought, as Anghie also admits 
elsewhere.120 It was not easy for the victorious powers of World War I to 
relinquish the idea of annexing the former German colonies and Turkish 
territories. These territories were seen as spoils just as they had been for 
centuries.121 All colonial powers had interests in and plans for the territories, in 
both Africa and the Near East, and it required much persuading for them to give 
up these plans.122  
 The concept of “tutelage” and “trusteeship” had a long tradition in British 
colonial history.123 International law had recognized several methods through 
which non-Europeans had been brought under the control of colonial powers and 
to the realm of international law, including forceful colonizing by way of 
discovery, occupation, conquest or cession,124 and treaties between Europeans and 
native chiefs.125 Other methods included features similar to those in the mandates.   
Europeans had set a standard of civilization to determine how far a certain 
territory could be considered to be from European civilization. The rules that the 
Europeans would apply to these territories would depend on such 
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determination.126 Europeans could also make protectorate agreements in which the 
European states would take care of the interests of uncivilized states and protect 
them. Thus, the European states were able to control both the internal and 
external relationships of a state, while the latter formally had a native chief. For 
the Europeans, the protectorates had been a useful method of controlling non-
European states while being able to limit their own responsibility at the same 
time.127 Also, through the mandates system Europeans defined what the 
inhabitants of the mandated territories should be like in order to be integrated into 
the international community. Many believed that they could not be integrated at 
all. 
 One important concept for early 20th century lawyers was that of 
consciousness, which had developed within the field of psychology. The result of 
positivist thinking had been that because of sovereignty and the requirement of 
consent, the interior of a state was left without outside supervision. International 
law could react only to external affairs of states. International lawyers saw that 
access to the interior of a state would revolutionize the entire field. According to 
Anghie, the meaning of human rights can be seen here, as they brought access to 
the interior, the consciousness, of a sovereign state. Anghie believes that the 
mandates system also brought international law and international institutions 
access to the interior of the mandatory states during the interwar period.128  
1.5 Earlier Scholarship on the Mandates 
Considering the scope and influence of the institution, the League of Nations 
mandates system has received surprisingly little attention from scholars. On the 
legal side, the work of Antony Anghie remains the most notable exception, but the 
general historical developments of the mandates are still understudied. The first 
studies on the mandates were published when the mandates were still in existence 
or immediately afterwards.129 These works were mostly descriptive and focused on 
the history of events.  
 Quincy Wright’s thorough treatise on the mandates system was published in 
1930 when the mandates had been in existence for a decade.130 The book was well 
received at the time. William Rappard, who had a long experience on the 
mandates system, complimented that “this remarkable treatise … is bound to 
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remain the standard work on mandates for many years to come”.131 As an 
American scholar, Wright could distance himself from his topic. Though he 
presents to the reader the origin of the system and the organization of the League 
in relation to the mandates and the methods of mandatory administration and 
supervision, he dedicates most of his attention to the “law of the mandates system” 
and especially the question of sovereignty. He also, quite exceptionally for his 
time, looks at the “rights” relating to the mandates from the perspectives of the 
different parties, including the rights of the League,132 the rights of the 
mandatories,133 the rights of the mandated peoples,134 and the rights of third 
states.135 He maintained that due to their special status as not being under the 
sovereignty of any state but rather under the protection of the League, the people 
of the mandated territories enjoyed “rights under international law correlative to 
the duties imposed by the mandates upon the mandatories for their benefit”.136 He 
finishes his book by providing an array of scientific methods to measure progress 
in the mandates and native welfare.137 Wright, though one can consider him a 
humanitarian and a liberal, wrote as a representative of his generation. While he 
admitted that natives might have preferred to be left alone, he considered the 
possibility that their culture might entirely disappear “in continuous contact with 
the modern world” without expressing much regret.138  According to Wright, the 
most essential feature of the mandates system was the supervision it provided for: 
“Any one is a poor judge in his own case, and however it may try, a state has 
always found it difficult to visualize a subject people except from the standpoint of 
its own interests.”139 He endorsed the idea of the extension of the principles behind 
the mandates, namely trusteeship, administration in the interests of natives, 
tutelage, “cultivation of a capacity for self-government” and international 
supervision.140  
 Norman Bentwich, Attorney-General of Palestine, also published his lectures 
on the mandates system in 1930.141 He refers to his work as descriptive, due to his 
official position in one of the mandates. Thus, he refrains from discussing any 
controversial issues. However, he fails to hide certain liberal ideals in his book. 
His idea of the dual mandate is somewhat different from Lord Lugard’s.142 Instead 
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of referring to the (economic) benefits of the mandate to both the mandatories and 
the inhabitants of the territories, Bentwich speaks of a double trust on behalf of 
both the inhabitants and international society.143 The mandatory has an obligation 
and a responsibility, but no right as regards the mandated territories.144 According 
to Bentwich, the mandates changed the idea of sovereignty by the “definite 
purpose of preparing peoples under guardianship for self-government in the one 
case, and of carrying out, in the other case, a trust for the well-being of the 
inhabitants.”145  
 Duncan Hall studied the trusteeship system “as a phenomenon of the 
international frontier in relation to the working of the state system and the balance 
of power”.146 Hall did not see the mandates as a product of humanitarianism, 
which he said played only a minor role, but as “by-products of the working of the 
state system of the world, of the political relations of the powers, and thus factors 
in the balance of power”. 147 Hall continued that concentrating on the African 
mandates showed the mandates system too much as a humanitarian phenomenon 
and omitted the importance of the former Turkish territories.148 Hall used the 
concept of the “International Frontier” to explain the birth of the mandates and 
the trust. He explained it through the shifts in empires, their territories, colonies, 
state rivalry, spheres of interest and the balance of power.149 He described how the 
mandates are located in the frontiers of zones where the great powers make claims 
for territories.150  
 In International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study, 
Ramendra Chowdhuri studied the League of Nations mandates system and the 
United Nations trusteeship system from a comparative perspective.151 He 
described the two systems from their birth to their actors, theories on sovereignty, 
and certain practical questions. He also dealt with the different forms of the 
development in the territories, discussing e.g. slavery, the position of women and 
forced labour under the topic “social development”.152 He only briefly referred to 
human rights in the trusteeships under the context of social advancement, but did 
not discuss what their meaning could be or how a mention of human rights would 
make trusteeships different from mandates. He did, however, mention the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and racial discrimination. However, he 
concluded that social and psychological conditions are so complex that the only 
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means to affect such discrimination is education and understanding.153 One of his 
central points is that the idea of a “trust” is constantly changing.154 He compared 
the starting point of both systems and saw them as parallel. Both were established 
after the war in a world where humanitarian ideas were in contradiction with 
practical realities, which would lead to compromises. In both cases, the welfare of 
non-self governing peoples was an important concern of the international 
community. According to Chowdhuri, “both systems rest on the foundation of 
enlightened self-interest”.155 Both systems, moreover, were an innovation when 
one compares them to what had existed before and found the voluntary basis of 
both systems important. He draws a historical line with an aim to clarify how the 
changes in international trusteeship have occurred.156 He saw international 
accountability as the cornerstone of the trusteeship system. He noted that though 
there is no enforcement mechanism, the meaning of the public opinion was 
essential to the mandates. Thus, international accountability was for him the 
cornerstone of the mandates system.157 He was concerned with the fact that no 
time limit was set in the trusteeships for the self-determination of the trusts. In his 
view, the inhabitants would have needed such a limit in order to be motivated to 
realize the changes and development required from them. Of the trusteeships he 
believed that they had led to the political, economic, social and civilizational 
development of the peoples, but that the end result depended on the sincerity of all 
parties.158  
 The resurgence of interest in the history of international law and empire has 
led to some new historical studies on the Mandates system. Michael Callahan’s 
two-volume history of the mandates was published in 1999 and 2004.159 It was the 
first comprehensive research on the mandates system to appear after the 
decolonization period. However, Callahan has concentrated in his research on the 
African mandates and studied the mandates in the context of interwar colonial 
policies. He argues that the mandates system represented internationalization and 
changes in colonialism. According to him, the mandates changed the ideology of 
colonialism and had economic, political and cultural effects on both Europe and 
the inhabitants of the mandates. The mandates system not only reflected changes 
but created them as well. Some of these changes were unintended, but the system 
also aimed at solving problems relating to the traditional colonial idea of bringing 
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European institutions to Africa, the exploitation of African raw materials and the 
abuse of inhabitants.160 
 Susan Pedersen’s The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire 
(2015)  is the latest addition to the literature on the mandates. Susan Pedersen 
describes how the mandates system affected the imperialistic system in ways that 
its establishers could never have anticipated, by giving a voice to those different 
groups that had not had such a voice before. In the end, many started to question 
the position of the colonial system.161 What was new in the mandates was the 
machinery, international diplomacy, publicity and “talk”, i.e. the public opinion 
that increasingly reacted to the publicity of the various deliberations at the League 
of Nations. At the least, the mandatory states were forced to say that they were 
governing the territories in a different manner than before. The mandates were 
part of a process of internationalization through the League of Nations, and the 
system worked within the tensions between the demands of the old imperialists 
and the demands of self-determination that came from the outside. Pedersen 
describes the “role of the League of Nations as an agent of geopolitical 
transformation”. She argues that instead of being a failure, the mandates system 
and the League of Nations should be seen as more multifaceted and varied than 
before by examining how the different actors and objectives met, i.e. how imperial 
powers, the officers and rules of the League and local actors interacted. For 
Pedersen, the crucial change was the entry of Germany into the League, which 
gave the work of the mandates system a new dynamic. Realizing that it could have 
the old colonies back, Germany took to seeing that the promises of the 
establishing phase were fulfilled. Finally, Pedersen explains how the difficult years 
of the 30s, including the economic crisis and the withdrawal of Germany from the 
League affected the functioning of the mandates.162  
 The histories written on the mandates system are general histories aiming to 
describe or explain the mandates system on a general level, while Anghie has 
studied the position of the mandates in international law in general. In my 
research I am studying the mandates system as a case study,163 focusing on rights 
issues in the mandates system that have not been explored previously. Because the 
scale of the lacunae in scholarship, this study is limited to one issue, the use of 
rights language in the interwar era and beyond. Many issues are left for further 
research, such as the other activities of the League of Nations, the study of the 
minority questions more broadly (especially the petitions system), the various 
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committees of the League (particularly on slavery and women’s issues) and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). As I will show in the section on 
women’s issues (3.5), discussions similar to those held at the League of Nations 
would continue in the United Nations era as well. On the other hand, the Slavery 
Commission and the Permanent Mandates Commission had members in common, 
and thus it is likely that questions regarding slaves would be discussed in a similar 




 2. The League of Nations and the Establishment of the Mandates 
System 
2.1 Establishing the Mandates 
2.1.1 Drafting the Mandates System 
The purpose of this section is to explore the drafting process of the mandates 
system before, during and after the negotiations of the Versailles Peace Treaty and 
the League of Nations Covenant. The central issue was the consolidation of 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the principle of self-determination and the 
continuation of the practices of colonialism. The framers grappled with what was 
to be done with the former colonies of the Central Powers. Due to Wilson’s ideals, 
annexation was out of the question, but at the same time the territories were not 
considered ready for independence. The formulation of the mandates system was a 
contentious process in which the plans were changed numerous times. Central 
figures in this were Wilson and Jan Smuts, who sought to seek a balance between 
liberal ideals and vocal demands for annexation. While the narrative of the 
mandate negotiations has been told by eyewitnesses like David Hunter Miller and 
most recently by the historian Susan Pedersen, this section seeks to follow the 
formation of the legal principles of self-determination and petition within the 
process. Though the principle of non-annexation was based on humanitarian 
ideals as well as socialist policies advocated by the British Labour Party and 
discussed in the February 1918 inter-Allied Labour and Socialist Conference, the 
result was a legal document interpreted by international lawyers.1 
 In Britain, imperialism as such was not frowned upon. Quite the contrary, 
Britain wanted to become a moral leader in colonial policies and it was widely 
believed that the mandatory system replicated the British colonial ideal. The 
British had seen themselves as the protectors of natives from the misdeeds of bad 
colonial masters, such as Portugal and France. It was the task of the British to 
help small nations and their inhabitants.2 Initially Britain was the only country to 
support Wilson’s ideas, acting as an intermediary between the Americans and the 
rest.3 However, Michael Callahan has argued that the British gave the impression 
of supporting Wilson, while at the same time they did not believe that the idea of 
mandates would apply to colonies in British hands.4 Yet, as the American historian 
Susan Pedersen has described, Britain easily accepted a third element (liberal 
internationalism) to add to its dual attitude towards its colonies, imperial 
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humanitarianism and imperial expansionism.5 British Prime Minister Lloyd 
George and Lord Robert Cecil believed that the mandates would set the standard 
for the colonies everywhere, British standards instead of those of France and 
Portugal, for example. The British Colonial Secretary, Viscount Alfred Milner, on 
the other hand, saw the mandates as a mechanism for the universalization of 
British norms and practices.6  
 France was initially strongly opposed to the idea of mandates and 
internationalism and would have been glad to see the whole idea fail.7 Georges 
Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, was obsessed with the idea of punishing 
Germany. The French wanted to see the former German colonies in new hands 
and were reluctant to accept the idea of external control. 8 In the Near East France 
had high hopes of gaining Syria and preferably also Palestine as French colonies.9 
Particularly important was also the question of African soldiers. France wanted to 
use soldiers from its African colonies, but this would have been prohibited in the 
mandates. The question of soldiers became decisive to French acceptance of the 
mandates system, as she was promised that the terms of the mandates did not 
prevent her from using African armies to defend the mandated territories.10 
 Popular opinion had turned against new colonies by the end of the war.11 
President Wilson strongly supported the principle of non-annexation. In the UK 
and in France, however, there was a strong internal division on the reaction to the 
fate of the former Turkish and German colonies. In both countries, the labour and 
socialist parties (in Britain also the liberals) supported international supervision, 
whereas in Britain there was strong criticism from the conservatives towards the 
new plans and in France Prime Minister Clemenceau and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Pichon supported direct annexation. An Inter-Allied Labour and Socialist 
Conference was held in London in February 1918, which proposed for  “all 
German and Turkish colonies a system of international supervision which would 
respect ‘national sovereignty’ but at the same time safeguard the interests of the 
indigenous inhabitants and preserve the open door”.12 British premier Lloyd 
George supported the principle of national self-determination with the 
understanding that “‘the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an 
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administration acceptable to themselves’”.13 The Dominions, South Africa, New 
Zealand and Australia, on the other hand, believed in the right to annex the 
neighbouring German territories for themselves.14 As Lloyd George explained in 
Paris in 1919, the people in the Dominions were behind their governments on the 
mandate question: “These gentlemen were not enamoured with the system.”15 In 
Britain many, including Lloyd George, however believed that the empire was 
already large enough.16 
 The different participants of the Paris Peace Conference had varied ideas on 
the fate of the territories that had been proposed as mandates and how they were 
to be administered.17 At the peace negotiations “discussions … were heated and 
violent”, as Miller reported from the drafting meetings.18 
 The United States and the United Kingdom agreed on the necessity of non-
annexation of the territories, though there were differences in the implementation 
of this idea.19 The United States believed that it was time to end the colonial era 
and saw itself as a leader in this change. Also in Britain the idea of outright 
annexation was mainly rejected.20 Therefore of all mandatory nations it was easiest 
for the British to reconcile their ideas with the Americans.21 The British policy, at 
least officially, was that it did not want more colonies, British policy makers 
realizing that it had nothing to gain from new colonies economically or politically. 
Thus Britain supported the US in the plans to find a new solution for the 
mandated territories. When promoting his plans, Wilson emphasized that the 
interest and benefit of the people living in the territories would have equal weight 
to the government claims. He also wanted the Turkish territories to have an 
“absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”22  
 The British Dominions, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, had 
several reasons for their demands of annexation of the German colonies. Firstly, 
there was the need of compensation for the cost and losses to the Dominions in 
World War I: “The Dominions entered into this war … because the Empire, of 
which they were a part, was fighting for a great cause – fighting for its honour – 
for humanity – for civilisation, in order to keep faith with its Allies, and to defend 
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the smaller nations.”23 Secondly, there were security considerations and thirdly, in 
the Dominions’ view annexation would also have been in the interests of natives.24 
New Zealand Prime Minister William Massey maintained that direct annexation 
would speed up the development of the territories and would thus be better for all 
concerned. Annexation would also in his view help spread the principles of 
Christianity, “necessary for the welfare of all nations”.25 Australian Prime Minister 
William Hughes noted that like his colleagues from New Zealand and South 
Africa they were in favour of direct control, “‘annexation’, to put it bluntly, as 
Massey noted”.26 
 Of the demands for annexation, Wilson was adamant that “the world would 
not accept such action”. “Principles of non-annexation and international 
accountability, consent of the governed in the Turkish dependencies” must prevail 
over the “recognition of the occupying Powers as Mandatories and allocation of 
the Mandates by the Allied and Associated Powers instead of the League of 
Nations.”27 
 For Britain it took some time to persuade the Dominions. In the end, the 
Dominions were prepared to accept the mandates as a compromise. They strongly 
demanded the three different classes of mandates, which were later to become the 
A, B and C mandates. British Prime Minister Lloyd George maintained that the 
system to be applied to “countries where the population was civilized but not yet 
organized” needed to be different from those that were to be applied to “cannibal 
colonies, where people were eating each other”.28 The Dominions were not alone 
in their demands for annexation, as the Japanese also demanded annexation.29 
The French, for their part, wanted to annex Togoland and the Cameroons “to 
ensure the effective protection and development of the natives ‘towards a higher 
plane of civilization’”.30 
 There were differing views on how the administration of the mandates would 
be arranged.31 Initially, Wilson supported supervision and control by the League. 
Again, he met fierce opposition from the Dominions. Both Hughes of Australia 
and Smuts of South Africa claimed that international administration would lead to 
“confusion”.32 “The inhabitants of the territory are either confused or if they are 
sufficiently developed, make use of these differences by playing one set of nations 
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off against the other”, as Smuts put it.33 In this matter Wilson could not expect 
support from the United Kingdom. Lloyd George noted that there was an 
agreement that there would be no indirect administration for the former colonies. 
Faced with such arguments direct international control was rejected and the 
principle of single Mandatory administration “on behalf of the League” was 
included in the Covenant. Also Germany had demanded international 
administration.34 
 The creation of the mandates system may be credited to two very different 
characters, US president Woodrow Wilson and South African general Jan Smuts. 
Both were very conflicted personalities, possessing at the same time great idealism 
and a tendency to support policies that were later denounced as racist. Wilson’s 
well-known programme of fourteen points called for the reorganization of world 
order, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts was first entered as part of the 
agreement of armistice and then to the peace conference. Though Wilson’s initial 
policy had been to keep the US out of war and to concentrate on domestic 
matters, he changed policy after the German submarine warfare had caused 
popular outrage. Before election as president, Wilson was a lawyer who had a 
long career in both academia, especially in Princeton, and in politics as the 
Democratic governor of New Jersey. A progressive politician, Wilson’s interest in 
statesmanship was both academic and practical. Despite his reputation as an 
idealist with regard to international relations, critics had remarked that in practice 
Wilson disregarded his principles such as the idea of national self-determination 
by enforcing military US interests in South America. His record on race is 
similarly mixed, because he supported segregation and saw US slavery through a 
paternalistic idealism.35 Wilson’s influence in the peace process, though crucial, 
suffered from his deteriorating health and a lack of domestic support.36 The 
support for Wilson was due to the Americans’ unwillingness to wage a war for 
imperialistic aims. Wilson’s promise was to give peace without the establishment 
of new colonies and to reform European imperialism.37 The United States, 
however, failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty due to domestic concerns.38  
 The second central character in the establishment of the mandates system was 
Jan Smuts. Smuts had at that point a long career behind him in South Africa, 
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where he had been born to an Afrikaner family. Originally a lawyer educated in 
Cambridge, Smuts had returned to South Africa as conflicts between the Boers 
and the British were rising. He participated in the Boer War as a field commander 
and went into politics after the war, becoming an advocate for the Boers and a 
unified South Africa. During the World War, Smuts had commanded the troops 
that conquered the German South West African colony, the current Namibia. He 
went on to join the British war effort in Europe and to command troops in the 
war, surfacing after the war as one of the key figures in the establishment of the 
League of Nations. Smuts supported a strong Commonwealth of Nations that 
would balance the interests of great and smaller powers on the world stage. 
Smuts’s position at Versailles was a delicate one, he was a representative of the 
British Dominions, who had insisted in the face of opposition from British 
politicians that they would be present in the negotiations as equals. Smuts wrote a 
memorandum on the League that was read by Wilson, who was enthusiastic about 
the idealistic vision. Smuts had proposed the League as the solution to the national 
problem and formulated the outline of the mandates system, which was equally 
taken on by Wilson.39 Like Wilson, Smuts had a far less idealistic side in domestic 
politics, where he was a supporter of segregation and the dominance of Afrikaners 
in South African politics.40 Perhaps as a consequence of Smuts’s personal 
involvement and the impact it had in South Africa, Smuts did not think that the 
mandates system should be universal. For example, the policy of non-annexation 
did not apply to German colonies, according to Smuts.41 Thus the position of the 
German South-West African colony, conquered by South Africa, was not at all 
clear.  
 During the drafting period Britain was led by Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd 
George, who was known for his progressive ideas, such as the welfare system. 
During the process Lloyd George sought to moderate nationalist views of 
participants. He accepted the idea of a mandates system in principle, but was also 
willing to consent to the demands of the Dominions.42 As the British noticed that 
Wilson was not planning to give in, they turned to their second plan, where the 
mandates would be divided into three groups. The first group contained those 
mandates that needed only assistance, the second group those where the 
mandatories would have sovereign rights, and the third group would take into 
account the annexationist demands of the Dominions. Lloyd George saw the role 
of the League of Nations to be relevant only if the mandatories misused their 
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power. Wilson, however, thought that this was not enough. The compromise was 
found by a British draft that would give the League more power on the mandates 
according to Wilson’s wishes.43  
 The idea of an internationalized regime for the German and Turkish colonies 
was presented in different contexts in the years 1917-1918, when it had become 
clear that the war would be won by the Allied powers. Different proposals were 
drafted for the post-war eventualities, but much depended on the outcomes of the 
peace negotiations.  
 The founding of the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference were 
closely intertwined, as the Covenant of the League and consequently the 
Covenant’s Article 22 concerning the mandates were drafted during the Paris 
Conference. The conference took place in 1919-1920 at Versailles and thirty-two 
states participated in the negotiations.44 The Paris Conference was initially a 
meeting to set the terms for the peace treaty with the Central Powers but grew 
into a massive reorganization of the global order where the mandates system was 
but a small part. 
 A draft covenant of the League and its earlier article 19 on the mandates was 
approved by the Supreme Council of the Allied powers in February 1919, only a 
month after the beginning of the peace conference. Its contents had already been 
agreed upon by the Council of Ten, the representatives of the main Allied powers, 
in January 30, 1919. The article concerning the mandates received its final form 
now as Article 22 of the League Covenant on April 25th, 1919.45  
 The first drafts of the League Covenant, the Draft Convention of Lord 
Phillimore’s Committee to the British Government (March 2, 1918), Colonel 
House’s draft to President Wilson (July 16, 1918) and Wilson’s own first draft 
(late summer 1918) did not contain any mentions of mandates. However, 
according to the notes of geographer Isaiah Bowman, Wilson had on December 
10, 1918 explained the idea of declaring Germany’s former colonies the “common 
property of the League of Nations and administered by small nations”.46 
 The first League Covenant draft to refer to the mandates was articles 2-9 of 
the Smuts plan of December 16, 1918. According to Smuts, the fundamental 
principles that will guide in the establishment of the League were “no annexations, 
and the self-determination of nations”.47 More concretely, he recommended to the 
“peoples and territories formerly belonging to Russia, Austria and Turkey … no 
annexation of any of these territories to any of the victorious Powers, and 
secondly, that in the future government of these territories and peoples the rule of 
self-determination, or the consent of the governed to their form of government, 
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shall be fairly and reasonably applied”.48 This idea was realized only partially, as in 
the end the mandates did not extend to Russian and Austrian former territories. 
Instead, German colonies in Africa and the Pacific were only added in a later plan 
by Wilson. Of these, Smuts had famously written “the German colonies in the 
Pacific and Africa are inhabited by barbarians, who not only cannot possibly 
govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of 
political self-determination in the European sense”.49 Even later, when such 
colonies would become mandates, South Africa would never accept that the 
principle of non-annexation applied to them as well, which led to an ongoing 
conflict with the League and later the United Nations on the last mandate to 
become independent, South West Africa. On the other hand, Smuts was inspired 
by President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,50 to suggest the disposal of the former 
German colonies. Clause 4 recommended that “authority, control, or 
administration”, unless the peoples had their own self-determined authority, “shall 
be the exclusive function of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and 
exercised by or on behalf of it”.51 If the League were to delegate its authority, 
control or administration to another State as its “agent or mandatary”, such an 
“agent or mandatary”, if possible “shall be nominated or approved by the 
autonomous people or territory”.52 Smuts assumed that in most cases the 
mandatory would be chosen by the people “on historic grounds”, determined by 
“old ties of acquaintance or friendship”.53 However, where an autonomous regime 
was not yet possible (he mentioned Palestine and Armenia as examples), the 
League should nevertheless try to find out the wishes of the people and select a 
mandatory accordingly.54 “The mandatary State should look upon its position as a 
great trust and honour, not as an office of profit or a position of private advantage 
for it or its nationals.”55 According to Smuts’s plan, there would be separate Acts 
or Charters, in which the details of the mandates would be stipulated and which 
would vary in the different territories. “The delegation of certain powers to the 
mandatary State must not, however, be looked upon as in any way impairing the 
ultimate authority and control of the League… ”56   
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 The so-called Cecil Plan of January 14, 1919 by Lord Robert Cecil, head of 
the League of Nations section of the British delegation and president of the 
League of Nations Union, did not pick up on Smuts’s suggestion.57 However, 
Wilson in his second draft (January 10, 1919, also sometimes called Wilson’s First 
Paris Draft) did. He added a supplementary agreement to his draft, which 
included also the former colonies of Germany that Smuts had not included in his 
plan. Wilson also added the possibility of substituting one mandatory for another. 
Wilson still included the former territories of Austria-Hungary in his plan. 
According to him, “the League of Nations shall be regarded as the residuary 
trustee with sovereign right of ultimate disposal or of continued administration in 
accordance with certain fundamental principles hereinafter set forth”. The 
principles mentioned were no annexation, that self-determination or the consent of 
the governed to their form of government shall be “fairly and reasonably” applied, 
and that the administration and economic development shall be “based primarily 
upon the well-considered interests of the people themselves”.58 The clause on the 
League’s authority and separate agreements remained as Smuts had drafted them. 
The article also included a reference to the “open door” policy59 for League 
members. 
 Cecil made a new draft on January 19, 1919 after which Wilson prepared a 
Third Draft on January 20, 1919, after having received comments from the 
American delegation. The first parts of the Article on mandates were similar to 
Wilson’s earlier draft, but he added more detail to the special agreements noting 
that they would be drafted by the Executive Council. He also added a paragraph 
on the distribution of expenses, and another lengthy one where he clearly stated 
his commitment to the principle of self-determination:  
 
The object of all such tutelary oversight and administration on the part of 
the League of Nations shall be to build up in as short a time as possible out 
of the people or territory under its guardianship a political unit which can 
take charge of its own affairs, determine its own connection, and choose its 
own policies. The League may at any time release such a people or 
territory from tutelage and consent to its being set up as an independent 
unit. It shall also be the right and privilege of any people or territory to 
petition the League to take such action, and upon such petition being made 
it shall be the duty of the League to take the petition under full and 
friendly consideration with a view to determining the best interests of the 
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people or territory in question in view of all the circumstances of their 
situation and development.60 
 
Jan Smuts drafted a resolution with a three-level division of what he now called 
mandates, including the future A mandates, i.e. “certain communities formerly 
belonging to the Turkish Empire” [he included also Armenia and Kurdestan], 
those Central African peoples that would become inhabitants of the B mandates, 
and the territories that “can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory 
states as integral portions thereof”, later the C mandates.61 
 The same ideas as were in the Smuts’s resolution also found their way into a 
British draft resolution from January 24, 1919. However, the British draft 
resolution spoke of “‘assisted states’ which in consequence of the late war are to 
attain their independence, [and] shall be entitled to such assistance as they may 
desire for the purpose of securing peace, order and good government for the 
population of those states…” and “‘vested territories’ which in consequence of the 
late war are to be transferred to any states [and] shall be held by such states upon 
trust to afford to their inhabitants peace, order and good government”.62 The 
description of the vested territories included a list of prohibited practices, 
including slavery and forced labour. Likewise, the vested territories and assisted 
states would include freedom of conscience as well as a mention of equal economic 
opportunities and an open door policy for all League members. The British draft 
also included clearer ideas on sovereignty, as the final articles on mandates would. 
In the case of vested territories, “the States placed in charge thereof shall 
discharge all duties and responsibilities and be invested with all powers and rights 
of a sovereign government, but they shall report annually to the League of 
Nations on all matters relating to the discharge of their obligations under this 
convention”. As regards assisted states, the assisting states only had the “powers, 
rights, duties, and responsibilities as shall be given to them by any agreements 
with the Assisted States …”.63 The Council of Ten prepared a resolution on 
January 30, 1919, which was based on a resolution drafted by Smuts.64 This 
resolution would resemble to a large extent the final version of the mandates. 
 The mentions of the right to appeal and the special acts with which each 
mandate would be separately defined and that had existed in Smuts’s original plan 
and Wilson’s drafts did not find their way into the resolution of the Council of Ten 
or the final Article 22.65 On the other hand, the Council of Ten resolution included 
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introductory paragraphs on the reasons for the mandates, which were omitted 
from the final version.66 
 Wilson prepared a fourth draft on February 2, 1919,67 where two paragraphs 
were added to the Council of Ten resolution. One authorized the League to issue 
mandates and hear petitions and the other stated as the object of mandates to 
“build up in as short a time as possible out of the people or territory under its 
guardianship a political unit which can take charge of its own affairs, determine its 
own connections, and choose its own policies”.68  
 The mandates article took its final form during the meetings of the 
Commission of the League of Nations, starting on February 3, 1919, in Paris. The 
draft upon which the Commission worked was not Wilson’s but the Hurst-Miller 
draft by the legal advisers of the British and American delegations.69 As the Hurst-
Miller draft was very brief, Smuts introduced a draft based on the resolution of 
the Council of Ten from January 30.  
 The early plans of Article 22 included a right to petition (or appeal, as it was 
worded in Wilson’s and Smuts’s plans), as existed in British colonies. For 
instance, Wilson’s second Paris draft stated that “[the Executive Council], which 
shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental unit the right 
to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of any breach of the mandate 
by the mandatory State or agency or for the substitution of some other State or 
agency, as mandatory”.70 Wilson’s third Paris draft still included the right to 
petition. However, in this draft a different wording was used. The proposed right 
was to petition to the League to release the territory from its mandatory, and to 
grant it a status as an independent unit.71 The question of whether the consent of 
the governed peoples was required to set up an administration was also omitted 
from the final version of Article 22.72 
 The mandates consisted of the former Turkish territories and German 
colonies. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations does not mention 
which of the territories were included in this distinction nor who was to become 
responsible for their administration. The details were later to be described in 
individual treaties for each of the mandates. The German and Turkish colonies 
were initially handed over to the Allied powers. The Supreme Council of the 
Allied powers selected the mandatory powers.73 
 The territories that were to be added to the mandates system varied 
throughout the plans. Smuts did not include the former German African and 
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Pacific colonies in the mandates.74 However, David Hunter Miller, a legal adviser 
to the American delegation to the League commission, states in his account of the 
League Covenant drafting negotiations that all agreed in the necessity of Germany 
losing its colonies.75  
 Of the former Turkish territories, Armenia was initially to be included in the 
mandates. It was believed that Armenia needed internationalized administration 
for the protection of the Armenians. The mandates system would have saved the 
Armenians “from a brutal fate”. As Lloyd George put it, “somebody had to be 
there to protect the Armenians, and to keep the tribes and sects in Lebanon from 
cutting each other’s throats”.76 These were direct references to the horrific events 
during the war, when hundreds of thousands of ethnic Armenians died from mass 
killings, starvation and forced marches in the so-called Armenian genocide.77  
 In the end, the result was the division of mandates into three classes. The A 
mandates were comprised of territories that had been part of the Turkish Empire. 
These communities were recognized provisionally as independent nations, though 
only Iraq78 gained actual independence during the existence of the mandates. The 
three other A mandates were Transjordan79 and Palestine,80 administered by 
Britain, and the joint mandate of Syria81 and Lebanon, administered by France. 
The B mandates were all situated in Central Africa, and comprised Togoland 
(British and French), the Cameroons (British and French), Ruanda-Urundi 
(Belgium) and Tanganyika (Britain). Here the inhabitants were seen to be at such 
“a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the 
territory”. The C mandates were a compromise between annexation and non-
annexation.82 The C mandates included South- West Africa and the Pacific islands 
of Nauru, New Guinea and Samoa (administered by the Dominions) and the 
Islands under Japanese mandate, the South Sea Islands (Islands north of the 
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equator, including the modern-day Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, Federated 
States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands). These mandates were to be 
administered “under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its 
territory”.83 
 In conclusion, the drafting process of the mandates system was a convoluted 
negotiation during the Paris Peace Conference. The mandates were born as a side 
product of the meeting of Wilsonian internationalism and colonial practices. The 
underlining question was what to do with the former colonies of the Central 
Powers, which were transferred to the victorious powers. Having ruled out 
annexation during the war, the administration of the former colonies was a 
practical problem that needed to be solved. The central characters were Wilson 
and Smuts, who oversaw that the details of the system were hammered out in 
numerous drafts. The victorious Allied powers were by no means unanimous in 
their opinions, some favouring annexation and only through lengthy negotiations 
would they accede to the plan. An internationalized system of governance was set 
up, three different categories of mandated areas were determined based mostly on 
levels of development and civilization as understood by the Allied powers and a 
system of oversight was established. That Wilson’s idea of international 
governance would produce something like the mandates system was a result of 
political expediency as British popular opinion was soundly against enlarging the 
empire, making it possible for the plan to come to fruition. While the Council of 
Ten may not have been primarily motivated by liberal idealism, the mandates 
system offered a practical solution to a practical problem that was politically 
acceptable. 
2.1.2. The Concept of “Mandate” 
Where did the ideas behind the mandates come from and how was the system of 
mandates constructed? Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant defined the 
rights and duties of mandatories as well as the guarantees and safeguards granted 
to the inhabitants of the mandated areas. In the following I shall examine Article 
22 and the separate mandate agreements that formed the legal framework of the 
mandates system. These contained various prohibitions and guidelines that varied 
from one type of mandate to another. What is especially interesting is how the 
texts sought to safeguard different freedoms, such as freedom of religion, as well 
as in certain cases in the A mandates even used the language of rights. 
 The text of Article 22 was deeply imbued with humanitarian ideals as well as 
paternalistic attitudes towards the less developed. The humanitarian ideals behind 
the League of Nations mandates system had a long history in Western thought. 
Early commentators referred to the precedents of the concept of trusteeship and 
moral obligations towards the colonies in different instances like Spanish 
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scholastic thought or British humanitarianism in the nineteenth century.84 While 
by the late 19th century, “humanitarian ideas were already in vogue”,85 part of the 
sense of urgency came from the so-called scramble for Africa and the ill effects of 
colonial expansion. In addition to governments, there were groups of private 
European actors in Africa who expected to benefit from the lack of rules and 
supervision. As a result, common international rules were needed for Africa, and 
these were on the agenda of the series of conferences between 1885 and 1912 that 
established the international accord between the colonial powers.86 The League 
itself described the mandates system as being based on ideas that had been 
developing for some time “in the minds of idealists, statesmen and experts in 
colonial matters and international law”.87 These ideas had led to the above-
mentioned international conventions, which thus indicated some of the principles 
of the mandates system in embryo.88 The mandates system was in another way 
similar to the international settlement for the scramble for Africa in that it resolved 
the issue of equal division of colonies among the victorious Allied powers.89 
 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations stipulates the basic 
principles of the mandates system:  
 
To those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late 
war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly 
governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand 
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there 
should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of 
such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the 
performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.  
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that 
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by 
reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, 
can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and 
that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of 
the League.  
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of 
development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its 
economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 
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Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire 
have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as 
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. 
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage 
that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the 
territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and 
religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the 
prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor 
traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military 
and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police 
purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal 
opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League. 
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the 
South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, 
or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilisation, or 
their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other 
circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory 
as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above 
mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. 
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the 
Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its 
charge. 
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised 
by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of 
the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. 
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and 
examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council 
on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates. 
 
The paragraph on the A mandates provisionally recognized the communities as 
independent nations and required “administrative advice and assistance by a 
Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone”. The paragraphs on B 
and C mandates contain more precise “guarantees” or “safeguards” for the 
inhabitants: freedom of conscience and religion (subject to maintenance of public 
order and morals), prohibition of the slave trade, arms traffic and liquor traffic 
and limitations on the use of mandates for military purposes. Robert Cecil noted 
that the safeguards were those that “the enlightened public opinion demands”.90 
The paragraph also includes equal opportunities for trade and commerce for other 
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League members. It has no provision regarding the authority which was to 
nominate the Mandatories. They were nominated by the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers (France, Italy, Japan, UK, USA), based on Article 119, where 
Germany renounced her rights over her overseas possessions to the Allied 
powers.91  
 Furthermore, the details of each mandate were written in separate 
agreements.92 However, Article 22 set down the general aim of the system, being 
the well-being and development of the mandated peoples and the means to achieve 
it through the tutelage of these peoples by “advanced nations”. This tutelage was 
compared to civil law principles: the mandated peoples were regarded as minors 
and their “guardians”, meaning “the advanced nations”, needed to keep a 
disinterested attitude and were not to exploit “minors” for their own profit.93 
According to the League of Nations, the phrase “peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves” meant that the idea was that the mandates were not to be indefinite.94 
 The separate agreements with which the details of all mandates were outlined 
had originally been intended to become part of the Versailles Treaty. However, by 
the time the Versailles Treaty was signed, there were still disagreements 
preventing the concrete drafting of the agreements.95 The drafting began by a 
commission representing the Principal Allied and Associated Powers led by Lord 
Milner. Japan resented the drafts of the C mandates on the basis of 
discrimination. It would have wanted the open door policy to be included in the C 
mandates. France’s objections relating to the B mandates were about France’s 
insistence on recruiting natives for military service.96 The A mandates were 
postponed for a lengthier time due to disagreements on the position of Jews in 
Palestine and especially Americans’ insistence on taking care of their interests in 
the A mandates now that they did not have a mandate of their own. 
 The C drafts were approved on December 17, 1920.97 The C mandates 
comprised seven articles. The first article describes the territory to which the 
mandate applies, the second article the powers (“full power of administration and 
legislation over the territory subject to the present mandate as an integral portion 
of [the mandate]”) and duties (“shall promote to the utmost the material and 
moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory subject 
to the present mandate”) of the mandatory. Articles 3-5 described in more detail 
prohibitions of abuses of the inhabitants of the territory: prohibition of the slave 
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trade and forced labour, control of traffic in arms, control of spirits, limitations to 
military training, and a clause on religious freedom. Article 6 stipulated the duty to 
report to the League Council and Article 7 the subsequent modifications and 
dispute settlement.98 
 The standard agreement for the B mandates was rather similar to the C 
mandates, albeit with more detail. These agreements had a more detailed 
description of the geographical boundaries of the territories. There was one 
general article on the duties of the mandatory: the mandatory “…shall be 
responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and shall 
undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the 
social progress of its inhabitants”. There were also several more detailed duties 
concerning slavery, the slave trade, forced labour, arms traffic and liquor sale, 
taking native customs into consideration in land issues, and freedom of 
conscience.99 The greatest difference to C mandates was a lengthy article on the 
open door policy and the fact that international conventions were applicable to the 
mandated territories. On administration, the agreements declared that “[t]he 
Mandatory shall have full powers of administration and legislation in the area 
subject to the mandate: this area shall be administered in accordance with the laws 
of the Mandatory as an integral part of his territory and subject to the preceding 
provisions”. The mandatory could apply its own laws to the territory “subject to 
modification required by local conditions”. The provision also granted the 
possibility of forming “a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with 
the adjacent possessions under his own sovereignty or control”. Here, however, 
the British mandate of Tanganyika differed from the others, completely leaving 
out other mentions of administration and only providing the possibility of a union 
with bordering territories.100 The final articles concerned the duty to report to the 
League, the requirements for modification and dispute settlement. These were 
similar to the C mandates.  
 The A mandates differed from the B and C mandates in the sense that they 
took more into consideration the local features of the territory, whereas the B and 
C mandates were almost similar (with a few exceptions) to all relevant territories. 
The A mandates were also much more complex. For example, the mandate 
agreement for Palestine comprised 28 articles, many of which were specific to the 
area and its conditions. Nearly half of the articles dealt with issues of religion and 
the relationships between religious communities. Articles 1 and 2 dealt with 
administration, declaring that the mandatory has full powers of legislation and 
administration that must however both secure the establishment of the Jewish 
national home and “safeguard the religious rights of all the inhabitants of 
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Palestine, irrespective of race and religion”. Article 3 encouraged local autonomy. 
Article 4 noted the necessity of establishing a Jewish agency as the representative 
of the Jewish populations and named “The Zionist Organization” as such an 
agency.101 Article 5 prohibited the cessions or lease of any Palestine territory to 
foreign governments. Article 6 was about the facilitation of Jewish immigration, 
Article 7 about nationality laws and Palestinian citizenship for Jews, Article 8 
about the non-applicability of Ottoman era privileges and immunities of 
foreigners. Article 9 granted a judicial system with complete guarantee of rights 
for everyone, as well as respect for personal status and religious interests. Article 
10 dealt with the applicability of extradition treaties. Article 11 concerned the 
administration’s duties in safeguarding the interests of the community, control of 
natural resources, public works, services and utilities and the introduction of a 
land system, Article 12 the task of the mandatory to control the foreign relations of 
Palestine. Articles 13 to 16 dealt with religious issues, and the mandatory’s duty to 
safeguard the access to holy places and religious sites and ensure free exercise of 
worship. The mandatory was also given the task to study and determine “the 
rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims 
relating to the different religious communities in Palestine”. The mandatory’s task 
was to ensure complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of 
worship and to ensure that there was no discrimination between inhabitants of 
Palestine on the grounds of race, religion or language. Article 17 was concerned 
with the forces for the preservation of peace and order and Article 18 with non-
discrimination against nationals of League member states (open door). Article 19 
dealt with adherence to international conventions, Article 20 with disease 
prevention and combat and Article 21 with the enactment of a law of antiquities. 
Article 22 settled as the official languages English, Arabic and Hebrew, and 
Article 23 recognized holy days. Article 25 provided for the possibility of 
postponing or withholding provisions of the mandate to “the territories lying 
between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine” (Transjordan). 
Articles 24 and 26-28 concerned annual reports, dispute settlement, and the 
modification and termination of mandates. 
 For the mandate of Syria and Lebanon, the mandate agreement started with a 
duty to frame an “organic law” for the territory in agreement with the native 
authorities and taking into account the “rights, interests, and wishes of all the 
population inhabiting the said territory”. Article 2 dealt with maintaining the 
mandatory’s troops for defence in the territory, perhaps in reference to the 
continuing presence of French troops in the area since the end of the war. Article 
3 was about the mandatory’s control of foreign relations and diplomatic and 
consular protection. Article 4 prohibited lease or secession of the territory. Article 
5 concerned the non-applicability of Ottoman capitulations and Article 6 the 
establishment of a judicial system to ensure natives and foreigners a complete 
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guarantee of their rights and respect for personal status and religious interests. 
Article 7 was about extradition treaties and Article 8 on freedom of conscience (in 
common with Palestine). Article 9 granted immunity of “Councils of management” 
and religious communities and Article 10 limited the mandatory’s supervision of 
religious communities to maintenance of public order and good government. 
Article 11 concerned the open door policy (similar to Palestine, but longer and 
more detailed). Article 12 dealt with international agreements, Article 13 disease 
combat, and Article 14 antiquity laws. Article 15 dealt with reimbursement of all 
expenses by local government in organizing administration. Article 16 declared 
the official languages to be French and Arabic, Articles 17-20 dealt with the duty 
to make an annual report, modification of the mandate, termination of the 
mandate and dispute settlement. Syria did not have a constitution until 1929. In 
May 1930 separate organic laws came into force for the different provinces in 
Syria.  
 Due to Iraqi resentment of the mandate regime, the mandate of Iraq was not 
established with a mandate agreement, but with a treaty between Great Britain 
and Iraq, concluded between the British Government and King Faisal in October 
1922.102 A Syrian General Congress meeting which at the same time proclaimed 
Syria an independent state had named King Faisal the King of Syria in 1920. As 
Faisal refused to accept France as the mandatory of Syria, he was expelled from 
Syria and would re-emerge in Iraq, to be crowned the King of Iraq with the 
support of the British.103 The language of the treaty would provide “advice and 
assistance” from the British, but national sovereignty would remain within Iraq.104 
In Iraq, the treaty was accepted by a Constituent Assembly. 
 In addition to the treaty with Great Britain, the Iraqi Constituent Assembly 
approved the Organic Law of Iraq, containing the Constitution and Electoral Law 
of Iraq. The Organic Law begins by stating that “Iraq is a sovereign State 
independent and free”. Part I of the Organic Law comprises the “Rights of 
People”, “in accordance with the established traditions of the written 
Constitutions of Europe and Oriental peoples, the fundamental rights of the 
people”, as Norman Bentwich, then the attorney-general of Palestine described.105 
Such “rights of man” he continues, “are embodied in generalizations modified by 
some legal restriction”.106 Such rights include e.g. personal freedom of all 
inhabitants, access to the Courts, right to ownership, prohibition of forced labour, 
freedom of expression and assembly, freedom of belief and freedom to practise 
forms of worship, and equal rights. These were naturally subject to limitations set 
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by laws or caused by threat to public safety, order or morality.107 The treaty 
between Britain and Iraq was to be a temporary one, but its renewal was set aside 
as the plans for Iraq’s independence started to move forward.108 
 The individual mandates were accepted by the League of Nations Council as 
resolutions December 17, 1920.109 The question of the legal nature of the separate 
mandates agreements has remained controversial.110 The nature of the instruments 
was discussed in the case concerning South West Africa, as it had relevance as 
regards the position and the legal status of the applicants of the case.111 The 
International Court of Justice concluded that the mandates had taken the form of 
a treaty. The Court, while acknowledging the fact that the mandates were 
accepted as resolutions, emphasized the novelty of the instrument. The Court 
called the agreements “special type[s] of instrument[s] composite in nature and 
instituting a novel regime.” According to the Court, the mandates had a different 
type of character than merely an executive action. This was in the Court’s view 
apparent in the preamble of the mandates.112 The Court saw the mandates as 
consisting firstly of a tentative agreement on the terms of the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers to be proposed to the League Council and secondly of a 
confirmation agreement on the terms defined by Council and agreed between the 
Council and the mandatory. The Court saw no legal significance in the language 
of the instruments, i.e., in the term “declaration”.113  
 However, in their dissenting opinion, judges Spender and Fitzmaurice were 
not ready to accept the view of the majority of the judges. The two judges 
contested the treaty making capacity of the League of Nations at the time. 
Moreover, they reminded that there had been initial plans to make the mandates 
in the form of a treaty, but such plans had not been followed. As conclusion, they 
stated that “the Mandate, in its final form, was the act of an organ of an 
international organization in active exercise of power conferred on it by its 
constitution.”114 Moreover, there was the question of who would have been the 
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parties to the mandate treaties, if the agreements were seen as such?115 Judge 
Bustamante had already in the 1950 advisory opinion on South West Africa 
maintained that the parties were the inhabitants of the mandated territories and 
the mandatory. Yet, the inhabitants had no role in establishing the mandates, thus 
it would have been far-fetched to see them as active parties to a treaty. Even less 
than the League of Nations, they did not have such a legal personality as would 
have been needed for them to become party to an international treaty. Spender 
and Fitzmaurice studied the possibility of the Allied Powers and the individual 
members of the League as possible treaty parties, but concluded that most likely 
the treaty would have been concluded between the League of Nations and the 
mandatories. Here they returned to the problem of the lack of legal personality of 
the League.116 As the League did not in their view possess sufficient powers to 
conclude treaties, the acts could only be seen as quasi-legislative acts of the 
League Council.117 As their starting point the judges noted that it was not 
necessary for the instrument to be a treaty in order for it to give rise to 
international obligations.118 Throughout the existence of the mandates, the 
existence of such obligations was never contested by any of the parties. As a legal 
issue the question arose only as part of the pleadings on South West Africa in the 
ICJ. Thus, even if the questions of the legal status of the individual mandates 
remains unsolved, this had little effect in the actual working of the mandates.  
 That the mandates came to be called “mandates” was in and by itself a result 
of a considerable search for a suitable word to describe the system of guardianship 
that was established.119 The Roman law institution of mandatum gave its name to 
the system but its contents were established by Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, as well as separate agreements between the League of Nations 
and the mandatories. The League itself saw the mandates as the embodiment of 
humanitarian ideals, but the agreements were contracts drafted by lawyers which 
instituted a series of obligations and safeguards to protect the mandates and their 
inhabitants. Like in the civil law system of guardianship, the aim of the mandates 
was to be of benefit to the mandated areas. While the system was constructed as a 
guardianship of the advanced nations over those unable to stand by themselves, 
the language of rights through which Article 22 and the agreements were written, 
was intended to underline the differences between the mandates system and the 
old colonial regimes and to ensure that the mandates remained separate from the 
colonies.  
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2.1.3. The Problem of Sovereignty 
The issue of sovereignty was one of the most central problems of international law 
with regard to the mandates. But what was the position of the mandates? Were 
they under the sovereignty of the League of Nations, the mandatory, or where 
they something in between? In the following we shall explore the evolution of use 
from contemporaries like Lauterpacht to the post-war observers. While 
Lauterpacht begins with the origins of the mandates in the Roman law tradition, 
for him the central characteristic was its transitional nature. Others debated 
whether the mandatory relationship was that of guardianship, tutelage or trust: 
Who had the final say in naming the mandatory and who determined when the 
mandates would begin and end? 
 There were several interpretations by different lawyers on who had 
sovereignty over the mandates. The principal alternatives presented were that 
sovereignty over the areas was vested on 1. the League of Nations, 2. the 
victorious Allied powers, 3. that there existed a shared sovereignty between the 
mandatories and the League, 4. that sovereignty had reverted to the inhabitants of 
the area due to the abolition of colonies, or 5. that the issue of sovereignty was 
unresolved and remained so due to the co-operation of the League and the 
mandatories.120  
 Hersch Lauterpacht had a long interest in the mandates starting from the 
very early years of the system.121 He wrote a thesis on the topic in 1922, which was 
submitted to the University of Vienna. He continued researching the mandates in 
his later works and referred to them in his post World War II writings on human 
rights. Lauterpacht’s stance on colonialism was twofold. On the one hand, he was 
an admirer of the British colonial tradition, which applauded itself for the 
abolition of the slave trade, for treaties protecting natives and for taking into 
consideration the welfare of natives.122 For Lauterpacht a liberal tradition had 
developed in the 19th century and humanitarian sentiments towards natives were 
an essential part of it.123 On the other hand, the First World War formed an 
exception to this tradition that he was still eager to find.124 He also disagreed with 
the “ruthless economic exploitation of native peoples”, prominent in European 
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colonialism in general.125 For him, the mandates provided a welcome exception, a 
new way to handle the problems relating to colonialism.  
 Lauterpacht noted that the mandates were a concept of Roman law that was 
accepted by all systems of private law, and were now raised to a position of an 
institution in international law.126 Thus, Article 22 formulated the mandate as a 
positive creation of international law.127 According to Lauterpacht, the position of 
mandates in international law was that the mandatory was the administrator and 
exercised all sovereign rights. However, the mandates were not a part of the 
territory of the mandatory and the inhabitants had their own nationalities.128 Also 
the word “tutelage” as the purpose of the mandate meant that the League of 
Nations had certain sovereign power in the mandated areas. He noticed a gap 
between Article 119 in the Versailles Treaty129 and Article 22 of the League 
Covenant. However, he found that Article 22 Part 2 revealed that the sovereignty 
was within the League of Nations, and had it not been clear, at the latest the 
limitations in Parts 4-6, including for instance the abolishment of slave trade, 
revealed the location of sovereignty.130 There were certain shortcomings in the 
sovereignty of the League of Nations. For instance, France and Britain denied 
that the League of Nations could appoint the mandatory, whereas Germany 
believed it to be the only possibility.131 However, Lauterpacht found that the 
sovereignty to be vested in the League of Nations did not require that the 
mandatory be assigned by the League. To prove that the mandatories did not 
possess sovereignty in the mandates, it was sufficient that limitations existed for 
the mandatories. The right of the mandatories to act in regard to the mandates was 
limited in three ways: the sovereignty of the League of Nations, as provided by 
Article 22, the nature of the mandates, and the individual provisions of the same 
article. Lauterpacht did accept that the League of Nations not choosing the 
mandatory were “certainly more than aesthetic shortcomings in the Mandates 
system”. Yet, he did not see this as decisive.132 Firstly, the mandates had a 
transitory character, especially the A mandates. Secondly, the obligations of the 
mandatory were a sign of a new policy of colonization. Thirdly, every League 
member could actively intervene if the mandatory power did not comply with its 
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obligations; and fourthly, the mandatories had an obligation to submit reports and 
the League of Nations had a right to control the mandates or the actions of the 
mandatories.133 Finally, there was a clause concerning the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, which Lauterpacht interpreted as meaning that every 
member of the League of Nations could take an issue to the Court concerning 
non-compliance with any conditions of the mandate.134 The mandatories were not 
the mandator, the entity in whose name the mandates were governed.135 
Lauterpacht also emphasized that on a general and a principal level, the C 
mandates did not differ from the A and B mandates. The purpose of the mandates 
was to act as an opposite to annexation, even in the weakened form of the C 
mandates.136 
 Another influential early observer, Walther Schücking, a German Professor 
of International Law and later Judge at the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, saw that the mandates were administrated in the name of the League of 
Nations so that the League of Nations had the sovereignty and the mandatories 
were its organs. This was in balance with the well-being and development of the 
natives, as stated in the first part of Article 22. For him Article 22 was the first 
time when the well-being of peoples was settled on a more general level. Earlier 
instruments, for instance those limiting the slave trade, had been specialized. The 
issues of the mandates could not be domestic but they did have to do with the 
rights and duties of the League of Nations, as the League guaranteed the well-
being and the development of peoples. Schücking’s insistence on the sovereignty 
of the League of Nations may be a consequence of his liberal pacifist and socialist 
tendencies,137 but it also fitted the German view of keeping its former colonies 
under the League of Nations and out of the hands of the Allied powers.138 
Schücking had been a member of the German delegation at the Paris Peace 
Conference.139 Schücking’s and Hans Wehberg’s commentary on the League 
Covenant, Die Satzung des Völkerbundes, was widely read and Schücking would also 
become well received outside of Germany.140 What he called the 
“Kulturgemeinschaft” (cultural community) could only be taken care of if the 
colonies were administered by the League. As the sovereign, the League of 
Nations could get rid of one mandatory and exchange it for another. This was also 
reinforced also by the fact that only members of the League of Nations could be 
mandatories. If other countries could be mandatories, it would be a lot more 
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difficult for the League of Nations to use its sovereign powers on them. Another 
reason why it was essential that the mandatories could be gotten rid of if necessary 
was that one day they would be gone when the mandates would become 
independent.141 Like Lauterpacht, he also noted the discrepancy between Articles 
119 of the Versailles Treaty and Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, but 
concluded that Article 22 evidenced with absolute certainty that the transfer of the 
German colonies should only be temporary, and thus the meaning was that the 
mandates would be under the sovereignty of the victorious states only up to the 
time when the League of Nations would start taking care of them and name the 
mandatories.142  
 French commentators showed a more reserved approach towards the 
mandates system, tending to see it as a continuation of the colonial system and the 
commercial interests of the mandatories. The Polish Professor of Law Julien 
Makowski found two legal relationships, one between the mandatory and the 
inhabitants of the territory and the other between the League of Nations and the 
mandatory.143 Also he saw the position of the mandatory as a guardian and the 
mandates as a guardianship.144 The first relationship, between the mandatory and 
the individuals, was of protection and guardianship.  The second relationship was 
about the legal status of the mandates and their sovereignty. The winners of the 
First World War had obtained the German and Turkish territories and the 
mandates were self-set limitations to their sovereignty.145 According to Makowski, 
the League of Nations had a duty to protect indigenous populations, but it did not 
possess a legal title to care for the relationship between the mandatory and the 
mandated territory.146 The mandatory powers held the mandated territories by 
right of conquest or by virtue of assignments, not by delegation of the League of 
Nations.147 Also, should the League of Nations be dissolved, the territory would 
remain under the sovereignty of the mandatory.148  
 For French authors it was difficult to believe that the British held mandates 
solely for humanitarian purposes.  André Blondel was particularly suspicious of 
the independence of Iraq, reminding others that the British still had wide rights 
regarding the territory.  He noted that the independence of Iraq was a precedent 
to the other territories as well and might hasten the release of the other territories, 
such as mandated Syria. Of course, a precedent also set certain rules for the 
procedure, conditions and guarantees, but at the same time he seemed to believe 
that for Britain this was but one step in its old colonial policies, “another branch of 
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the Imperial Road”.149 Also, there was a risk of emerging nationalism, which 
independence could bring to the fore. 
 The Comte de Moncharville, Professor of Law at the University of 
Strasbourg, reminded people of the diligence of France’s reporting to the League 
of Nations. He talked about work done against slavery, labour conditions, 
vaccinations, freedom of religion, getting rid of polygamy, and promoting 
education. He noted that there were several possibilities for arranging the 
sovereignty of the territories, but did not specify which was the one he believed to 
be the most credible one.150  
 Albert Millot also saw the British as extending their policies to the mandates 
rather than taking care of their mission. He claimed that the use of Syrian 
mandates for the French was extending the “the glory of France”. It was 
expensive for the state but good for commerce. There was much talk and many 
fancy ideas but in essence he saw the mandates as an extension of colonialism. The 
mandates were at the same time political, legal and economic, the last being the 
reason why the French wanted them. Mandates continued the practice of colonial 
governance allowing colonizers to continue with their traditions.151  
 Quincy Wright, the American political scientist and international lawyer, 
refused to take a stance on the location of sovereignty: “It is not certain that 
complete sovereignty rests anywhere”, he maintained soon after the establishment 
of the mandates. In Mandates under the League of Nations (1930) he introduced the 
reader to the different theories of sovereignty in the mandated territories. 
Sovereignty could be vested in the Principle Allied and Associated Powers, in the 
mandatories themselves, the mandated communities or the League of Nations. 
Each of these forms of sovereignty could be supported by various authors and 
actors within the mandates system. Wright also pointed to the various political 
and sentimental reasons why the different actors thought as they do. Lawyers, 
however, had neglected to state precisely their theory on “the concept of 
sovereignty” and “the sources of law applicable”.152 Therefore, he concludes that 
there is not enough consensus amongst jurists to determine the source of 
sovereignty or the method to interpret it. Thus, “most of the jurists agree that the 
essential characteristic of the system is the assurance, through gratuitous activity 
of a mandatory acting under supervision of the League, of certain defined rights in 
the territories.”153 According to Wright, the source of sovereignty was not as such 
a relevant issue in the mandates. What mattered was that the territories gained 
certain advantages through a joint effort by the mandatory and the League.  
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 Similarly, Norman Bentwich, the Attorney-General of Palestine, looked at 
the question of sovereignty more from the point of view of the outcome of the 
mandates system. Bentwich compared the theories of sovereignty with the 
“dominant thesis” of non-annexation. This meant, according to him, that 
sovereignty could not be possessed by the mandatories. He saw the entire concept 
of sovereignty modified by “the recognition of a new creation of political science 
and a new relationship in International Law”.154 The mandated territories were 
governed on behalf of the League with two purposes, depending on the territory. 
According to him, the first purpose was to prepare the peoples for self-
government, the other a trust for the well-being of the inhabitants.155 
 The British barrister James C. Hales did not believe that any individual body 
could have sovereignty over the territories. He also agreed that the mandatories 
only had the right to exercise the powers of sovereignty, but sovereignty was not 
vested in them. He also noted the treaty restrictions on the rights to exercise this 
sovereignty and the condition that when the territory was able to stand by itself, 
the exercise of sovereignty by the mandatories would end. The League of Nations 
acted as a trustee for the territories which restricted the exercise of sovereignty as 
well. However, the League was not the holder of sovereignty as such, as no one 
was, but only acted as a trustee.156  
 In a later article written in the final years of the mandates, Hales clarified his 
position on sovereignty and instead of vesting it in no one, he wrote of a combined 
sovereignty of the League of Nations and the mandatories. The administrators, 
according to him, were merely trustees, whose duty was to carry out the task until 
it was ended. Thus, he emphasized the temporary nature of the mandates, 
reminding people however that in the case of the C mandates it was not as likely 
that the mandates would end at some point when compared to the other 
mandates.157 The legal title to the mandatory powers came from two different 
sources. It was conferred both by the Principle Allied and Associated Powers and 
by the League of Nations.158 The obligations to the mandatory powers were 
binding, as they were granted in treaties that had been entered into between the 
mandatories and the League. With these treaties the League (the trustee) 
delegated its trust to the mandatories acting as its agents. As treaties are normally 
binding in international law, the treaties concerning the mandates did not make an 
exception. He also believed that this new standard of administration was superior 
to the one that had existed before. Many abuses had existed during old colonial 
regime and the limitations set in paragraph 5 of Article 22 existed in order to limit 
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the possibility of abuses. Thus, the League of Nations had a direct interest in the 
welfare of the inhabitants.  
 Interpretations on the issue of sovereignty would change radically after the 
Second World War. While the interwar debates on the issue of sovereignty were 
by and large about whether sovereignty would rest on the mandatory, as was the 
case in colonial arrangements or with the League, after the war, the principle of 
self-determination and its realization became a central preoccupation. 
 Of the post war interpretations, Duncan Hall, the Australian historian and 
author of Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, did not make much of 
independence as a goal for the trust. He believed that as an objective, 
independence could lead anywhere and would not necessarily be an improvement 
for the people. The word “trust” as such said as little as trusteeship or tutelage. On 
the other hand, what trust ought to be about was “education for self-government”, 
as this would lead to the “self-government of a free people standing on its own feet 
as a result of a process of education. This was the full liberal intent of the 
Covenant”.159 However, at least in some of the territories, progress was bound to 
be slow,160 but nevertheless, education for self-government would provide a 
“ladder … which primitive native tribes could climb steadily to the goal of a self-
governing people”.161 
 Even in 1955 Ramendra Chowdhuri was not ready to give an opinion on the 
question of sovereignty. In International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A 
Comparative Study, in a section aptly named “Estimate”, he notes that there is an 
“element of uncertainty and ambiguity” in the legal status of mandates (as there 
was also in United Nations trusteeships).162 Perhaps there was no solution. As 
some have pointed out, the system was new and therefore the old concept of 
sovereignty simply did not apply any longer, or even have much relevance. The 
ultimate goal of such territory was self-government or independence, and once 
that was achieved, the answer to the question of the placement of sovereignty 
would become clearer.163  
 Many regarded granting independence to African or Asian peoples as 
irresponsible, a path to chaos. Self-determination as a principle was for 
Europeans.164 These opinions, coming just some years before the African 
independence movement, show how slowly change was accepted.  
 The extraordinary position of the mandates in the international legal system 
was nowhere more apparent than in the discussions over the issue of sovereignty 
over the mandates. Many of the debates over the question who had sovereignty 
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over the mandates reveal the legal indeterminacy and uncertainty as well as the 
political quarrels surrounding the notion of “mandate”.165 Internationalist and 
idealist authors, like Lauterpacht and Schücking, thought that while the 
mandatories exhibited many of the traits that were traditionally associated with 
sovereignty, ultimately sovereignty rested on the League of Nations. Germany 
after joining the League was one of the most vocal defenders of the League’s 
sovereignty over its mandates. Others were more prone to grant sovereignty to the 
mandatories, ascribing the League only a supervisory role. Many international 
lawyers in fact refused to ascribe sovereignty to any individual body, considering 
the mandates to be outside of old concepts like sovereignty. The issue was 
revisited after the Second World War and the abolition of the League of Nations 
as the rise of independence movements brought the ultimate aim of independence 
into the discussion.  
2.1.4. Was the Mandates System Merely a Continuation of Colonization? 
The mandates system was established at a time when the colonial empires, the 
foremost of them being Britain, controlled vast tracts of the globe. From the 
beginning of the 20th century, colonial powers were increasingly concerned about 
the ethical justification of colonial rule. Though the formulators of the mandates 
system were adamant that they were constructing a novel system of international 
governance based on ethical principles and self-governance, the question remains. 
Was there a difference between old colonial administration and the mandate 
system? Similar humanitarian justifications such as the abolition of slavery were 
presented in favour of both.  
 The use of international law and international organizations for the 
advancement of liberal and humanitarian ideals had spread during the late 19th 
and early 20th century. In the late 19th century, international law associations were 
established by liberal lawyers to spread liberal ideas. In 1868, Gustave Rolin-
Jacquemyns, Tobias Asser and John Westlake established the Revue de droit 
international et de législation comparée.166 The establishment of the institute and the 
Revue were a turning point in rational and moral international law. The earlier idea 
of the “noble savage” and universal law which had dominated the discourse of 
international law since the 18th century had changed to the idea of European 
superiority, European international law and the duty to civilize those on a lower 
level of civilization. Whereas international law had earlier had certain universal 
features, now it was thought that societies outside Europe were not only different 
but also inferior. Inhabitants of “uncivilized” societies were treated as barbarians, 
not very different from children, to whom an organized society like that of Europe 
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was impossible.167 Towards the end of the 19th century, the idea of the humane 
treatment of natives and universal law that had been based on some kind of a 
natural law, had become outdated and was replaced by a belief in the development 
of societies from primitive to civilized. International law as such had not been 
applied to “primitive” people even earlier, but natural law had provided for a 
certain degree of legal protection. The idea of development also acted as a 
justification for colonial administration: civilization became the measuring stick 
with which societies outside Europe were assessed, and colonialism could be 
justified by spreading civilization outside Europe. Even though there were 
differences amongst international lawyers in how they saw the civilizing mission of 
Europe,168 generally speaking the lawyers agreed with European colonial policies. 
Even those with the most humanitarian attitudes towards the inhabitants of the 
colonies (e.g. the Swiss Joseph Hornung) could be described as paternalists. 
Hornung, for instance, believed that colonies were justified in the interests of their 
inhabitants. The inhabitants were to be treated as children, gently but with a firm 
hand.169  
 This discussion did not apply only to the colonies, but also to Europe’s 
relationship with other nations, such as the Ottoman Empire, Japan and China. 
Europe searched for standards that would determine when a state would 
sufficiently resemble Europe for it to be included in the international community 
and international law. Setting civilization as a standard meant that a sufficient 
similarity with Europe was required. Europe set the standard, and no external 
measures existed. For this reason, it was always possible to leave Turkey and 
Japan in a position where they constantly needed to prove their standard of 
civilization.170 This was also apparent in the reactions of the Western drafters of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations to Japan’s request for a clause on racial 
equality.171 The standards of civilization and the measures of development could be 
seen equally within the mandates system in the division between the A, B and C 
mandates according to the perceived level of development and civilization. 
 On paper and in speeches, the mandates were drafted to take care of the 
interests of the inhabitants of the mandated areas. As Woodrow Wilson explained, 
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“the Mandatory system was not intended to satisfy merely the interests of the 
Mandatory power but to care for, protect and develop the people for whom it was 
intended”.172 Of course, this could mean a great many things, and even a willing 
and benevolent administration would resort to paternalism rather than emphasize 
safeguarding the natives’ rights. A less benevolent colonial administration could 
call any abuse “assisting” or “protecting” the natives. The apartheid homelands for 
native peoples in South West Africa serve as an example of the latter.  
 On the whole, the inhabitants were ignored in the drafting process of the 
mandates.173 During the drafting, the only recorded protest from an inhabitant of 
the mandated territories came from Kazem-El-Hussaini, Chairman of the 
Executive Committee of the Arab Palestine Congress, “against the principle of the 
Jewish National Home in Palestine”.174 On the other hand, several philanthropic 
organizations participated in the drafting process, including the Native Races and 
the Liquor Traffic United Committee and the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines 
Protection Society (London), which demanded the “prohibition of liquor traffic”, 
“conscription of natives in the army”, and “abolition of slavery particularly in the 
African Mandates”.175 
 As there were no direct precedents, it was difficult to see what kind of shape 
the mandate system would take at the moment of its establishment. The main issue 
was naturally whether there was any real difference between the mandates and 
traditional colonial administration. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
noted at the Paris Peace Conference that he saw no great difference “between the 
mandatory principle and the principles laid down by the Berlin Conference”, apart 
from the external machinery of the former,176 or, in other words, the lack of 
supervision of the latter.177 
 Article 22 of the League Covenant defined the newly-established system as a 
“sacred trust”, begging the question what was meant by trust. Article 22 provides 
only a vague idea, according to which the well-being and development of such 
peoples (i.e. peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world) form a sacred trust of civilization and that 
securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. The source of the expression “sacred trust” is not clear but 
reflected both humanitarian paternalism and a Christian influence. Commentators 
on the mandates gave different interpretations for the term. These interpretations 
naturally reflected their views on the mandatory system as compared to earlier 
colonial governance and would radically change through the years. 
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 Hersch Lauterpacht saw Article 22 as a compromise between humanitarian 
requirements towards natives, and the traditional imperialist principle of power.178 
Paragraph 1 of the Article was an expression of the “high humanitarian task of the 
civilized nations towards peoples in a culturally lower position”.179 The interests 
and rights of the administrating nations were less important than their duties 
towards the inhabitants of these territories. This was different compared to earlier 
colonial administration where administrators were restricted in a binding and far-
reaching manner.180 
 The reasons for this change were both political and related to the spirit of the 
time. Lauterpacht was hopeful, as this spirit brought about an entire instrument 
and a new international legal institution. He differentiated between the old and the 
new, between the territories under the sovereignty of the countries that were 
defeated in the war and the new position of these territories as mandates.181 
According to Lauterpacht, it was high time to stop concentrating on the faults of 
the mandates and talking about them as a continuation of the old power, and 
accept the mandates as an international institution.182 The task of the mandates 
was to protect the inhabitants from the exploitation of the old system, and support 
the development of the peoples. One such task close to Lauterpacht’s heart was 
establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine.183 
 With his thesis Lauterpacht not only wanted to contribute to the 
understanding of mandates as a novel legal concept, and not only as something 
hiding the imperialist annexationist aims of the victors, but also as a contribution 
to legal theory. In Lauterpacht’s view, the mandates were not to exist indefinitely, 
although this was only indirectly expressed by the sentence “until they are able to 
stand by themselves”.184 He tried to define the meaning of the concepts behind the 
mandates, “trust”, “tutelage”, and “mandate”. Of these concepts he considered that 
the term “mandate” had a legal meaning. The two others, “tutelage” and “trust” did 
not.185 He noted that many believed that the concept of “trust” was behind the 
mandates. He realized that it was an important concept in English law, but for 
him it could not be the main idea as “it seems to me very questionable to take this 
institution, which constitutes a sort of combination of mandate and deposit of 
property for the purpose of guardianship, as a basis for the mandate in 
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international law.”186 For him, it did not give a proper explanation of the idea 
behind the mandates, though he noted, “it should not be denied that certain 
peculiarities of the ‘trust’ … could be of relevance for an understanding of the 
Mandates system”.187 Thus, he wanted to emphasize that the term “trust” was not 
the most important one in understanding the mandates, but it did have some 
relevance. On the other hand, the word “tutelage” was only to indicate the 
purpose of the system and had no legal meaning as such. Even the term “mandate” 
had different possible meanings. The Anglo-German meaning was that the 
mandator was always above the mandatory, assigning the mandatories and 
deciding on the terms of the mandate, whereas on what he called the Western side 
and partly in the practice of the League of Nations, the idea was different. In that 
tradition, even sovereignty could be moved to the mandatory.188 
 Norman Bentwich noted that “trust” had been used as a moral declaration in 
relation to African colonies by Joseph Chamberlain, who spoke of them as 
“undeveloped estates of Europe which were held by England as trustees for 
civilisation”.189 
 Lord Lugard, writing in the 1920s, interpreted the concept of trust in the 
colonial context. For Lugard, the mandates were the “latest expression of the 
conscience of Europe”.190 He believed that the principles applied would not only 
concern mandates but also the other territories under the administration of the 
mandatory powers.191 The mandates served as “a model and an aspiration”.192 
Tutelage meant acceptance of control primarily in the interest of the inhabitants.193 
Due to the “advantages of an inherited civilisation”, “superior intellectual culture” 
and “physical superiority”, the governing nations had both moral and material 
obligations towards the natives.194 Lugard was keen to emphasize the Britishness 
of the system. According to him, British ideals came to life in the mandates, 
including indirect administration, where local officials were given administrative 
duties under the guidance of the British.195 
 The Swiss William Rappard, Lugard’s fellow member of the PMC, was an 
internationalist and an ardent believer in international collaboration.196 In his view 
the League was the natural result of an “instinct of preservation” of states. “I 
believe its [the League of Nations’] essential aim, the substitution of law and order 
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for chaos in international relations, to be so absolutely beneficent and so clearly in 
the line of human evolution, that no one but a madman or a criminal can repudiate 
it”, he declared.197 For him, imperial order would be transformed by the mandates 
system by subjecting imperial rule to international control.198 His optimism was 
mainly based on his respect for the PMC.199 He hoped that the mandates system 
would prove to be a “superior method of colonial government”, benefiting both the 
inhabitants of the territories and the “civilized” world at large.200 His enthusiasm 
was tangible when he told how he hoped the mandates system would prove to be 
“the beginning of a very significant and fortunate revolution in colonial 
administration”,201 and “a great novel enterprise of international coöperation for 
the amelioration of colonial conditions”.202  
 Mark Carter Mills, at the time Assistant in Economics and Sociology at the 
Indiana University, also saw the mandates as an opportunity to solve the colonial 
issue in a way that took native interests into consideration.203 He also reminded 
people that Woodrow Wilson had made a “fundamental contribution” when 
demanding that native rights be taken into consideration in his Fourteen Points.204 
 The British lawyer Duncan Campbell Lee saw British colonial policies as an 
inspiration for the mandates and the ideas behind them.205 He was sorry that there 
was a misunderstanding amongst some British who believed that the territories 
had become part of Britain and thought that if they had been more understood 
through the notion of “trust”, which also existed in British law, it would have been 
easier to understand the true nature of the mandates.206 “There is no disguise about 
Mandates. The scheme was not intended to deceive anyone […]. We have done, I 
hope for ever, with the barbarous idea of expropriating one set of humanity by 
another. The Mandatory System is confessedly an alternative to the division of 
peoples as spoils of war.”207 He noted that the well-being and the development of 
peoples had been the motive behind British colonial actions for five generations.208 
He gave examples from the mandates and gave credit to the administrators for 
developing the territories and noting that conditions in these territories had been 
bad before setting up the mandates. For example, in the Cameroons, repulsive 
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tribal customs, such as cannibalism, had been suppressed. He was optimistic about 
the reports showing great advancement in these territories:209 “Reports from year 
to year show that the Mandatories are promoting to the utmost the material and 
moral well-being and the social progress of the native peoples”, he said.210 As 
examples he told that slave trade had now ended, there was adequate 
remuneration for labour, traffic in both arms and liquors was now prohibited, 
there was a freedom of conscience and worship in the territories and missionaries 
were allowed to enter and move freely:211 “The black and backward peoples of the 
earth are now certain to obtain … a new freedom, a new civilisation; and all in 
harmony with the best traditions of the British Empire.”212 Of course, there were 
problems and concerns, but that was quite natural when peoples possessing a 
lower culture had to adapt themselves to the new state of things, or accept a new 
subordinate position in their own country.213 Here he referred to the Palestinians 
and their mandate. He compared the achievements of the British in Palestine to 
the miserable French administration in Syria, and was convinced of the 
superiority of British administration.214  
 Though many British authors saw similarities between British colonial 
policies and the mandates, Quincy Wright noted that the British Empire had 
become a means for self-determination gradually, whereas the League of Nations 
was that from the beginning. He had agreed with Palacios, a member of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, who had noted that “the emancipation of the 
territories under mandate was, or ought to be, the normal goal of their 
development”.215 According to the League Covenant, this applied to all the 
mandates, but particularly to the A mandates, where it had been formulated 
explicitly.  The purpose of the mandates system according to Wright was the self-
determination of territories and to provide the means to achieve it. However, this 
was not easy to accomplish.216 Also, the interests of local people were, if not the 
central focus of the administration, at least to be taken notice of: “It is believed 
that the system has advantages from the standpoint of the inhabitants of the area 
and of the world in general over the system of imperial control … which has 
characterized the relation of advanced and backward peoples in the Eastern 
hemisphere, and also over the less precise system of self-determination qualified 
by the Monroe Doctrine, sporadic interventions, quasi-protectorates, 
receiverships, and occasional annexations by the United States … .”217 
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 The international lawyer B. A. Wortley’s starting point for the mandate 
system was also trust.  For him trust was an ethical concept, “based on conscience 
and conscionable conduct, a juridical notion closely connected with ideas of 
morality and public policy”.218 A trust imposed a moral attitude and a moral duty 
to the trustee.219 However, at the same time he saw another side of a trusteeship, 
“the holding in trust for the world of those resources it is a duty humanity to 
develop”.220  A trust was not to last for ever. It would come to an end when the 
minor would gain full legal status, and the same applied to the mandates.  He 
believed that for many this might take a long time to achieve, but nevertheless, 
everyone had the ultimate right to aim for improvement of their conditions.221 As 
an example of such an attitude he reminded people of Article 23 of the League 
Covenant, which was against labour exploitation.  This article was to protect the 
weak and the principles were used in the mandate as well.  The ideals of the 
League of Nations showed respect for the human personality which was based on 
the humanist thinking of Vitoria and Grotius.222  
 Chowdhuri and Hall, the leading interpreters during the 1950s, still operated 
in the colonial paradigm of the white man’s burden, the ethical responsibility for 
the less fortunate. Chowdhuri describes the language of the Covenant as more 
emotional and humanitarian than legal or parliamentary. Trust did not have any 
legal meaning in the Covenant (which several decades later let the judges of the 
ICJ make very different opinions on the responsibilities of the mandatories 
towards the mandated areas and their peoples).223 Chowdhuri described the 
mandates as the “foundation of enlightened self-interest”.224 According to Hall, an 
international organization would better act as a conscience towards the natives 
than an individual state. Nevertheless, he believed in the existence of a national 
conscience as well, which was apparent in humanitarian (e.g. anti-slavery) 
movements.225 Duncan Hall also interpreted the “sacred trust” in the context of 
Lugard’s Dual Mandate. However, he did not elaborate on the meaning of trust, 
noting that the principle was a general one, and “had in it a large element of 
haphazard and accident”.226 
 The territories that in the end became mandates were extremely diverse and 
the plans on their future were similarly diverse. Some authors saw the system 
mainly as a means to emancipate those countries that were about to become 
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independent in the foreseeable future (in practice the territories that were to 
become the A mandates). However, interest in the mandates focused more on the 
African mandates. Duncan Hall has claimed that the idea of mandates would be 
misunderstood if one looks at them only in the African context, as they did not 
originate mainly in Africa. In his view, looking at mandates mainly from an 
African point of view has shifted the focus of the history of the mandates to “the 
humanitarian movement, the abolition of slavery, the development of national 
trusteeship, colonial self-government, equality of commercial access, the Berlin 
African Conference of 1884-85, and, finally, the setting-up of the League African 
mandates”.227  
 Duncan Hall saw trust as a universal ethical principle: “If the ethical 
principles and the code of welfare are valid they are of universal validity.”228 Thus, 
if due to Article 22 these principles were to be applied to some dependent 
territories, there was no reason why they should not be applied to other colonized 
territories as well. Hall found it difficult to distinguish which territories were 
administered as a sacred trust, and which by some other code of conduct. He 
believed that crossing a border from a mandated territory to another territory 
administered by the same country would not reveal any true difference between 
these two: “Laws and ordinances, administrative forms, basic ideas and principles, 
would look much the same on both sides of the frontier.”229 In essence, according 
to Hall, the Permanent Mandates Commission was working out “the best colonial 
practice”, in the end to be applied to colonies everywhere.230 He maintained that 
the ethical principles of the mandates system were contagious: “The principles 
which the Covenant embodies must be taken to extend to also colonies and 
territories … . Article 22 in fact means the final repudiation of one system of 
colonial government and the definite acceptance of another.”231 
 Of the most recent accounts, Susan Pedersen has argued that the mandates 
started as a project of imperial reconciliation, but inadvertently shifted into a 
project where normative statehood became, at least to a certain extent, a real 
possibility.232 Firstly, Pedersen finds that the significance of the mandates system 
can only be understood if one understands its geopolitical importance. The 
mandates were established at a time when British and French imperial interests 
were in need of reconciliation, there was a risk of Germany wanting its share of 
the colonial wealth,233 and a way for American participation in the global political 
order was required. The mandates were a means to negotiate between the 
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different conflicting demands. Secondly, once the process of internationalization 
had begun, there was no way of turning back. The League established new norms 
and new processes through supervision, questioning, accepting petitions and first 
and foremost, through publicity. These processes became the new standard for 
colonial administration, even if this had not initially been the plan of the Allied 
powers. Pedersen finds this interaction between geopolitical interests and 
international scrutiny to be the most important legacy of the mandates system. 
The simultaneous coexistence of these two dynamics, colonialism and 
internationalism, led to unexpected results, opening the way to statehood for 
dependent peoples.234 
 Similarly, Michael Callahan describes how the mandates system combined 
the two predominant global forces of the inter-war era, imperialism and 
internationalism. The vocabulary of “trusteeship” and “sacred trust” enabled the 
imperial powers to reform their colonial practices in a more humanitarian 
direction, changing the entire colonial culture and, at the same time, improving 
their imperial reputation. He finds that international trusteeship created channels 
for both the European critics of imperialism and the inhabitants of various colonial 
dependencies to challenge colonial rule.235 
 Anghie, on the other hand, claims that the mandates system brought a 
distinctive character of non-European sovereignty to those states that had once 
been mandates. In his view, the ambitions of colonial transformation of the 
mandates system failed. Instead, the former mandates were left with a 
vulnerability due to economic inequality that has enabled the continuation of 
similar processes, not through colonialism as such, but through the interventions 
of economic institutions, such as the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund. He claims that these institutions have 
brought a new civilizing mission, similar to that of the mandates.236 
 Was the mandates system merely a continuation of colonization? I would 
argue that in many ways it was, especially in the beginning. First of all, it was 
based on ideas that derived directly from the colonial era. Humanitarianism was 
not new. Since the 19th century there had been aims to reconcile colonial needs 
and the welfare and development of the inhabitants of the colonized territories. If 
news of severe maltreatment of natives reached Europe, it was bound to cause 
popular outrage and in some cases even lead to changes in colonial 
administration.237 Of course, this by no means meant that the welfare of locals was 
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always made a priority. The private law metaphor of trust was used by comparing 
the natives of the mandates to the different beneficiaries of trusts, the natives 
taking the place of a “minor” or “lunatic”.238 The mandatories accepted an 
obligation of “binding legal character” towards the international community when 
accepting the mandate.239 However, it has been questioned whether this legal bond 
also applied to the relationship between the mandatory and the natives, rather 
than only between the mandatory and the mandated territory.240 At the same time, 
local welfare was used as an excuse and justification for colonies. It was believed 
that colonial administration would bring the civilization necessary for living 
conditions to improve. It was believed that there were certain levels of civilization 
and that administration by Europeans would help raise the level of civilization in 
the colonial territories.  
 This idea found its way into the mandates system as well. The mandatories 
and the PMC saw themselves as representatives of a higher civilization, whose 
task was to bring the mandates closer to the level of Europeans, and in the best 
case reach the standard of civilization where they could be granted statehood. The 
PMC’s suspicion of the readiness of Iraq to achieve independence shows that they 
could not envision such an event taking place any time soon, if ever. 
 Yet, there was a will to create a novel, internationally controlled system of 
imperialism, though of course the Western powers would still in practice be 
responsible for the control of the system. Though the mandates were intended to 
fulfil ambitious humanitarian ideals, the practical administration was often no 
different than the colonial system. Especially countries like South Africa, Australia 
and New Zealand treated their mandates almost as colonies. On the other hand, 
the mandates were the result of a will to create something new and better than the 
colonial governance. 
2.2 The Permanent Mandates Commission and the League Organs 
As the League of Nations set out to administer the mandates, there were 
important technical issues to resolve. How would the League oversee the 
mandatories and their government of the territories? For this purpose, an 
international commission was set up and tasked with supervising the mandates. 
The Permanent Mandates Commission was staffed by a motley crew of old 
colonial hands, idealists and reformers. It worked for over twenty years, as long as 
the mandates existed.  
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 A Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) as an expert commission was 
originally proposed by the British. Its composition was later determined by the 
League Council.241 The members were not to represent their government but were 
chosen for their individual qualifications and expertise.242 The colonial minister of 
France, Albert Sarraut, was worried that if the members of the Commission did 
not mainly represent the mandatory states, they would be guilty of rash decisions. 
However, most of the members did in practice have colonial experience.243 
According to the constitution drawn up by the Commission, the PMC was to be 
composed of nine independent experts with the majority being nationals of non-
mandatory states. Later the headcount increased to 10 and in addition an ILO 
expert was present for matters relating to labour issues.244 Membership was 
permanent and the members could not hold government office at the same time.245 
They could not be dismissed without the consent of the majority of the League 
Assembly.246 In practice, four members were nationals of mandatory states, four 
members were nationals of other colonial states and two were members of states 
with no colonies. The League Assembly decided that one of the members would be 
female.247 There had been a suggestion of a “coloured member”, but that idea was 
quietly abandoned.248 Also, no state presented anti-colonial, radical candidates and 
Sweden was the only country willing to give their seat to a woman. Chowdhuri 
has summarized the pros and cons of the PMC membership arrangement. On the 
plus side, he noted that as a non-political body its authority would derive from its 
“impartiality, independence, experience and individual competence of its 
members”.249 However, on the negative side, the fact that some of the members 
were nationals of mandatory states, could question its authority: “[T]he 
independent experts … have become a somewhat rare species, and more often 
than not, are either only government agents in disguise or tend to be more popish 
than the Pope.”250 Members also both held government posts before their 
Commission membership and returned to government office from their position in 
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the Commission, which has also raised questions about their impartiality.251 On the 
other hand, Lugard serves as an example of how members did criticize their own 
countries as well. When Ormsby-Gore left the Permanent Mandates Commission 
to serve as the colonial minister for the United Kingdom and returned to the 
commission as a representative of the government, Lugard was, to the others’ 
great amusement, unyielding in his criticism.252 
 The Permanent Mandates Commission was intended to be an advisory body. 
It examined the reports which were given annually by the mandatory powers.  
The reports of the mandatories were discussed in front of the Commission, and of 
these reports the Commission forwarded its recommendations to the League 
Council. The Commission could not make any binding decisions concerning the 
Mandates.   
 Many of the members had long experience in colonial administration. Several 
also had a legal education, including William Rappard, Daniel François Willem 
van Rees, Leopoldo Palacios and Pierre Orts. Within the discussions of the 
Mandates Commission, several figures are prominent. Britain’s representative was 
Lord Lugard, who had a long career in the British colonial administration. While 
the French representatives were changed regularly and thus made less of an 
impact, the Swiss member William Rappard, who was both an academic and a 
diplomat, headed the Mandate Section of the League of Nations and was 
prominent in the Commission. The Norwegian representative Valentine Dannevig 
was the only long-time female member of the Commission and, perhaps due to her 
background as a teacher, often raised issues of education and civilization. Freire 
D’Andrade, the Portuguese representative, was often a proponent of traditional 
colonial rule. Leopoldo Palacios, the Spanish representative, who also wrote a 




Lord Lugard, the British representative, had a long career in the British colonial 
administration. Lugard’s career had started as a soldier and adventurer in 
different parts of Africa, where he was mainly employed by different chartered 
companies, eg. the Imperial British East African Company and the Royal Niger 
Company, trekking with caravans of African soldiers, fighting slave merchants 
and exploring new territories, and eventually, much later than he had wished,254 he 
became part of the British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria.255 
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 Lugard was a man of action and a pragmatic civil servant. His main legacy in 
colonial thought is the so-called “dual mandate”, of which he wrote a book of the 
same name in 1922. On the one hand, the book was a justification of Britain’s 
colonies in tropical Africa.256 Lugard was an ardent believer in Britain’s abilities to 
govern Africa, as compared to all other nations present on the continent.257 
Densely populated Britain needed the colonies, and Britain was in his view the 
most capable nation to take up the task of civilizing.258 One of Lugard’s interests 
was slavery, which he fought in different African locations throughout his 
career.259 He believed that British administration was needed to rid Africa of the 
problem. The Labour party in Britain had published a pamphlet against the 
colonies, and Lugard’s book was partly an answer to that criticism. On the other 
hand, it sought to smooth out the contradiction between traditional, self-interested 
colonialism and new ideas about a more humanitarian approach to the colonies. 
Hence, the “dual mandate”. In Lugard’s view, the colonies could be both: they 
would prove useful to the mother country, but at the same time improve the 
conditions of the inhabitants of the colonies.260 Moreover, this kind of a “civilized 
administration”, combining the two approaches, was the only proper way to go 
about the colonies in his view.261 
 Lugard has been described as a passionate man and besides his work, he was 
deeply devoted to his wife Flora. He had originally left for his adventures in Africa 
after an unhappy love affair, and his wife’s inability to live in Africa affected his 
later career choices.262 This conflict between his two passions led to his diplomatic 
career at the League of Nations, where he was a long-time member of the PMC. 
The mandates represented well his idea of the dual mandate, and he took his 
membership in the PMC seriously, even criticizing his country’s actions in the 
mandates. However, he was slightly amused by the initial establishing phases of 
the mandates, describing the venture as the Allies states, led by President Wilson, 
giving content to such “catchwords”, as “no annexations”, “self-determination”, 
and the “open door”.263 In principle, he did support the mandates, albeit with some 
reservations.264 
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The Swiss member of the PMC, William Rappard, who was both an academic and 
a diplomat, headed the Mandate Section of the League of Nations from 1920 to 
1924 and was thereafter prominent as a member of the Commission. He was a 
liberal and an internationalist. Together with the Belgian Pierre Orts, he was the 
only member to work with the mandatory system throughout its lifespan.265 
Having worked in the secretariat, he knew the mandates system as well as anyone 
could and had been part of establishing and integrating it with the rest of the 
League of Nations.266 According to Ania Peter, who wrote his biography in the 
1970s, Rappard was supportive of colonialism. He was also sceptical about the 
attempt to justify colonialism as a humanitarian obligation. She writes that he 
struggled to understand why one should intervene in disputes between different 
African tribes, but ignore more close-by actions against injustice, for instance in 
the Ottoman Empire or Russia. He also believed that the world economy could 
not do without colonization. However, he claimed that the mandatories had first 
and foremost a responsibility towards the natives in the mandated territories, and 
only after that a responsibility towards the international community.267 The 
national administrators, the mandatories, he excluded from the scope of those 
whose interests would play a role.268 Rather, they were “servants more than 
masters”.269 He continuously stressed the disinterested governing of the mandates. 
Like Dannevig, he used the rhetoric of tutelage, often comparing natives to 
children. The disinterested nature of the duties of the mandatories was thus 
natural, as it needed to be compared with the duties of guardians and their 
wards.270 The mandatory powers were to “pursue their ‘sacred mission of 
civilization’ of guiding their minor wards on the road leading toward self-
government”271 “pending the coming of age of the minor whose education is to be 
completed”272 and the interests of the “wards” were not to be “sacrificed to the 
jealousies of the guardians”273. In his view, the entire mandate system rose out of a 
compromise between American antipathies to colonialism and European empires. 
He pointed out that Wilson was part of the American tradition in his hostility 
towards annexations, whereas members of the British Empire wanted the 
territories for themselves.274 The mandates were the compromise between these 
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two conflicting pursuits, “disinterested humanitarianism and acquisitive 
nationalism”, and in his view a successful one. He saw the mandates system, and 
also the UN trusteeship system after that, as a way to improve colonialism, to 
change the focus of colonialism from self-interest to the inhabitants themselves.275 
Only Japan, he complained, did not play by the rules of the game.276 Rather, there 
was a “veil of ignorance and misunderstanding” between the Japanese and the 
PMC because of “distance, language, official discretion, and undoubtedly also 
deliberate policy”. He admired his colleagues at the PMC and credited mainly 
them for the successes of the mandates. He described them as “experienced”, 
deserving of the “respect and confidence” of the international community, men 
[sic] with “conscientious attention and a real zeal”.277 His own task “as a mere 




The Norwegian representative Valentine Dannevig was the successor of the 
Swedish Anna Bugge Wicksell, and served in the Commission from 1927 to 1939. 
 The feminist movement was interested and active in the establishing of the 
different League institutions and sought to include women in its decision-making 
processes. Dannevig was one of the few women in visible positions in the League. 
In a way, Dannevig embodied the dual character of paternalistic colonialism and 
benevolence of the entire mandates system. Being Norwegian, she was one of the 
PMC members from a non-mandatory state. She was originally a schoolteacher, 
and her interest in education was apparent in her conduct during the PMC 
meetings. She was one of the liberals of the PMC, together with Lugard and 
Rappard. In her questioning, apart from questions of education, she paid much 
attention to girls and women. Her interest involved international feminist 
concerns, including the trafficking of women, the treatment of women in colonies 
in general, age of marriage, and other issues relating to marriage, including 
polygamy. She also took an interest in the electoral laws in Palestine, which would 
have restricted the elections to men.279 
 Dannevig did not criticize colonial rule as such, but wanted to improve the 
administration through her active questioning of the representatives of the 
different mandates about social conditions.280 Dannevig regarded the natives as 
children. In her world, ideal administration centred around education and the 
improvement of native conditions. She was not tolerant towards rebels, regarding 
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them as misbehaving schoolboys who needed a change in attitude and disciplinary 
reprimand rather than anything else. In such instances she did not criticize the 
mandatories for suppressing the rebellions. However, she did not tolerate the 
mandatories’ various explanations about why the social standards of the natives 
could not be improved.281 In general, the natives, like children, could be controlled 




The Portuguese Alfredo Augusto Freire D’Andrade had a long career in 
Portuguese Africa, where he had acted, among other things, as Governor General 
of Mozambique.283 Being very much a son of the Portuguese colonial tradition, he 
was often a proponent of traditional colonial rule. D’Andrade was among the 
loudest members of the PMC to tout the supremacy of the white minority 
population in Africa and the duty of the administration to keep the black majority 
obedient.284 Like many Social Darwinists, he believed in the existence of strong 
and weak races.285 D’Andrade believed that the fact that a community would 
disappear simply meant that it was not fit enough for survival and civilization.286 
D’Andrade saw well-being from an economic point of view: development meant 
economic development.287 He saw African men as naturally lazy and therefore 
encouraged compulsory labour in order to achieve the economic progress 




The inner tensions within the Permanent Mandates Commission were not 
necessarily revealed to the world outside but were nevertheless present, and also 
clearly visible in the published minutes of the PMC.288 The question whether 
petitioners would be heard serves as an example.289 The division on petitions was 
clear: the French mandatory administrations were hostile to petitions in general 
and certainly did not want petitioners to participate in oral hearings. The French 
members of the PMC echoed this, not hiding their distaste about the possibility of 
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having to hear oral complaints from the “Orientals”.290 Yet, the rest of the PMC 
believed that petitions were an essential part of the mandatory system. 
Particularly the Italian Theodoli used his position as chairman to irritate both the 
British and the French administrations. First of all, it was his task to determine the 
“receivability” of the petitions, and he used this power to let through petitions that 
would have otherwise been rejected due to “violent language” or the fact that the 
petition would have rather belonged to local courts. He also distributed petitions 
to rapporteurs that he believed would be sympathetic to the complaints and thus 
increased the possibility of their acceptance.291 Similarly, the question of native 
welfare revealed a wide division in the ideals of Lugard and D’Andrade, the latter 
showing Darwinist ideas about the survival of the fittest communities and no 
regret about the dying out of the weaker ones, while Lugard stressed the duty of 
the mandates system to increase the welfare of all native communities.292 Lugard 
and D’Andrade had several heated debates on the issue, which led to them writing 
memoranda at Theodoli’s suggestion to air their disagreements.293 
 The Permanent Mandates Commission worked in an atmosphere of 
conflicting needs and expectations. For the sake of credibility, it needed to be 
neutral, but on the other hand, for practical reasons and the ability to work, it 
called for the support of the mandatory governments.  As the PMC required the 
support of the mandatories, it also needed to assure that they were not “judges in 
their own cause”.294 It solved this contradiction by including the mandatory states 
as parts of the commission and having the accredited representative present when 
the reports of the relevant mandate were discussed. The representative, however, 
did not have the right to vote.295 
 The working of the Permanent Mandates Commission evolved through the 
years to include tasks and powers which were not intended originally. The League 
Covenant did not contain the right to petition. However, in 1923 a resolution was 
adopted by the League Council that allowed petitions.296 The inhabitants had to 
submit the petitions through the mandatories to be subsequently considered by the 
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Permanent Mandates Commission. The minutes of the Mandates Commission 
were public, which according to Rappard led to one of the greatest influences of 
the Mandates Commission, namely transmitting knowledge of the mandated 
territories and thus affecting public opinion.297 
 The most important source of information for the PMC were the annual 
reports by the mandatories.298 The members had to work at considerable distance 
from the actual mandates and react after a delay when the reports were discussed 
in Geneva.299 The members of the Commission developed a quick eye in finding 
shortcomings and inconsistencies in the reports.300 The reports were published by 
the governments and the League of Nations did not even make summaries of 
them.301  There was more tension between the PMC and the administration of the 
C mandates than the other administrations, and it was more difficult for the PMC 
to gain information from the C mandates than from other territories. The 
representatives of the C mandates mainly resided in London or Geneva, and thus 
would not be able to bring first-hand knowledge from the mandates.302 
 The contents of the report were based on a questionnaire, drafted by the 
PMC. The different “guarantees”, such as slavery, liberty of conscience, etc. 
discussed in the reports, were all mentioned in the questionnaire. Also, all legal 
and administrative decisions made during the relevant year were added into the 
report.303 In 1926 the PMC left the Council a suggestion of a broader 
questionnaire and a proposal for hearing petitioners orally.304 Here the mandatory 
governments in the Council considered that the power of the Commission was 
becoming too wide and the questionnaire too inquisitorial.305  
 Throughout the years, the PMC developed a mode of work that could be 
called both supervision and co-operation.306 The PMC exerted a small degree of 
pressure by posing expert questions, rarely criticizing and often praising 
(especially if it criticized).307  
 Hall viewed the PMC as a “remarkable body”, with no precedent, whose 
members were able and competent. As mention was made of the PMC in the 
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League’s Covenant, it was out of the question for the mandatory governments to 
dissolve it.308 As reasons why he deemed it a success, Hall noted that: “A 
commission made up of individual members, debating in the seclusion of a room at 
Geneva and unable to study conditions at first hand in the mandated areas, might 
indeed have degenerated easily into a doctrinaire body engaged in endless 
discussions of questions of theory. It was saved from this by the practical 
experience and good sense of its members, as well as by their continual contact 
with responsible officials from the territories themselves.”309 The PMC accepted 
different methods of administration and did not try to unify the territories, but saw 
that “the well-being and development of such peoples” can be achieved through 
different kinds of methods.310 The PMC was able to reach its goals during its 20 
years of existence without major conflicts and crises. According to Lugard, the 
secret of its success was that it did not criticize and refrained from giving overly 
direct advice, and while all members had the right to speak out, and their views 
were recorded in the minutes, all the differing views did not bind the commission 
and the neutrality of its members was respected. The PMC became more 
independent than anyone would have imagined in its early years. Susan Pedersen 
explains this as the result of the members’ strong positions in the colonial 
administrations of their respective countries and especially their expertise in the 
colonies. This meant that they were difficult to control. Also formal matters, such 
as the term being fixed, their authority being based on League of Nations 
documents and the fact that their deliberations were published, strengthened their 
position.311 However, the French members differed from the rest by openly 
protecting the interests of France.312 
 The League of Nations Council consisted for a great part of states holding 
mandates and this had an obvious effect on its relations to the Mandates 
Commission. Particularly during the early years, the Council was sceptical of the 
Commission’s work.313 The League of Nations Council had the duty of making 
final decisions on the mandates and receiving the reports of the mandatories. 
Besides the permanent members of the League Council, all the remaining 
mandatory powers in 1923 were invited to participate in the discussion of the 
mandates question by the Council.314 According to Article 22, the Council 
appointed the members of the PMC, received annual reports of the mandatory 
powers, endowed the Commission with a constitution and rules of procedure, 
made appropriate observations to the mandatory powers on the basis of the PMC 
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reports, modified or amended the terms of the mandates and determined the 
requisite conditions for the termination of a mandate.315 Throughout its life, the 
Council made only unanimous decisions on the mandates.316 
 Article 22 makes no reference to the League Assembly.317 The Assembly 
included all member states of the League and was supportive of the Mandates 
Commission’s work. The Assembly had a majority of non-colonial powers and 
they used the mandates as an opportunity to criticize the colonial governments. 
Criticism in the Assembly would receive wide publicity, which made it a useful 
political weapon.318 In the early years there was a controversy about the role of the 
Assembly relating to the mandates. The first Assembly claimed that they had the 
right to discuss mandates, but this was declined. Lord Balfour stated that the 
responsibility was only the Council’s: “if this catastrophe were really to arise … 
the future of the League of Nations was profoundly imperilled”.319 According to 
Chowdhuri, the controversy led to the fact that even when in the end the 
Assembly did gain the right to discuss mandates as part of its general competence, 
this right was rarely exercised: “The League Assembly limited its action to the 
routine consideration of the section of the Council’s annual report dealing with the 
Mandates through its Sixth (Political Committee) …  [and] adopted resolutions, 
courteously worded.”320 However, Hall gives a very different account of the 
actions of the Assembly relating to the mandates: “It added, not infrequently, 
recommendations relating to particular questions such as the Bondelzwarts 
incident in South West Africa (1922), particular situations in Palestine or Syria, 
or questions like the liquor traffic in the ‘B’ and ‘C’ mandates.”321 The Assembly 
also discussed the annual Secretary General’s report. 
 One of the reasons for the frustrating position of the Mandates Commission 
was that it had to be careful not to undermine the authority of the administration 
in the territories, either in front of the natives or the League of Nations member 
states. For that reason, it very rarely opposed anything that the mandatory powers 
did. The mandatories were hostile to the hearing of petitions in front of the 
Commission and were also antagonistic towards the Commission’s enquiries about 
the mandated territories. The mandatory powers believed that their authority in 
front of the natives would be endangered if the Commission took too active a role 
in the administration of the territories. In their view, the presence of the 
Commission in the mandated territories, or the presence of the petitioners in front 
of the Commission together with the mandatories would put the Commission in 
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the role of a court which was to decide between the view of the mandatory and the 
view of the native. Nor should the Commission provoke complaints that were not 
justifiable from the mandatories’ point of view. In most cases, the Commission 
behaved towards the mandatories in a polite, patient and encouraging manner. 
The mandatories were congratulated whenever the Mandates Commission found 
reason to do so.  The Commission did, however, question the mandatories 
whenever it found it necessary, and particularly worrying questions were brought 
up year after year. There was also direct criticism towards the mandatories, 
particularly South Africa, as the Commission grew suspicious that South Africa 
was attempting to annex South West Africa into its own territory.322 
 Like the mandates system itself, the Mandates Commission set to administer 
it was a mix of liberal idealism and old colonial practices. Its members were 
independent experts who had been nominated by their countries. One sign of the 
influence of liberal ideals was that one of its members was to be a woman. The 
composition was a mix of old colonial officers and idealists. Sometimes these could 
be one and the same person, like Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard, one of the 
chief ideologists of British indirect rule. As an advisory body that relied chiefly on 
the reports of the mandatories themselves and without the power to issue binding 
rulings, the Commission had a weak official position in relation to the 
mandatories. The power of the Commission and its importance lay in its ability to 
make public concerns about the administration of the mandates. An integral part 
of this power was the system of petitions, which it used to exert pressure on the 
mandatories.   
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 3. Themes: A Reading of the Minutes of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission 
3.1 Introduction  
In his book International Law and Human Rights (1950) Hersch Lauterpacht saw the 
mandates as part of the gradual change in the position of the individual in 
international law. While not being subjects of international law, he wrote that 
individuals possess a certain procedural capacity. He pointed out, for instance, 
that the League of Nations Minorities Treaties created rights and duties between 
the signatory parties and thus did not constitute, according to the doctrine of the 
time, direct benefits for the individual. The treaties did not create individuals as 
subjects of international law. He, however, believed that the matter was not so 
black and white, as the treaties created “some procedural status” for the 
minorities. Even more so, he noted, “this was also … the position in relation to the 
inhabitants of mandated territories”. Lauterpacht did not view the mandates 
system as a human rights system. He discussed the Charter of the United Nations 
as the “innovation” where “the individual human being first appears as entitled to 
fundamental human rights and freedoms”.1 He acknowledged the existence of an 
“occasional recognition of some fundamental human rights in treaties providing 
for religious freedom and the cultural and political rights of minorities”, providing 
the Minorities Treaties as an example.2 He did not mention the mandates in this 
context. Thus, for him, the significance of the mandates was processual. They 
included the right to petition, which he argued was a natural right and should be 
included in the post World War II International Bill of Rights.3 The rights granted 
to the inhabitants of the mandates were part of a gradual shift in the position of 
the individual in relation to international law, which would culminate in the post 
World War II human rights treaties. 
 In this section, I will be following the emergence of rights language in the 
minutes of the Mandates Commission during the years 1921-1939. As I have 
discussed in the introduction of this study, I will examine discussions of the PMC 
on land tenure, the obligations that newly independent territories would have, the 
eradication of slavery, the issues of forced labour, the position of women and the 
liberty of conscience as arenas of proto-rights language.  
 The questions that I have chosen to study are those that could also be looked 
at from the point of view of the individual. Each of these issues has the potential to 
improve the position of the individual and have been looked at as such at some 
moment in history. All of the questions that have been studied here concern the 
relationship between the individual and the administration, not only the 
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mandatory administration, but also the PMC as the institution supervising this 
relationship. Through the mandates instruments the mandatories had taken the 
duty to “safeguard the interests of the natives”, for instance by giving certain 
guarantees concerning these different “rights”. Similarly, through receiving 
reports and formulating the questionnaires, the PMC guided each of the 
mandatories to report on its actions regarding these issues. 
 Despite the vast differences between the three types of mandates (A, B and 
C), in most cases the mandates have been studied together. In questions such as 
slavery or the position of women, the PMC discussed the different types of 
mandates in a very similar way. However, in the case of freedom of religion, the 
PMC’s emphasis was different in the A mandates when compared to the B and C 
mandates. In Palestine, the aim to achieve peaceful coexistence between the 
Muslim and Jewish groups demanded most of the PMC’s attention. In Syria and 
Iraq, the PMC’s attention focused on the position of Christian minorities. In the B 
and C mandates, the emphasis was different. The Cameroons had a large Muslim 
population, whose customs the PMC took into consideration, but at the same time 
it accused the Muslims of “uncivilized” practices, such as polygamy and slavery. 
In the other territories most of the discussions related to the various missions and 
their mutual relationships, but every now and then they touched upon native 
religions and their customs as well.  
 In the terminology of the early 20th century, the “rights” of individual people 
usually meant civil rights as opposed to human rights. In 19th- and early 20th 
century Europe civil rights were linked to nationality and citizenship. For this 
reason, they were not provided for in the colonies.4 In the mandatory system, the 
civil rights of the various groups of inhabitants, similar to those granted in 
European constitutions, were granted in the A mandates. For instance, the organic 
law of the mandate of Palestine declared that: “The Mandatory shall be 
responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and 
economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, 
as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, 
and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants of 
Palestine, irrespective of race and religion” (Article 2). The organic law of Iraq 
provided for the personal freedom of all Iraqi dwellers, prohibited torture and the 
exile of Iraquis (sic) outside the Kingdom of Iraq, safeguarded the rights of 
ownership, and free expression and assembly.5 
 Such rights were, however, left outside the competence of the PMC. As the 
PMC discussed the “receivability” of petitions from the mandates, the Commission 
concluded that petitions on matters that could be referred to local courts could not 
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be considered receivable. These would include “ordinary civil rights”.6 The PMC 
deliberately did not want to act as a Court of Appeal. Of course, it was difficult to 
distinguish between questions justiciable in the local courts and those that “refer 
to questions of policy or of administrative or executive action on the part of the 
local officials of the Mandatory Power in regard to which the petitioner has no 
means of redress”.7 Such rights, particularly concerning legal or religious 
discrimination in the different communities, were debated before local courts.8 
 The petitions originating from Palestine revealed the limitations to civil rights. 
The Arab population complained that they were perhaps granted civil rights, but 
political rights were out of their reach. There was no intention by the League to 
give them the right to affect the political status of the area.9  
 While the PMC considered the interpretation of any clauses containing civil 
rights to be the task of local courts, it was interested in their existence in the 
constitutions of the A mandates. However, as regards the substance of such rights, 
the PMC’s interest circled around the situations of minorities.10 The A mandates 
were at least to a certain extent seen to be on a path towards self-determination. 
Thus, it was part of the task of the PMC to see that they had constitutions 
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including rights “granted … by organic laws of all civilized countries”.11 These 
rights were, however, based on the citizenship of the people, and in the case of 
minorities there was a genuine fear that minorities would remain outsiders.12  
 The rhetoric of freedom and promises given to the people in the mandated 
territories, particularly in the A mandates, to have more say in their own matters, 
had been used during World War I to justify the war and to persuade inhabitants 
of colonies to participate in the war. Especially Wilson argued that the right to 
self-determination was one of the main reasons why the war had been fought.13 
During the Paris Peace Conference President Wilson declared that “… to hand 
over distinguishable [?] people to a Mandatory in perpetuity and to say: ‘You 
never shall have a voice in your future; you are finally disposed of,’ would be 
contrary to the principles of that Conference and contrary to the principles of self 
determination accepted by it”.14 Nationalist mobilization took place in several 
colonies, and in the mandated territories it was particularly visible in Syria and in 
Samoa.15 The Syrians in particular were disappointed with the establishment of 
the mandates. They had had high hopes for self-determination and detested 
France’s presence as a mandatory, not least because France had ousted Syria’s old 
government. Now the Syrians felt that the promises made by the League 
Covenant had been broken.16 In Samoa a movement called “Mau” had long been 
in conflict with the New Zealand administration. Pedersen describes the reactions 
of the PMC to the Mau movement and its demands of self-determination as 
paternalistic. The inhabitants of Samoa were deemed immature and difficult and 
thus it was the administration’s task to keep order and protect them.17 Their status 
as a C mandate had in itself declared them not ready for self-determination and 
therefore the PMC was not ready to consider any opposite arguments. 
 The PMC gave conflicting signals of whether it thought that the idea of the 
mandates system was to provide for self-determination for all mandated territories, 
or only for the A mandates. The PMC agreed that the Covenant was clear on the 
fact that the A mandates were of a temporary nature and were to become 
independent “at some future date”.18 The fate of the B and C mandates was more 
complex and as the independence of the first mandated area, Iraq, brought about a 
debate on the general principles of granting independence to a mandate, it was 
only natural to discuss whether these principles concerned the B and C mandates 
at all. As the PMC had been given a task to study the conditions of independence 
by the League Council, the PMC believed it had two options: to follow Chairman 
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Theodoli’s suggestion that they would study only the A mandates as it was not 
possible to foresee the end of the B and C mandates, or, to follow De Penha 
Garcia’s view that the B and C mandates could not be left entirely out. Firstly, he 
noted, the A mandates were so different that one could not speak of them even in 
general terms. Secondly, due to Article 22, “the possibility might well be 
contemplated of a country whose civilization was very different from Western 
civilization but which might be able to give sufficient guarantees to ask for 
emancipation, it being understood that that emancipation would not compromise 
the peace of the world and that, within limits in proportion to its civilization, the 
country would be capable of ruling itself. He did not think that this was a purely 
hypothetical case”.19 Yet, “[h]e was certain that the time for the cessation of B and 
C mandates was still far off”.20 In a note that Van Rees wrote about the general 
conditions to be fulfilled before the mandate regime could be brought to an end, it 
is likely that he sums up the thoughts of the majority of the PMC. While it was 
true that the Wilsonian principles of non-annexation and self-determination 
applied to the entire mandates system, and while the wording of Article 22 refers 
to a “temporary incapacity” of self-government (which Van Rees uses as a 
synonym for self-determination) and it is clear that the Peace Conference 
anticipated that one day all the mandates would win independence, “[i]n the case 
of the African and South Pacific territories, this goal is beyond dispute still so 
remote that it would be safe to say that it is really no more than of theoretical 
interest”.21 
 As Susan Pedersen demonstrates, in practice the PMC did not show that it 
accepted that the right to self-determination was extended to all mandated 
territories. Instead, it used the language of tutelage to deem the mandates 
perpetual minors who would need guidance and education for eternity. The PMC 
would accept the silencing of nationalist movements as long as the mandatories 
would present that as minors, the mandated peoples could not possibly understand 
their own best interests.22  
 I have chosen to study the following themes in the deliberations of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission. 
 In the chapter on religion I have looked at how the clause in the mandates 
granting freedom of religion was understood by the permanent mandates 
commission. Was it seen as granting true freedom of religion to local religions, or 
was it merely a continuation of the idea to protect Christianity in foreign 
territories? The limitation clause included in the B and C mandates gave the PMC 
the possibility to interpret freedom of religion in almost any manner they wished. 
The PMC strove to provide for genuine freedom of religion to the local religions, 
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but at the same time would not disguise their preference for Christianity. At the 
same time, the division between native religions and Christianity was also a 
division between tradition and modernity. How would the PMC balance between 
preserving the traditions and modernizing the territories? Also, the PMC needed 
to balance between preserving native religions and granting the religious rights of 
the many different Christian missions that existed in the mandated territories. 
Would the PMC give preference to either one? In the A mandates matters were 
different and the PMC’s task was to ensure an even treatment for all religious 
communities in the territories.  
 In the section on slavery I look into whether the process that had started as 
the anti-slavery movement in the early 19th century had evolved during the 
mandates period. How was slavery approached by the PMC? Was it a tragedy 
perceived by the individual or a societal or civilizational question?  
 It has been claimed that the abolition of slavery and the slave trade was the 
first human right or human rights movement.23 Therefore I have looked into the 
discourse used by the PMC to see whether they viewed the prohibition of slavery 
through rights language, or whether there was any other motivation instead of, or 
in addition to, the individual right to freedom of the populations in the mandates. 
The discussions show that the abolition of the slave trade and slavery was the 
result of a mix of motivations such as paternalism, moral superiority, preserving 
racial hierarchies, civilization, but also genuine benevolence. 
 Fair working conditions were provided by Article 23 of the League Covenant, 
forced labour was prohibited in the separate mandates agreements, and Article 
421 of the Versailles Treaty required the application of ILO labour conventions in 
colonies as well. Thus, guarantees for fair labour conditions were provided for by 
three international instruments. Here I have looked at how these instruments were 
applied in the mandates. The PMC was almost unanimous about the necessity to 
abolish forced labour (here D’Andrade is an exception, emphasizing the 
educational aspect of labour), but as with slavery, it was difficult to find out 
whether there was actually forced labour in the mandates. The PMC needed to 
interpret the clauses by drawing the line between legal and prohibited forms of 
labour, including traditional forms of labour ordered by village chiefs and labour 
levies. Through labour the PMC was required to find an appropriate balance 
between the well-being of the people and the economic development of the 
territory. 
 The mandatories of the B mandates were given the duty of taking native laws 
and customs into consideration and respecting the rights and interests of the 
native population when framing laws relating to the holding and transfer of land. 
In the section on land tenure I study how this clause was interpreted. What was 
meant by native interests? Who would determine what the interests and rights of 
natives to their land were? Questions regarding the use of land reveal the conflict 
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between local traditions and the idea of modernization and modern ownership that 
the mandates were supposed to forward. The mandatories were seen as the 
guarantors of native rights and the possible threat to land rights was expected to 
come from within, namely from the ignorance of the natives. Thus, it was the 
mandatory’s duty to teach proper ownership to the natives. 
 Issues relating to women did not appear in Article 22, the individual 
mandates, nor even in the questionnaires. However, in the minutes of the PMC 
they appeared as separate topics, often initiated by Dannevig. Women’s issues also 
came under discussion through petitions sent by organizations advocating 
women’s rights. In the section on women’s issues, I have looked at how questions 
such as dowries, female circumcision, child marriages, polygamy, prostitution, 
education and labour were discussed in the PMC. How did the PMC see their 
role in improving the position of women in the mandates? Did the Commission see 
women as a group, the rights of which would warrant separate action, or were 
women seen as a part of a greater culture, the traditions of which were either to be 




The themes chosen for this chapter, apart from women’s issues, were present in 
the questionnaires that the PMC drafted for the mandatories of the B and C 
mandates during its first meeting. The aim of these questionnaires was to serve as 
frameworks for the reports that the mandatories were to draft. Thus, the purpose 
of the questionnaires was to provide the PMC with sufficiently detailed reports. 
New questionnaires to replace the old ones were drafted in 1926. 
 Rappard drafted the first preliminary draft questionnaire. In his draft he 
included the “special clauses with regard to the guarantees laid down by the 
Covenant or by the draft mandates” and “General clauses in accordance with the 
spirit of the Covenant”.24 The topics included slavery, labour, arms and munitions, 
liquor, freedom of conscience, military clauses, economic equality, education, 
public health, land tenure, moral, social and material welfare of the natives (which 
included interests, rights and customs of the natives), public finance and 
demographic statistics. The questionnaire did not include a separate paragraph on 
women, but women’s issues were dealt with under the other rubrics, especially 
labour and social and material welfare of the natives. The drafting of the questions 
regarding the mandates required some assistance from the representative of the 
ILO, whereas the other questions were drafted by the PMC alone.  
 I will present the formulation of the questionnaire of forced labour as an 
example. D’Andrade believed that the suggested formulation was too restrictive. 
As he would explain on many occasions, he believed that “forced” and 
“compulsory labour” were not synonymous. In his view, compulsory labour was 
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necessary to prevent native idleness and laziness, which differed from “going to 
the native villages, to take natives and to bring them, under escort, to the locality 
where they were to work”.25 The former simply meant that “the native should not 
be entitled to refuse to work, though he should have the right to choose freely the 
nature and place of his work”.26 Rappard reminded D’Andrade that in studying 
the reports the PMC was bound by the provisions of the draft mandates, which 
included an absolute prohibition on forced labour. Thomas of the ILO noted that 
what needed to be taken into account in the questionnaire were both the 
prohibition of forced labour as stated in the mandatory agreements, and the actual 
conditions of the mandates. Thus, in the end, the questions on forced labour took 




A. 1. What are the measures intended to ensure the prohibition of forced 
labour? 
2. For what public works and services is forced native labour required? How 
is this regulated? 
3. Are there any other forms of forced labour, such as labour in lieu of 
taxation, maintenance of highways, etc., except for essential public works and 
services? 
4. Are there any other forms of forced labour, such as work on plantations or 
commercial undertakings? If so, how are these regulated? 
5. What are the positive results of these measures? 
 
B. 1. What measures have been taken with regard to the recruiting of labour? 
2. Does the administration participate in this recruiting? 
3. What compulsory measures are authorized with respect to native labour? 
4. What powers has the Administration for dealing with labour contracts and 




A. 1. What measures have been adopted to ensure that account is taken of the 
conventions or recommendations of the International Labour Conferences? 
2. Are these Conventions or recommendations being carried into effect? 
3. By what other provisions is free labour protected?27 
The other questions followed this same format, although with varying degrees of 
detail. In 1926 the PMC drafted a new set of questions, as it had become apparent 
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that the original ones left out important questions. Thus, the new formulation took 
into account the already existing reports and the questions were drafted according 
to the actual reports of the mandatories.28  
 Not all of the issues dealt with by the questionnaires have been studied here. 
Drawing the line between “rights” issues and social questions is not easy, as many 
of the questions at hand, particularly slavery, forced labour, land tenure and the 
position of women, can be seen equally well as social questions than as rights. 
Moreover, the PMC has often discussed these questions as social issues, taking 
the perspective of the entire community instead of the individual. In cases where 
there has been a tension between the advantage of the community and that of the 
individual, the imagined good of the society has prevailed. The position of slaves 
serves as an example. In many of the PMC’s discussions on slavery it became clear 
that it was often considered more important to maintain order in society by 
avoiding sudden changes than rapidly changing the position of individual slaves. 
Change and improvement was looked at from the perspective of generations. As 
the mandatories and the PMC were not actively advancing the independence of 
the mandates, they believed they had ample time to enable a change that would 
take place over generations.  
 Of course, by discussing matters that were seen as social questions rather 
than as rights, the problem of anachronism remains.29 In reading the minutes of 
the PMC, I have been interested in examining how the different members of the 
PMC have discussed these questions and what point of view they have taken. The 
minutes do not show that the PMC would have viewed the issues as rights, not to 
mention individual rights or human rights. However, at times, they do reveal a 
certain sensibility towards the idea that the presence of a mandatory ought to lead 
to improvements in the conditions of individual slaves, labourers, and women and 
children as well. 
3.2 Freedom of Religion 
The provisions established in the mandates system set out to guarantee freedom of 
religion conceptualized as freedom of conscience. The aim of this section is to 
explore the freedom of religion in the mandates system, as discussed in the PMC. 
Freedom of religion was established as a freedom which was secured through the 
establishment of safeguards. Within the provisions, freedom of religion was 
understood to be universal which covered all religions. Within the League, 
freedom of religion was a contested issue and the practical application of the 
universal doctrine proved to be an issue, especially when the religion in question 
was not Christianity and even more so when discussing so-called native religions. 
                                                      
28 Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations, 161. 
29 See Moyn, ‘Substance, Scale, and Salience: The Recent Historiography of Human 
Rights’; Pedersen, ‘Did “Imperial Trusteeship” have Anything to Do with “Human 
Rights”?’ I have discussed the question of anachronism in the introduction to this study. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
90 
In the following I will observe how the PMC pondered religious rights in Africa 
and the respective encroachments of Christianity and Islam. Freedom of religion 
was also a fundamental issue which separated discussions between A, B and C 
mandates, mostly because the issue of freedom of religious rights was a highly 
contentious political issue of the mandated territories of Palestine and Syria. The 
concept of freedom of religion dates back several centuries and the concept had 
become generally accepted by the early 20th century. However, the purpose and 
meaning of the concept has changed throughout its history. The flexibility of the 
concept of freedom of religion has a tendency to make it a good indicator of the 
influence of contemporary values, convictions and ideas. 
 Until the early 20th century freedom of religion was closely tied to protection 
of (Christian) minorities.30 Europeans were worried about Christian minorities in 
new states and therefore freedom of religion was closely tied to minority rights 
and the standard of civilization.  The Berlin Treaty of 1878 organized the post-
Ottoman order in the Balkans and Eastern Europe and provided for freedom of 
religion in the newly-established states. Freedom of religion had become a 
condition for independence in the new states, as it would be during the League 
period as well (at least in most cases).31 
 Malcolm Evans regards religious freedom to be “one of the driving impulses 
behind the [League of Nations] minority treaties”.32 According to him, they had an 
even more permanent meaning, as the principles that they expressed continued to 
live on in the European Convention of Human Rights.33 Evans, however, omits 
mandates from the scope of religious rights: “Just as religious freedom had 
previously been bound up with minority rights, since the 1940s the international 
protection of religious freedom has been bound up with the development of the 
concept of individual human rights as an object of international legal concern.” 34 
Yet, religious rights are granted explicitly in the mandates as well, and not only in 
connection with minorities. 
 Woodrow Wilson had planned that freedom of religion would have a stronger 
emphasis in the League Covenant. The plan to include religious freedom in the 
covenant was, however, silently buried, as it would have left the door open to 
                                                      
30 On the duty of civilized nations to protect freedom of religion in less civilized states and 
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32 Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, 162. 
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Japan’s initiative on the equality of races.35 Anna Su claims that the reason why 
freedom of conscience was attached to the mandates (and minority regimes) was 
President Wilson’s insistence on including it in one way or another in the League 
Covenant. Wilson’s preference would have been to include a general article of 
freedom of conscience in the Covenant, as he, according to Su, believed that it 
would be needed to avoid future wars. Wilson believed religious intolerance to be 
a potential source of war.36 However, including the said article would have opened 
up discussion on Japan’s proposal for racial equality. Thus, as Japan’s proposal 
could not be approved, so Wilson’s suggestion had to go.37 In a later version of his 
drafts for the mandates system he therefore included freedom of conscience and 
religion.38 
 By the time of the establishment of the League there was a will to grant 
freedom of religion not only to Christians but to other religions as well, at least in 
theory. However, in speech and in practice, many actors in the League (diplomats, 
PMC members, etc.) revealed that their way of thinking derived from the old 
prejudices and their wish to secure the rights of Christians. This is also apparent 
in the reactions to the Japanese equality initiative. However, the changes were 
already in the air, as can be seen from the comments to questions on the religious 
rights of some of the PMC members.  
 Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship were 
guaranteed both in B and C mandates.39 In the B mandates this was guaranteed by 
Article 22 of the League Nations Covenant, according to which administration 
must happen “under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or 
religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals …”.40 The C 
mandates had the same safeguards as the B mandates.41 
 The individual agreements of the B mandates declared that: “The Mandatory 
shall ensure in the territory complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise 
of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality; 
missionaries who are nationals of states members of the League of Nations shall be 
free to enter the territory and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess 
property, to erect religious buildings and to open schools throughout the territory; 
it being understood, however, that the Mandatory shall have the right to exercise 
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37 Ibid., 248–49. 
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such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good 
government, and to take all measures required for such control.”42  
 The statutes of the C mandates had a different wording, putting more 
emphasis on the limitations: “Subject to the provisions of any local law for the 
maintenance of public order and public morals, the Mandatory shall ensure in the 
territory freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, and 
shall allow all missionaries, nationals of any state member of the League of 
Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the territory for the purpose of 
prosecuting their calling.”43 Thus, the provisions existed for the two different types 
of mandates, but the tools granted for limiting the right were stronger for the C 
mandates.  
 However, in practice the interpretation of freedom of conscience did not 
differ in the B and C mandates. Freedom of conscience granted by the different 
mandates was twofold. According to the mandates agreements, all forms of 
worship could be freely exercised, and thus, there was complete freedom of 
religion (limited, of course, by the condition of public order and morality). More 
important for the interests of the PMC and the discussions between the 
Commission was the second part of the clause, which provided for free entrance 
and residence of missionaries who were nationals of a League of Nations member 
state. 
 The statutes of the mandates ensured freedom of conscience that would cover 
the practice of native religions as well. However, as the paragraph limited the 
exercise of religion, conditioning it to public order and morality, it gave the PMC 
and especially the mandatories a very broad “margin of appreciation” in the 
interpretation of such rights.44 The PMC gave the mandatory a rather free hand as 
regards the limitations, with the reminder that such a condition (i.e. public order 
and morality) was necessary for the full development of all freedom. In the PMC’s 
report of the third session it was written that: “[t]he Commission therefore drew 
attention to the fact that the mandate makes the free exercise of religion subject to 
the condition that it should not be prejudicial to public order, and that, in this 
connection, the mandate gives to the Mandatory the right to exercise such control 
as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order. … and order is a 
necessary condition for the full development of all freedom, not excepting freedom 
of religion.” The text originally related to B mandates, but Orts pointed out that it 
applied to the other mandates equally.45 Orts noted that the maintenance of order 
(if it was genuinely endangered) was the highest priority and free from criticism, 
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and would trump free exercise of religion, but only to the extent that it was 
necessary.46 
 Of course, the task of making such limitations and creating a standard that 
would take all different interests into account, was not easy. While respecting 
native religions, the administration also had the duty to educate natives in moral 
matters, and the PMC at times struggled to reconcile these two duties. Palacios 
commented on the annual report of the Education Department of Tanganyika for 
1930 about the “difficulty of achieving a code of pan-moral training to serve as a 
standard which would respect the convictions of such widely different persuasions 
as the Pagan, Mohammedan and Christian, and of the difficulties of creating a 
model type of African citizen”. He believed that the people working for the 
administration and concerned with such matters “were doing so in the noblest 
spirit”.47 Thus, he applauded the Department for their noble spirit faced with a 
difficult task. 
 Both the PMC and the mandatories felt an urge to convince others that they 
were taking the freedom of native religions seriously. The New Guinea 
administration ensured that it “… endeavoured, as far as was practicable and 
consistent with public morality and civilization, not to interfere with native 
customs and religious practices, or, for that matter, with the practice of the 
Christian religion”.48 So, as the administration did not interfere with native 
customs, similarly it did not want to interfere with missions and their freedom. 
The representative of British Togoland also assured the PMC that it was the 
policy of the government to grant complete liberty of conscience and worship to 
all individuals, regardless of whether they were Christian, pagan or Muslim. He 
stressed that “it is not the duty of the Government … to bring any pressure to bear 
on the people to abandon their pagan beliefs, provided of course that they do not 
involve the performance of any barbarous practices”.49 
 However, even when the PMC reminded the mandatories about their duty to 
ensure that native religions were respected, it was quite apparent that they would 
have preferred the natives to be Christians. This preference was closely tied to 
demands of civilization. To the PMC, civilization equalled Christianity. Therefore, 
native religions were at best tolerated, but their practice was not encouraged. It 
was believed that civilization would bring about Christianity in its wake. Even 
though there was a freedom to practice all religions, and to some extent this was 
recognized by the PMC, the attitude of the Commission towards native religions 
was apparent. For example, on commenting on the evangelization of two native 
Sultans in Ruanda-Urundi, M. Palacios noted that “there was happily no such 
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clash between native traditions and civilized morality [in Ruanda-Urundi] as 
existed in other mandated countries in Africa”. In his view the “conversion of the 
big chiefs … must be recorded as a great innovation since they were the living 
embodiment of the ancient native customs.”50  
 The fact that Christianity had been widely spread in the territories was 
generally applauded as simplifying the duties of the mandatory. Palacios 
questioned Samoa’s representative about the true meaning of liberty of conscience 
in Samoa. To whom did it apply? Were “native beliefs unjustly interfered with 
under cover of the legislation concerning public order or morality”?51 Mr. Gray, 
representing Samoa’s administration, assured him that “there was absolute liberty 
of conscience for everybody. All the natives were Christians”.52 In certain regions 
of the French Cameroons, a report of the administration had noted that due to the 
presence of Catholic schools, a third of the children were baptized and another 
third were “sympathizers whose only reasons for not being converted were to be 
found in their attachment to certain traditions, especially polygamy”. Even the 
remaining third could not be regarded “as beyond reach”.53 To Dannevig’s 
assumption that the missions of the said territory were working in the interest of 
the natives, Besson, the French representative, assured him that there was “not a 
shadow of doubt about that”.54 
 It would be too simplistic to say that freedom of religion covered only 
Christianity in the B and C mandates, but native religions were hardly ever 
discussed unless they caused moral dismay, and there was a general 
understanding of the spread of Christianity benefiting the general progress of the 
territories.  
 Of course, Islam was an issue in some of the mandates, especially in the 
Cameroons. Muslims formed a part of the society that was considered to be at a 
more developed level and, at the same time, an existing reality that simply needed 
to be tolerated. Muslims were accepted as representatives of native customs, and 
for instance in the French Cameroons representatives of religious groups sat as 
assessors in helping solve disputes, their task being to “indicate the native 
custom”.55 At the same time the PMC was appalled by certain customs it viewed as 
Muslim, including the slave trade.56  
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 In the discussions of the PMC the native religions represented tradition. It 
was the task of the mandatory system to preserve the worthiest traditions, to do 
away with the rest and to introduce progress. It was a difficult balancing act to 
establish the features of native religions that could be considered worth saving. 
 The emphasis of the discussions on religion between the PMC and the 
mandatories was how the different missions worked in the mandates rather than 
how freedom of native religions was arranged. The latter part of the article on 
freedom of religion in the mandates concerns the freedom of missions to enter and 
work in the territories.  
 The missions, representing various different churches and denominations 
(e.g. the Roman Catholic Church, the Church of England and other Protestant 
Churches), had a vast number of tasks to take care of and were an essential part of 
the administration. Apart from actual religious tasks, or tasks that could be 
considered to be practising religion, they founded different kinds of schools 
throughout the mandated areas and were largely responsible for health care, 
sending doctors, etc.,57 and also had commercial enterprises, such as sawmills (that 
were partly used for educational purposes).58 The missions had been in the 
mandated territories longer than the mandatory administrations, many already 
during the German period, and therefore had experience of the territory that the 
administration had not yet accrued.  
 Many of the missions arranging education were government funded, and one 
of the tasks of the PMC was to ensure even distribution of resources between 
them.59 In some cases the mission schools had better resources and were 
applauded by the PMC for their accomplishments in education.60  
 Of course, when one looks at freedom of conscience from the point of view of 
the missions, an entirely different picture emerges. For the missions, freedom of 
conscience meant freedom from the supervision of the administration. In the event 
that they felt that the mandatories had too much control over the missions, the 
missions did not hesitate to invoke freedom of conscience for their own benefit. 
For example, the administration of New Guinea complained that “[E]ven a 
suggestion to the missions to submit reports might be misconstrued and held to 
infringe that all important principle of freedom of conscience”.61 To a certain 
extent the PMC agreed with the missions. Palacios noted that the reports would 
be sent to the mandatory instead of the PMC: “This question had nothing to do 
with freedom of conscience but, on the contrary, would tend better to safeguard 
that freedom.”62 
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 The missionaries’ double role as provider of religious services and as part of 
the administration by e.g. organizing education was not always easy, and could 
cause tensions between different interest groups. In South West Africa the 
administration tried to resolve the problem by requiring a permission from the 
missions to operate. However, this worried the PMC as they saw a risk of 
infringing freedom of worship if the missions could not operate freely.63 
 There was a certain amount of jealousy between the different missions, 
primarily about allocation of funding and other resources. There were, for 
instance, disputes on the allocation of funding between the Roman Catholic and 
the Finnish missions in South West Africa.64 The British representative of 
Tanganyika even went so far as to suggest spheres of influence to the various 
missions in Tanganyika, so as to avoid competition and friction between the 
missions. The PMC was reluctant to consent, recommending instead other ways to 
solve the tension. “The duty of the Commission was to safeguard the interests of 
the natives, and it was clear that the natives were not profiting by the rivalry of 
the missionaries,” Lugard said.65 On the other hand, the PMC applauded a decree 
regulating various forms of worship in the Cameroons that had been made by the 
Catholic and Protestant missions together.66 
 Each of the A mandates provided for slightly different provisions regarding 
religious liberties. The British Mandate for Palestine stated that “it being clearly 
understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and 
political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country…”(preamble);  “The 
Mandatory shall be responsible … for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of 
all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion” (art. 2). Respect 
for their [the various peoples and communities] religious interests shall be fully 
guaranteed (Art. 9).67 “All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and 
religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights 
and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the 
free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and 
decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory…” (Art. 13).68 Article 14 provided for a 
special commission to “study, define and determine the rights and claims in 
connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different 
religious communities in Palestine”. “The Mandatory shall see that complete 
freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to 
the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination 
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of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of 
race, religion or language.” (Art. 15)69 
 Religion was a more discussed issue in the A mandates than in the B and C 
mandates. In Palestine, the plan of the administration was to arrange the three 
major religious communities, the Jews, the Christians and the Arabs (Muslims) in 
a pluralistic manner, where they could settle questions such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, etc. according to their own faiths. The problem, however, was that the 
division was not as clear as the administration would have wished it to be. The 
Jewish community was divided into several subgroups, including Zionists (the 
majority), Sephardic Jews and Ashkenazic Jews, the latter group including an 
even smaller extreme orthodox minority composed of Chassidim Jews. The 
Zionist organization was set to represent the Jewish population of the Mandate.70 
The orthodox Ashkenazic communities petitioned to the PMC that their religious 
freedom was infringed by the administration’s plan to neatly group the different 
religions according to the majority. One of the major issues was the ritual 
slaughter of animals. Ormsby-Gore, the British representative, assured that even 
when the Jewish people formed one large community (and if needed, the 
petitioners could form a sub-community), their religious rights would be taken 
care of. The PMC was not convinced and did not understand why the orthodox 
Jews could not form a separate community according to their own wishes. The 
British had understood that the Orthodox Jews would have wanted to expand 
their own religious customs to the entire Jewish community, being the “original 
Jews” in Palestine. To complicate matters even further, the Jews in Frankfurt, 
Germany, joined the Ashkenazi in their quest. The PMC pointed out that the 
administration was bound by Article 2 of the Palestinian mandate, which 
safeguarded the “civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 
irrespective of race and religion”.71  
 Syria had also suffered serious discontent and unrest, and the Executive 
Committee of the Syro-Palestinian Congress approached the League of Nations 
with an petition in 1925. According to this appeal, France had taken no measures 
to guarantee freedom of worship. Syria had a numerous amount of small religious 
communities, and these had been used as a basis for the political organization of 
the state. However, according to the appeal, only communities large enough were 
granted the possibility to stand for election. Thus, small communities had to join 
others in order to make a large enough entity. The appeal went on to say that: 
“The French have done everything in their power to stir up religious antagonism 
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and to favour one community at the expense of another. … This is how France, 
the home of liberty and the proclaimer of the rights of man, applies her noble 
precepts in Syria and the Lebanon.”72 
 There was a constant danger of conflict between communities. In the A 
mandates the administration had the difficult task of balancing between different 
religious groups and their claims of ownership of holy places: “Feelings ran high 
… and there was a constant danger of incidents occurring between the officiating 
clergy.”73 In Syria the right to convert to another religion raised questions. From 
the point of view of freedom of conscience, should the administration respect the 
prohibition of conversion as applied by the Muslim religion, or the right to choose 
one’s religion? Rappard explained that the mandate required religious tolerance 
and it was the administration’s duty to grant it. According to him, claiming that 
respecting the prohibition of conversion as a religious practice was akin to 
accepting cannibalism because it was practised in a certain country. It was 
precisely the mandate’s task to change such practices. The French representative 
accepted Rappard’s idea in principle, but maintained that “it could only come 
about with a new generation”. He did not want to risk converts being murdered.74 
 It was thought that in some cases Christians would expect the mandatory to 
grant them preferential treatment, as was the case in Lebanon, and this would 
cause suspicion among Muslims.75 There were often differing views between the 
mandatories and the locals over whether religious rights had been violated. Here, 
the PMC resolved the issue through strict interpretation: if the communities felt 
their rights were violated, they were. The PMC noted that if some groups were 
complaining about their religious rights, there apparently was a problem and such 
rights were not granted in an appropriate manner. This applied, for example, to 
the community of Ashkenazic Jews in Palestine that was striving for its own 
religious traditions to be accepted by the majority. Some members of the PMC 
wanted to wait and see if the communities would reach an agreement, but 
Rappard noted that the Commission could not disregard petitions. The Chairman 
was not satisfied with Britain’s way of handling the matter and noted that: “He 
thought personally that the mandatory Power might have shown more prudence 
in dealing with such delicate questions.”76  
 At times religious rights would clash with other, especially women’s, rights. 
In a petition by the Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish Community, it complained 
about the lack of religious freedom: “The Statute for the Organization of Jewish 
Communities in Palestine, proposed by the secular and national Jews … deprives 
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Jewish inhabitants of freedom of religion and conscience and endangers the 
possibility of observing religion in communal life in Palestine in the future. The 
said Statute already contains clauses that are against Jewish morals and religion, 
such as giving women active and passive right of election, which is not practised in 
any existing Jewish community.” They referred to the customs of their community 
as the “tradition and … life of the original Jewish settlement in Palestine”.77  
 As with the League of Nations minorities regime, religion was to become an 
important condition for granting independence to new states. In the context of 
mandates, this meant scrutinizing Iraq’s treatment of its minorities before giving 
the PMC’s official recommendation for Iraq’s independence. For the PMC, the 
major interest seemed to be on the Christian Armenian minority: “Recognition of 
universal freedom of conscience and freedom to practise the various forms of 
worship, as well as respect for missionary enterprise, religious and social, subject 
to the necessary measures for the maintenance of public order, morals and good 
government, cannot reasonably be deemed an infringement of a country’s 
independence or sovereignty.” This was a principle that the PMC feared Iraq 
would not consent to if it became independent.78 In freedom of religion the PMC 
recognized a kind of a higher principle of rights, above independence or 
sovereignty.79 
 The League of Nations through the Mandates Commission grappled with 
issues of freedom of religion in highly different ways in relation to different 
mandated areas. Within the African territories the questions that arose were 
mostly linked with zealous missionaries whose conception of religious freedom 
was myopic. For them, freedom of conscience was shorthand for their own 
freedom from interference by the mandates administration. With regard to the B 
and C mandates, the issues of religious freedom were little different to those faced 
by the contemporary colonial administrations. The situation was completely 
different with regard to the A mandates, especially Palestine and Syria, including 
Lebanon. There conflicts between population groups took the form of religious 
conflict. In places like Syria and Lebanon there was a deep mistrust that the 
Christian mandatory powers would give preferential treatment to the Christian 
population. In Palestine religious conflicts took place between the fast- growing 
Jewish population, the Muslim elite and the Christian minority. A further issue 
was the protection of holy sites. The concern shown by the PMC for Christians is 
evident when it discussed the protection of the Christian minorities in the event of 
Iraqi independence.  
                                                      
77 Minutes 7 (1925), Annex 8, Petition from the Council of the Ashkenazic Jewish 
Community at Jerusalem, 182. 
78 Annex 3. Admission of Iraq to the League of Nations. Considerations which might 
serve as a basis for the discussion of this question. Note by M. Van Rees, Minutes 18 
(1930), 172. 
79 On other conditions for newly independent states, see section 4.2. 




One of the most voluminous issues dealt with by the PMC revolved around 
personal freedom, or in the vocabulary of the time, slavery. In this section I will 
study how the idea of anti-slavery evolved from the early years of the abolitionist 
movement and came to influence the working of the League of Nations. Slavery 
can be seen as an issue of Empire, the commercial foundation of colonial empires 
being founded on slave labour. Equally, the abolitionist movement had its roots in 
imperialist thought as well. It gave a moral justification to the colonial project and 
opposition to slavery was intimately tied to the idea of the superiority of 
civilization. Abolitionism was initially a British initiative, and although 
international agreements condemning slavery may be traced back to the early 19th 
century, most of these agreements may be traced to vocal popular opposition to 
slavery in Britain. For the League of Nations mandates system, the existence of 
slavery was clearly a moral and ethical issue, one that found wide support both in 
idealistic as well as realistic members. In the following we shall see how the fact-
finding operation of the PMC struggled with the practical implications of this 
idealistic demand. They grappled not only with definitional issues such as whether 
various kinds of dependencies should be defined as slavery, but also purely 
exploitative new practices, for example in South West Africa.  
 Britain started leading the anti-slavery movement from the early 19th century 
onwards. The earliest activists were members of different churches, and by the 
end of the century the campaign against slavery was on the official British agenda 
as well. Britain acted as the police of the seas, searching and seizing vessels of 
other nations suspected of carrying slaves and setting up tribunals around the 
Atlantic to confiscate the ships and liberate the slaves onboard. Britain’s actions 
were enabled by bilateral treaties, negotiations of which were achieved through 
both diplomatic means, and coercion and bribery.80  
 Several reasons have been given for Britain’s eagerness to stand in the 
forefront of the abolition movement. The history of abolition is not necessarily a 
history of humanitarianism or benevolence, though these values did play a role as 
well, especially in the early campaign. One common purpose for the early 
abolitionists, and people demanding measures against slavery was the belief in 
their own superior civilization. First, Europeans tended to compare themselves 
with Americans, and particularly the British compared themselves to all the rest.81 
Thus, a great influence has been colonial competition, economics, and Britain’s 
fear of losing its status as the leading maritime power.82 The historian Suzanne 
Miers notes that opposition of the slave trade in Britain in the early 19th century 
was based on economic competition. The reasons behind Britain’s vision of itself 
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as the leading force in abolishing the slave trade lay in domestic politics.83 What 
helped to ease the path to abolitionism was the fact that Britain did not have too 
much to lose. The problems experienced by the French in their Caribbean colonies 
diminished competition from them. As far as competition between the British and 
the Americans was concerned, if one abolished slavery, then the other one would 
be forced to follow. Ending the slave trade would increase prices and therefore 
profits. Thus, both the British and the Americans could try to emphasize their 
moral superiority without too many economic risks.84 Abolishing slavery led to 
diminishing production and as a result the British established new categories of 
slavery, i.e. slaves without legal status.85 Also, employers in the colonies could now 
use the newly-freed work force for their own purposes.86 Lauren Benton and 
Aaron Slater argue that the discussion on the rights of slaves in the British Empire 
served the purpose of strengthening the Empire as opposed to the slave owners in 
the British colonies. As the Empire presented itself as the giver of rights, it would 
prevent the periphery from taking over that task.87 
 Britain’s abolitionist campaign was started by activists, mainly belonging to 
different churches, who started to put pressure on the government. The campaign 
expanded due to the active role of both churches and newspapers.88 The 
abolitionist movement’s success was due to several reasons, including their 
successful marketing campaign, a fear of slave revolts, which meant some planters 
opted for emancipation (though expecting compensation), and also diminishing 
profits from the slave colonies.89 It was also anticipated that freed slaves would 
work harder when paid for their work.90 For a long time, the French and the 
Americans, not to mention the smaller actors in the slave trade, showed little 
interest in an active campaign against slave trade.91 The internationalization of the 
abolitionist campaign, however, can be linked to the British anti-slavery 
movement. 
 Historically, restricting slavery has been a way for colonial powers to flaunt 
their benevolence and humanitarianism.92 However, even when abolition was 
progressing, and Britain began to use its maritime power to influence the slave 
trade in other nations as well, a constant conflict between benevolence and 
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economics remained. This conflict would continue well into the 20th century and 
would influence the discussions on slavery in the Permanent Mandates 
Commission.93 
 Britain aimed at internationalizing the campaign against the slave trade by 
legal means. Early efforts include the Congress of Vienna in 1814, where slave 
traffic was condemned as “repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal 
morality” but not considered illegal,94 and the bilateral treaties allowing mutual 
search of ships and creating bilateral courts and mixed commissions to condemn 
slave traders.95  
 Slavery and the slave trade were only briefly on the agenda at the Berlin 
Africa Conference of 1884-1885. The final act of the conference stated that the 
slave trade was “forbidden by international law”, but no enforcement machinery 
was provided.96 Countries where the slave trade was still practised could be left 
outside the sphere of international law.97 According to Article 6.1: “All the Powers 
exercising sovereign rights or influence in the aforesaid territories bind themselves 
to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the 
improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being, and to help 
in suppressing slavery, and especially the slave trade. They shall, without 
distinction of creed or nation, protect and favour all religious, scientific or 
charitable institutions and undertakings created and organized for the above ends, 
or which aim at instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of 
civilization.” Thus, the treaty gave the colonial powers the “noble” task of putting 
an end to slavery by civilizing them,98 a task that would later be institutionalized 
by the mandates system. 
 The Brussels Act of 1890 was the first multilateral treaty against the slave 
trade. According to Britain, colonies were needed to improve the position of the 
natives, including slaves. It was also believed that the gradual civilization of the 
colonies would by itself take care of the problem of slaves.99 The treaty stressed 
the role of imperialism in the international campaign against slavery.100 The act 
was the first supervisory machinery, though it did not provide means for 
enforcement. It did, however, grant the possibility to search for slaves from the 
ships of other nations and thus control maritime traffic.101  
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 From 1919 onwards there was official slave trade only to the Arab countries 
and the Persian Gulf. The Brussels Act had lapsed during the war and the colonial 
powers were not interested in renewing it. Instead, a small clause was added to a 
treaty signed in St. Germain-en-Laye in 1919 on “the complete suppression of 
slavery in all its forms”.102 In addition, Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations provided for “fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and 
children”, although it was not clear if this applied to the colonies as well, since 
there was a separate clause for “just treatment of the native inhabitants of 
territories under their control”.103 The slave trade, not slavery itself, was 
prohibited by the mandates Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. The 
individual B mandates included the suppression of “all forms of slave trade” and 
“the eventual emancipation of all slaves”,104 whereas the C mandates included only 
the former.105 Thus, the B mandates went further than the Covenant in providing 
for the abolition of slavery as well.106 In the A mandates slave trade was 
approached as a treaty obligation. According to the mandates agreements, the 
duty of the mandatory was to adhere on behalf of the mandate to international 
conventions on slave trade.107 
 The Slavery Convention of 1926 was created under the auspices of the 
League of Nations. This treaty condemned slavery “in all its forms”.108 Slavery was 
defined as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the rights of ownership are exercised”.109 This did not necessarily 
include “lesser forms of exploitation”, such as serfdom or debt bondage, since a 
distinction between slavery and such “lesser forms” was formed by the League of 
Nations Committee of Experts on Slavery in 1936.110 This treaty was also a tool 
for Europeans to eradicate the last remnants of slavery outside the sphere of 
civilization and to overcome “the hurdles of native ignorance, laziness and cultural 
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backwardness”.111 International law now included a formal prohibition of slavery 
and  the Convention on the prohibition of slavery was also applied to the 
mandates.112  
 Especially in the early years of the mandates, very little was known about 
slavery in the territories. There were problems relating to the definition of slavery, 
where the mandatories were not too willing to admit the existence of slavery and 
would rather speak of it in different terms. Or, on other occasions, they would 
admit the existence but note its illegality.113 Of the C mandates, South West Africa 
had already been declared slavery free at the second session, but later it was 
noticed that the matter was more complicated than the administrator had been 
willing to admit.114 
 The Permanent Mandates Commission prepared a questionnaire with which 
it wanted to find out about slavery in the mandated territories. In the resulting 
report in 1923, it was noted that in practice slavery existed in many of the 
mandates, including, but not limited to, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi, both the 
British and French Cameroons and French Togoland.115 Thus slavery was 
particularly a problem in the B mandated territories which was in some territories 
explained by the influence of Islam.116 In many of the territories it was 
nevertheless not clear whether slavery was legally permitted. For instance, in 
French Togoland, preconditions for freeing slaves did exist; in Ruanda-Urundi 
there was an order to register domestic slaves, whereas in Tanganyika an 
ordinance came into force which prohibited keeping anyone a slave against his 
will. Also in South West Africa slavery was described as having a “mild 
character”, which required no “drastic action”. These slaves were said to 
“voluntarily pledge the persons of themselves and their children as security for 
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some debt or obligation” for a period lasting only as long as the obligation.117 Thus, 
legally slavery was not allowed but did exist in practice.118 The existence of slavery 
was not only limited to the B and C mandates, but in Jordan the administration 
also reported that “semi-slaves”, descendants of African pilgrims to Mecca and 
captured by Arabs, did exist.119 The same applied to Syria and Lebanon. Also in 
this case the administration was eager to differentiate the slave trade by local 
tribes and domestic slavery (or a “domestic status which was not without some 
resemblance to slavery”), practised by the Muslim population. “If … it was a 
question of interfering in the domestic life of the Moslems, it would be necessary 
to proceed with extreme prudence.”120 
 The attempt to “round-up” Bushmen by farmers in South West Africa 
illustrates the difficulties in gaining reliable information on slavery in the 
mandates. The Windhoek Advertiser had written of two incidents where native 
Bushmen had been rounded up and sold to farmers as servants. The Advertiser 
aimed at the information reaching the League of Nations, as they wished the 
administration to be open about such incidents rather than “some person should 
creep away to Geneva and prompt the members of the Mandates Commission to 
ask questions which might serve to indicate that an attempt was being made in this 
country to hush up what may be a most disreputable business. We are aware that 
the League of Nations are constantly on the watch for anything that savours of 
slavery or forced labour.”121 When questioned about the incidents by the PMC, 
South Africa responded that one of the incidents was a pure misunderstanding. 
The Bushmen had simply deserted from the service of the farmers and were 
persuaded to return to their duties. The second incident, however, could not be 
justified, and “a very serious view of their conduct had been taken by the 
Administration”.122 The perpetrators were arrested and sentenced a fine of £5. The 
lenient punishment was explained by the fact that the “action had been due mainly 
to youthful exuberance”.123 Moreover, “some of the Bushmen were very 
troublesome people”, although, of course, this could not be used as a 
justification.124 The South African representative, Mr. Clarke, emphasized that 
“slavery was unknown in the territory, though there were occasional cases in the 
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north-eastern region”.125 While the PMC questioned the leniency of the 
sentence,126 it was nevertheless concluded that the first incident did not seem to be 
serious and the second, “regrettable though it is”, was taken care of by the courts 
in South West Africa.127 
 Of the different kinds of slavery, domestic slavery was at the time of the 
establishment of the mandates still prevalent in many of the mandated territories, 
e.g. Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons.128 In French Togoland domestic 
slaves would recover their freedom if they fulfilled the conditions set by the 
administration: paying their taxes, fulfilling their regular labour dues and 
complying with other obligations imposed on natives. It remains unclear what 
would happen if they refused to fulfil these conditions. Would they be forced to 
retain their status as slaves?129 In their next report the administration maintained 
that it was not “necessary or convenient to adopt further direct measures against 
what remains of this system”.130 
 Lord Lugard, like many of his contemporaries, understood domestic slavery 
to a certain extent. Lugard maintained that the “temporary continuance” of 
domestic slavery had some advantages “as a form of labour-contract between a 
more advanced and a very primitive people” in cases where currency did not yet 
exist and the native was not aware that he could sell his services against such a 
currency.131 
 In some cases slavery was more comparable to adoption, which made it more 
acceptable or even desirable. “[C]hildren were sometimes entrusted to large 
traders, who became responsible for their instruction. This system, however, 
amounted to a kind of provisional adoption in the broadest sense of the word, the 
results of which were most satisfactory, for the children adopted in this way could 
get better instruction than would be possible in their own village.”132 
 The attitude towards slavery was above all practical. When the Permanent 
Mandates Commission discussed the reports of the mandatories and asked them 
about slavery, they stated that there was either no slavery or that there was at 
least an intention to diminish or abolish it. For example, in Tanganyika it was 
stressed that the abolition of slavery should not happen too quickly, as it was 
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expensive because the slave owners should be remunerated for losing their 
property, i.e. the slaves, and there were no funds for such purposes,133 or that the 
emancipation of slaves would happen too quickly, which could bring about social 
problems. Also, so- called “benevolent forms of slavery” were mentioned, in this 
connection meaning domestic slavery.134  
 Like other unaccepted customs, slavery was externalized as a native vice, 
from which civilization would gradually save the mandates. There was no rush, as 
slavery had always existed and exposure to Western civilization would gradually 
abolish it. 135 Also, general economic development would do away with slavery.136 
The changes brought about by the abolition of domestic slavery were also feared 
and it was anticipated that because of poor living conditions, there was little 
demand for emancipation.137 According to the British representative, Mr. Ormsby-
Gore, the administration in Tanganyika had been “too precipitate in abolishing 
slavery”. The emancipation had resulted in the “ruin of the plantations and in the 
starvation of the emancipated slaves”.138 Another concern were the compensations 
that would have have to be paid to slave owners.139 Compensation to former slaves 
was never discussed. Lugard recognized slavery as both a moral issue and an 
administrative problem:140 “Sudden emancipation would dislocate the whole social 
fabric.”141 The social problems that would occur in such an instance would include 
men thrown into the streets, women becoming prostitutes and masters, plantations 
and the industry in ruin.142 Moreover, “Africans of the lower classes … love to 
attach themselves to a ‘big man’”.143 Lugard’s solution to these problems was to 
abolish slavery as a legal status. Thus the emancipation would happen gradually 
(even over a period of generations) and both the slaves and the masters would 
have enough time to accustom themselves to the new situation.144 This applied, 
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however, only to Muslim countries. Elsewhere, in his view, slavery should be 
abolished entirely.145 In Lugard’s view, the most difficult task in putting an end to 
slavery was “to eradicate the servile habit of mind, bred by long traditions of 
slavery, to inculcate the right to be free, and to educate the native to a sense of 
personal responsibility, initiative, and aspiration, in order that he may learn the 
dignity of free labour and appreciate his duty as a citizen and to posterity”.146 This 
could be achieved by example, which in Lugard’s view the British administration 
amply provided.147 
 Grimshaw, the ILO representative, recommended the abolition of the legal 
recognition of slavery and the emancipation of slaves: “Any recognition of the 
legal status of slavery appears to accord ill with the terms of the mandates.”148 It 
would appear that the administrators understated the suffering caused by slavery, 
stating in their reports that domestic servitude did not necessarily mean more 
suffering than freedom with little economic means would mean or that there was 
no desire for emancipation among the natives.  
 The dialogue on slavery had three parties: the weak natives, still in darkness, 
at the mercy of stronger forces (or, alternatively, the natives who still held slaves); 
the administration, who did not permit slavery but would gradually abolish it 
bringing the light of civilization (maybe after some generations); and the 
Mandates Commission, which through its questionnaires tried to make sense of 
the situation of slavery in the mandates. Gradually it emerged to the mandatory 
states that the Permanent Mandates Commission truly held slavery to be a 
problem and was serious about abolishing it. The Mandates Commission brought 
to light practices of the administration in the mandates, and thus the mandatories 
had to reveal the situation concerning slavery and labour conditions in the 
mandated territories. There was much that was not known, but at least the 
mandate administrations were forced to explain how they planned to improve the 
situation of their inhabitants.149 
 Forced labour (to which I will return in the next section) was hardly a better 
option than slavery. Slavery transferred into forced labour in several ways. The 
employers needed to fill the work force gap created by abolition, and therefore 
slave traders started to convey employees into forced labour. The justification was 
to be found in laws prohibiting vagrancy.150 
 The abolition of slavery has been a tool for Western powers to judge the level 
of civilization in other countries. Slavery has been used as a reason for Western 
powers to establish colonies, as the colonizers felt that their superior level of 
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civilization and the example they set was needed to abolish slavery. These feelings 
of superiority were intertwined with genuine benevolent feelings toward the 
natives. As Lugard pointed out: “To the slave the effect [of slavery] is hardly less 
demoralizing. He is deprived of the dignity of manhood.”151 The 
professionalization of international law in the 1860s and 1870s led to the definition 
of the limits of the field.152 Slavery was used as a means to determine states as 
civilized or uncivilized. Thus anti-slavery became a sign of civilization.153 Due to 
the evolution of ideas concerning slavery, there had naturally been a shift from the 
idea of slavery being civilized to slavery being barbarous. During the mandates 
period, anti-slavery continued to act as a way of emphasizing civilization and the 
necessity of administration. Superior civilization was a means to differentiate the 
mandatories from the natives. 
 Italy’s conquest of Abyssinia was justified on the grounds of fighting slavery 
and bringing civilization.154 The abolition of slavery shows how the concept of 
civilization was used by the West to change the international order.155 Apart from 
using it as a motivation for colonizing, the concept of civilization was used as a 
means to include or exclude other countries from the international community. 
The independence of Abyssinia serves as an example. Britain was opposed to the 
independence of Abyssinia because slavery still existed in the country. On the 
other hand, Italy used this lack of civilization as a pretext for its conquest.156 
 The definition of slavery and the treaty against slavery were to be applied 
only to the “other” and the target of the definition was above all Ethiopia.157 
Abolition of the slave trade had much to do with racial hierarchies, civilization, 
and the moral superiority of a paternalistic liberator, granting rights and acting as 
a good-doer and educator.  
 The prohibition of the slave trade is often mentioned as the first human right 
or one of the first human rights.158 Jenny Martinez in her recent book The Slave 
Trade and the Origins of International Human Rights Law has claimed that international 
human rights law has its origins in the abolitionist movement of early 19th century 
Britain. Moreover, she maintains that the mixed slavery courts were the first 
human rights courts. The courts were established in 1817 at Britain’s initiative to 
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try slave traders and redistribute their assets. Before the establishment of the 
Courts, during the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had been unilaterally catching and 
searching vessels that she believed were transporting slaves. After the Wars, 
Britain was forced to find a new justification for searching such vessels, for 
searching enemy ships no longer applied. By bribing weaker maritime powers, 
Britain finally got Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands to sign agreements on 
mutual search of each other’s vessels and to establish tribunals to try slave 
merchants. The tribunals was a successful enterprise as the number of slaves freed 
by them was as much as 80,000.159 
 Paul Gordon Lauren has also called the abolitionist movement a human rights 
movement.160 However, critics like Reza Afshari have noted that it was unlikely 
that the abolitionists had a larger scheme of human rights in mind.161 Moreover, 
even when the abolitionist debates included different forms of rights language, can 
they be meaningfully compared with present-day understandings of human 
rights?162 The greatest problem with Martinez’s book is that it tells the story of 
abolitionism mainly as a triumph of moral values. However, there were many 
other considerations as well, such as economic and imperialistic.  
 A century later, during the League of Nations period, the same considerations 
were still on the table. Discussions on slavery were a balancing act between 
benevolence, economy and practical matters. The rights of individual slaves were 
not discussed. The idea of universal human rights and of human rights as 
inalienable and indivisible would only appear after the Second World War. The 
abolitionist movement was a single-issue movement, and could be said to show 
expressions of pity, benevolence and compassion rather than a human rights 
conscience, not to mention the equality of all human beings.163 For example, Lord 
Lugard, an opponent of the principle of slavery, wanted to abolish the practice 
gradually, avoiding excessive disturbance to the economic life of the society.164 
Thus, the human rights of individual slaves were not under discussion, but rather 
the general effects to the economy and safety of societies.  
 Not even the abolitionists were free of the racism that was typical of the 19th 
and 20th centuries. Most abolitionists did not envision the slaves as having a role in 
their own liberation. The movement was instead about the Europeans’ sense of 
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morality, about benevolence and paternalism, with the Europeans as givers and 
the Africans as takers.165 The abolitionists were far from envisioning the victims of 
slavery as true equals. 
 Despite their paternalism, many abolitionists referred to the humanity of the 
Africans. Naturally, this does not make abolitionism a human rights movement 
nor is it contradictory with paternalism. What did conflict with any budding 
human rights idea (and slow down the abolition process) was the fact that slaves 
were considered property. Thus, the slaves’ right to freedom was in conflict with 
the owners’ property rights. The latter were victorious in this conflict, as they 
were compensated for their loss even during the League of Nations period, but 
compensation for former slaves was never under consideration.  
 There was also the fear that freeing slaves would cause social unrest (and this 
idea was apparent during the League period as well). The individual rights of 
slaves were secondary to societal peace. Nor were black slaves believed to be able 
to manage on their own. Custody was thus moved from the slave owners to the 
colonial governments and then on to the mandatory administration.  
3.4. Forced Labour 
The prohibition of slavery, especially when it could be seen as a native vice, was 
easy. No such moral clarity existed in the question of forced labour. The purpose 
of this section is to examine how the conceptual and practical difficulties of 
colonial forced labour were faced in the debates in the PMC and within the 
mandates system in general. Forced labour was seen as a separate category and 
while, like slavery, it was prohibited by the Covenant, the grey areas surrounding 
forced labour were much larger. As a colonial practice, forced labour was also tied 
to the introduction of money economy, such as commercial farming in European 
plantations. When attempts at forcing the natives into salaried work failed, many 
colonial powers in the late 19th and early 20th century quietly introduced various 
practices to ensure the availability of labour force that may be interpreted as 
forced labour. Though forced labour was prohibited by the League Covenant, it 
was never seen in the PMC as a similar issue to slavery. The discussions over 
forced labour reveal convictions of morality, race and work in which assertions 
like the lazy native who needs to be forced to work were circulated. Various ways 
of working around the prohibitions of forced labour were devised, such as naming 
the labour obligations as tax or as traditional native customs resembling feudal 
obligations.  
 The price of labour vis-à-vis the economic developments were discussed at 
length after a questionnaire had been prepared to gain information on the labour 
conditions in the mandated territories. Especially the question of forced and 
compulsory labour raised heated discussion in the Mandates Commission. The 
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rule relating to forced and compulsory labour in the mandates was that the 
mandatory ought to prohibit all forms of “forced labour except for essential public 
works and services, and then only for adequate remuneration”.166 But how then 
was this rule to be interpreted?   
 The differences of view within the Commission were vast. The question was 
how to balance the needs for the economic development of the territories and the 
amount of work reasonably required from the inhabitants. Frederick Lugard and 
Freire D’Andrade represented the two ends of the debate. According to Lugard, 
the African native was generally industrious and hard working. He maintained 
that “economic development was most necessary but it must take a secondary 
place, since it was dependent on the labour supply and the increase of the native 
population”.167 But Freire d’Andrade, for instance, did not agree with the 
industriousness of the natives and believed that generally the native was not very 
keen on work.168 He considered that natives in general would regard work as 
something beneath their dignity, that most of the hard work was left to women, 
and that it was the duty of the mandatories to change this attitude. He believed 
that some of the races might disappear due to their lack of work capacity. 
However, he said: “as regards the other races, it was essential to require from 
them work which they were able to give in order to assist the mandatory power 
with the mission with which it was entrusted under the Covenant. This mission 
would not be accomplished if the mandatory power contented itself, for 
philanthropic reasons, with leaving the natives to drink and to indulge in endless 
debates and inactivity, under the pretext that they were happier in this mode of 
life and that it must be respected.”169 Orts pointed to the necessity of balancing 
between the two duties of the mandatories, namely the duty to develop the 
mandate and the duty of securing the welfare of the natives. As he believed that 
there were native races that did not (yet) have the capability for hard work, he 
believed that these two duties were in contradiction with each other and needed to 
be reconciled. He was also worried about “the intensive way in which certain 
tropical regions were being exploited”. He noted a high death rate and that natives 
were returned to their villages permanently incapacitated or incurably ill due to 
hard work.170 However, he did not want to make the problem a (solely) 
humanitarian one: “the Mandates Commission had not the right to indulge in 
considerations which were exclusively philanthropic, but needed to take account 
of the practical aspects of the colonial problem as well as the moral aspect.” 
 D’Andrade believed that the prohibition on compulsory labour could not 
mean that idle natives should not be forced to work because he believed that 
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“work is a law of nature” and wanted to make idleness a punishable offence.171  In 
his view, vagrancy ought to be punished as it was punishable in civilized societies 
as well: “Compulsory labour, as I see it, is that which every living being is 
compelled to do or perish.”172 He stated in a note that it should be permitted to 
demand labour not only for public works but that it was equally necessary for 
private enterprises as well, because “for without them public works can be of little 
practical advantage”.173  
 Forced labour was practised in all colonies. Forced labour was not 
disapproved of as slavery was. Its justifications, such as education, civilization, 
and the moral duty to work, were also different.174 Labour was described as an 
ennobling activity by some members of the PMC. Victorian notions of morality 
had contradictory views on slavery and forced labour. “Mutilation” by natives was 
resented, while corporal punishments for those trying to escape work were 
accepted as customary.175 Historically, slavery and forced labour were two sides of 
the same coin. Even when both had existed at the same time, the abolition of the 
slave trade and slavery led to an increase in forced labour.176 In the League of 
Nations politics, however, they were two separate issues.177 
 When the slave trade was largely abolished, a vast work force was suddenly 
free to work in Africa. A labour force was needed in the cotton fields, and now it 
was easy to find workers locally. This for its part helped to change the general 
opinion against slavery and to favour colonization. Cotton had been produced by 
former slaves in the colonies, and now their labour could be put to good use at 
home.178 The end of slavery brought about a new form of compulsion, which could 
sometimes be difficult to distinguish from slavery.179 Thus, as slavery had become 
inappropriate in a civilized state, forced labour was not and could even be held as 
desirable to advance the civilizational task.  
 The so-called “freedom villages” in the French colonies in what is now Sudan 
are revealing about the relationship between slavery and forced labour. These 
villages were set up for former slaves who had fled, been freed, or in other ways 
gained their freedom. The “freedom villages” offered a labour force to the 
Europeans and spouses to soldiers. If there were not enough labourers in the 
villages, the French sought for them in the neighbouring areas.  The villages were 
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dissolved between 1905 and 1910, when forced labour became more regulated and 
there were also other means to find labourers.180 
 Drawing the line between slavery and forced labour was not always easy in 
the mandates either. Rappard suggested that the labour conditions in New Guinea 
were “half-way between absolute freedom and absolute lack of freedom”,181 and 
Lugard noted that conditions similar to slavery existed in Togoland.182 One worry 
was the transition from slavery to paid labour. Where would the natives find the 
motivation to work if they did not need money? What if they did not wish to buy 
food or clothes?183 
 Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant was silent on the question of 
forced and compulsory labour. It was, however, regulated in the separate 
provisions concerning the B and C mandates. According to the regulation in the B 
mandates: “The Mandatory … (3) shall prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory 
labour, except for essential public works and services, and then only in return for 
adequate remuneration; (4) shall protect the natives from abuse and measures of 
fraud and force by the careful supervision of labour contracts and the recruiting of 
labour.”184 The C mandates were briefer, stating only that “… no forced labour is 
permitted, except for essential public works and services, and then only for 
adequate remuneration”.185 
 Article 23 of the Covenant was also relevant in issues regarding labour. 
According to this article, “the Members of the League a) will endeavour to secure 
and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children, 
both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and 
industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the 
necessary international organizations; b) undertake to secure just treatment of the 
native inhabitants of territories under their control; [etc.].”  
 The Mandates Commission did not discuss Article 23 at any length when 
talking about forced labour in the mandates, but D’Andrade nevertheless 
interpreted the article in this context. According to him, the first part of the 
article, the “fair and humane conditions of labour”, did not apply to the natives, 
but the second part, requiring “just” treatment of natives, did apply to conditions 
of labour.186 However, D’Andrade maintained that the labour conditions set for 
the B mandates could be said to interpret paragraph b) of Article 23 of the 
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Covenant to a certain extent.187 Lugard believed that Article 23 was concerned 
“only with labour and not with ‘other matters’”, but he too believed that natives 
required “just” treatment in all matters.188  
 The third instrument relevant to the labour issues was Article 421 of the 
Versailles Treaty of June 28, 1919,189 part of section XIII which established the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and called for social justice as the 
prerequisite for peace.190 According to Article 421, the parties to the treaty 
committed themselves to apply the labour conventions they became part of to their 
colonies as well, albeit with some restrictions:   
 
The Members engage to apply conventions which they have ratified in 
accordance with the provisions of this Part of the present Treaty to their 
colonies, protectorates and possessions which are not fully self-governing: 
(1) Except where owing to the local conditions the convention is inapplicable, 
or 
(2) Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the 
convention to local conditions. 
And each of the Members shall notify to the International Labour Office the 
action taken in respect of each of its colonies, protectorates and possessions 
which are not fully self-governing. 
 
Thus, the labour treaties binding the mandatories applied to the mandates as well.  
 Part XIII of the Versailles treaty was included in the discussions on the 
labour issues through the questionnaire prepared by the PMC to ease the task of 
writing the reports for the mandates. One part of the questionnaire posed the 
question whether measures had been taken to ensure “in accordance with Part 
XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, the taking into consideration of conventions or 
recommendations of International Labour Conferences”.191 It was also followed in 
subsequent reports whether the mandatories had reported this, and during the 
third session Harold Grimshaw from the ILO reported that there were three 
territories under C mandates where the “conditions of labour are not yet such as 
to allow the application of the decisions of the International Labour 
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Conference”.192 On the other hand, the administration of Tanganyika reported that 
“views of the International Labour Conference express the fundamental principles 
on which any labour-controlling legislation would be enacted, due regard being 
paid to native habits, customs and prejudices”. Grimshaw noted that “this would 
be the correct attitude”.193 He also pointed out that the terms of the Versailles 
Treaty already in themselves provided the necessary elasticity for application.194 
Upon questioning the New Zealand representative on the lack of application of 
the conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Conferences, 
the representative replied that the same regulations applied to Samoa as were in 
force in New Zealand and that New Zealand was in this regard more advanced. 
However, he noted that the “Administration only applied those regulations of 
New Zealand which had a practical application in the Islands.”195 
 The question whether the conventions regarding labour were applied in the 
mandates were handled through the reports to the Permanent Mandates 
Commission. However, as with slavery, it was difficult to acquire objective 
information about the existence of forced labour. In many instances the 
mandatories were praised for their efforts in enforcing the labour conventions by 
drafting laws that could be applied locally. Grimshaw, for instance, applauded 
Tanganyika for the development of its labour laws196 as well as the Cameroons for 
applying the international labour standards. The PMC also reminded the British 
Cameroons that the international conventions could be adapted to take local 
conditions into consideration.197 In the British Cameroons the Nigerian Labour 
Ordinance was applied to give the natives protection against European 
employees.198 Australia’s representative explained that in New Guinea forced 
labour was not allowed even to the extent that it was in the other mandates 
because of Australian decisions and also because there was no need for a labour 
force for public works. He commented that: “The Australian Parliament had 
probably been actuated by motives of humanity… .”199 However, Australia did 
admit that a certain kind of forced labour was used in agriculture.200 
 The questions on labour conditions applied to the A mandates as well. 
Palestine was to confine interference in private enterprise, as far as possible, 
within the limits imposed by international obligations, e.g. international labour 
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conventions. 201 Palestine adopted the Forced Labour Convention.202 Iraq was 
member to at least the Convention against slavery, and the Baghdad penal code 
regulated matters relating to slavery.203 Iraq’s independence brought about the 
question of what would happen to labour treaties when the mandates ceased to 
exist or other changes regarding the mandated territory occurred. In Iraq the 
treaties continued to exist unchanged, as Iraq had already been treated as a 
political entity during the time the treaties were ratified. In Palestine, however, 
treaties ratified by England were applied in accordance with an understanding of 
Article 421 of the Versailles Treaty concerning the application of conventions to 
colonies. Palestine was not a contracting party to the convention, but the 
provisions were applied to it under certain conditions.204 Therefore, different rules 
applied to Palestine than were applied to England. The PMC disagreed about 
what would happen if the status of Palestine changed, either by dividing it into 
two parts or by gaining independence (the latter was not considered timely). 
William Weaver of the ILO believed that Palestine would start anew, because it 
had not bound itself by these treaties and could therefore choose what it would 
want to be a party to. Rappard maintained that there were differences between 
international labour treaties and other treaties.205 Penha Garcia noted that when a 
nation became independent, it would usually become a member of the League of 
Nations, and as a member would become a party to certain treaties.206  
 Through reports from the mandates and the questioning of the 
representatives, the Permanent Mandates Commission tried to make sense of how 
the clauses on forced labour were applied. Certain labour was allowed: for public 
purposes labour could be demanded if it was compensated. The kind of labour 
regarded as “public” was commonly road construction and cleaning. For instance, 
in the French Cameroons forced labour in 1938 comprised mainly road 
construction, which all natives were required to do for 10 days a year. The 
administration compared this to a communal service tax. Forced labour was 
regulated by a decree of compulsory labour, which dated to 1938 in this case.207 
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 However, matters were not always so clear. What if the roads led to a village 
and their upkeep was demanded by a village chief? This kind of labour was often 
considered “communal labour” and considered a native tradition done for the good 
of the chief or the village community.208 Lugard differentiated between social 
services (e.g. cleaning around huts, burying the dead, etc.) and labour (e.g. road 
cleaning). Social services did not require compensation, labour did.209 Lugard 
wanted to see the total prohibition of all forms of unpaid labour: “To urge the 
sanction of native law and custom is absurd, for that customary law would 
sanction slavery and many other things contrary to humanity.”210 He added: “It is 
without question essential that, for whatever purpose compulsion may be resorted 
to, it should have the sanction of a law clearly defining the extent and conditions 
of the service required.”211 The British administration, however, believed that the 
unpaid maintenance of village roads at the command of chiefs was not compulsory 
or forced labour, but “traditional labour”. The British believed that the natives’ 
willingness to do “traditional labour” would diminish as the natives developed. 
The PMC nevertheless thought that the work was maintenance required by the 
administration, i.e. forced or compulsory labour.212 William Weaver of the ILO 
believed that villagers should be consulted before communal services could be 
demanded from them, but their permission was not required. According to him, it 
had been claimed that the Forced Labour Convention had set such criteria that it 
had been difficult to find people to take care of hygiene matters in the countryside. 
Thus, according to Weaver, the forced labour convention did not prevent social 
services and he was sorry that the convention was blamed for problems it did not 
cause.213 
 One of the reasons why it was so difficult to agree on the limits of forced 
labour was that much of it was done in the villages on behalf of the native chief. 
Even when the Commission took steps to ensure that natives did not abuse each 
other, it did agree that some of the work in the villages, being traditionally 
compulsory, was probably needed. This included weeding and cleaning around 
the villages. This was one of the reasons why Van Rees found a total prohibition 
impracticable: “[i]t would be impossible to comply with the terms of the mandates, 
which are not based on practical experience and therefore involve consequences of 
unforeseen extent”.214 Thus, in practice a grey area existed between public and 
private work.  
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 Certain work required by the chiefs was seen as unavoidable in order to 
secure the authority of the chiefs, and the administration was unwilling to limit the 
services required by the chiefs: “In a feudal society such as existed in the territory, 
the authority of the chiefs should be safeguarded by the maintenance of the labour 
service, which was at the basis of the traditional organisation.”215 The work 
required by the chiefs consisted mainly of building huts and taking care of plots of 
land.216 Yet, there were worries about the luxurious lifestyles of the chiefs, which 
were supported by services from the villagers.217 “There was a certain parasitism to 
be abolished,” noted Halewyck de Heusch, representing the Ruanda-Urundi 
administration.218 However, because the chiefs were accustomed to free labour, 
one needed to proceed carefully, he believed.219 Lugard raised the question of 
chiefs who were against the Forced Labour Convention and particularly its two 
clauses on personal services (Art. 7) and on compulsory cultivation in cases where 
there was a risk of famine or food deficiency (Art. 19), as they believed that “if 
these two paragraphs were retained, much feeling against them (the chiefs) would 
arise”.220 Thomas, representing British Togoland, replied that the chiefs referred to 
“personal services”, for instance “such work as carrying the chief in his palanquin, 
or bearing the ornaments attached to the ‘stool’ on state occasions”.221 He noted 
that it would have been impossible for the chiefs to require such services without 
the consent of his people.222 Weaver noted that there was a penalty attached to the 
refusal to perform such services, granted in the Order by the Governor. In his 
view, such a penalty turned the services to forced labour according to the Forced 
Labour Convention.223 The mandatory administrations did not see work ordered 
by chiefs as a great problem and emphasized its customary nature.224  
 Even in cases where labour could be regarded as public, the task of finding 
the workers was often given to the local chiefs. This of course caused several 
problems in itself. The PMC was worried about the power that the chiefs had over 
the labourers and the possible recruitment methods.225 According to Lugard, it 
was also part of British colonial politics that workers were found through the 
village chiefs. However, the chiefs needed to be supervised.226 The reports of the 
Mandates show that the authority of the chiefs was a sensitive issue. Lugard 
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maintained that one problem concerning finding a labour force through chiefs was 
that if the labourer declined the work, he would openly question the authority of 
the chief.227 
 An issue where native customs were referred to, was whether the chief would 
be entitled to the salary earned by a worker. In certain maintenance works in 
British Togo the salary was paid to the chief, as the administration noted that it 
was the native custom to do so and it would be laborious for the administration to 
do otherwise.228 Also, the representative of Ruanda-Urundi believed that if chiefs 
started compensating the workers, it would weaken the chief’s authority.229 
Bonnecarrère, representing French Togoland, admitted that probably the chiefs 
forced natives to work, but one should not exaggerate the danger. He saw the 
chiefs as feudal lords, who offered protection rather than monetary compensation 
in exchange for work.230 
 Generally, the PMC (with the exception of D’Andrade) agreed that there was 
a need to protect the natives from forced labour to private actors. Halewyck de 
Heusch noted that “[f]orced labour was as hateful if required for private 
individuals as it was commendable when imposed on the natives to remedy their 
lack of foresight and induce them to produce the foodstuffs indispensable for their 
elementary needs”.231 Lugard believed that the solution to the lack of work force 
for private employers could be “imported contract labour”, which, however, did 
not differ much from recruiting workers from the same country but further away, 
which could cause its own social problems (both on account of separation of 
families and because large groups of rootless men were gathered in one place).232 
 Were labour levies (prestation in the French mandates) forced labour? For 
instance in the French Cameroons certain work was encouraged to be done as 
public labour, instead of having taxes collected from the natives.233 The discussion 
on labour levies highlights the differences of opinion in the PMC. The 
Commission’s views were varied. They saw labour levies as a native custom and 
consequently they were not sure what to do.234 Lugard reminded his colleagues 
that it was the duty of the “European administration” to prohibit any actions 
contrary to its civilizing mission.235 The French administration defended labour 
levies, stating that the purpose of the clause prohibiting forced labour was 
decisive. According to them, the purpose was to avoid abuses and disguised 
slavery. It was probable that such abuses had occurred during the former 
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administration, but the tax was for “improvements advantageous to the natives”.236 
Van Rees represented the view that the prestations were a common and useful 
colonial policy: “literal compliance with this clause [prohibiting forced labour] was 
impracticable. Anyone with experience of colonial life knew that there was always 
need for such labour… .”237 However, he realized that if the mandates clause was 
to be taken literally, the prestation would be against it: “if forced labour were 
exacted as a fiscal tax, it was nevertheless forced labour…”.238 D’Andrade agreed, 
noting that “a strict interpretation of the clause of the mandate in question would 
result in making impossible the execution of indispensable works in Togoland”.239 
He noted that all civilized countries, or at any rate Portugal, had such labour 
levies.240 Lugard, on the other hand, strictly opposed labour levies. He would not 
see taxes as justifiable unless the natives had proper means to earn wages to pay 
them. He emphasized that he would not compromise on the matter.241 Dannevig 
found it strange that men needed to work instead of paying taxes and then work 
even more in order to feed themselves.242 Rappard, the diplomat, concluded that 
“no criticism of the French Administration was implied”, but creating a loophole 
to include forced labour in lieu of taxation could “enable unprincipled 
Governments to abuse the mandate”.243 
 In labour matters the PMC was from early on confronted with one dilemma: 
“the Commission was agreed on the necessity of discouraging idleness in the 
mandated territories and simultaneously protecting the freedom of workers.”244 
However, different members of the PMC emphasized different parts of this 
equation. D’Andrade was still very much part of the Portuguese colonial tradition: 
“The economic development of the country requires native labour, which must be 
adapted to its purpose.”245 “If he fails to [contribute to the well-being and 
development of peoples by work], and attempts to go on living under his present 
conditions, if he prefers his former habits of ease and idleness, then the Mandatory 
must intervene and give him to understand that work is a law of nature and that, 
in communities which hope to prosper, idleness is a punishable offence.”246 
D’Andrade did also see that there was a possibility that the administration would 
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require too much labour from the natives: “If a country is to be developed rapidly 
and this requires more labour than the country can supply in the normal course, 
there is a tendency to practise abuses upon the natives and to subject their habits 
and customs to abrupt changes, which cannot be made without some risk.”247 
 Lugard’s answer to D’Andrade’s criticism was education and civilization. He 
agreed with the basic starting point: that natives should work and that all work 
should not be left to women. However, he did not believe in the idea of work as a 
law of nature as promoted by D’Andrade. He denied the existence of such a law in 
England, but noted that vagrancy (which he found to be different from idleness) 
was only punishable in England if there was criminal intent. The only way to 
change matters was education.248 D’Andrade, however, replied that he did not 
have the patience to wait: “But the education of the coloured man must take scores 
of years, even centuries.”249 Penha-Garcia, the Portuguese member replacing 
D’Andrade in the PMC, shared D’Andrade’s view on forced labour.250 
 Some mandatories agreed on the advantages of forced labour. New Guinea’s 
representative noted that the country had just been lifted from the Stone Age. 
People would need to learn to work in order to survive the modern age. Thus, 
making the natives work was part of the “sacred trust” of taking care of their well-
being. Unless their work was overseen, they had a natural tendency to avoid it: 
“In the villages the natives were seen at their worst; on the plantations, at their 
best.”251 The South African representative denied that there was forced labour in 
the reservations of South West Africa: “there was not: but he always impressed on 
the natives that the reserves had not been set aside to enable them to lead a lazy 
life. The Europeans worked, and so should they.”252 
 D’Andrade believed that the duty to work emanated among other things from 
the fact that the natives owed a debt of gratitude to the administration, for if 
“civilization steps in to protect the natives in their own country against abuses 
against which they could not defend themselves, it was only right to exact from 
them in turn an effort equivalent to what was done in their interests”.253 Lugard 
disagreed with those claiming that African men were lazy by nature, leaving the 
women to work, while they themselves idled in the sun, eating and drinking. 
According to Lugard, few races were more hard-working: “the fertility of the soil, 
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his few wants, the physical capacity of his women for manual work, are all 
prompting causes for idleness, yet except when relegated to reserves, or when his 
status as a slave deprived him of all incentive, he is usually industrious.”254 It was 
also discussed whether there was a difference between compulsory labour and 
forced labour. D’Andrade believed that the first one had to do with preventing 
idleness (where the “real forced labour” was done by the wives), while the latter 
(meaning going to native villages, taking the natives and escorting them to work) 
was forbidden to protect the natives. “Native labour was most necessary in order 
to promote civilisation and progress among the natives themselves,” he claimed.255 
According to him, the difference could be reconciled letting the native choose the 
type and place of work, as long as he did not refuse to work.256 Lugard did not 
think education should be the primary reason for using force. Forced labour was 
justified only when workers could not be found for essential and hurried public 
tasks.257 Palacios explained, contrary to what Penha-Garcia had stated, that the 
PMC’s interest in labour conditions was not whether the natives had a duty to 
work, but rather that, when they did work, they could be abused. If the abuser 
was a private actor, then the responsibility was with everyone who was a 
“guardian of civilisation”, including teachers, doctors and missionaries. If the 
abuser was the administration, this could require “international intervention in the 
interests of humanity”.258 In Palacios’s view, “there were very few subjects which 
lent themselves better than labour to conciliatory and civilising efforts”.259 While 
the members of the PMC had different attitudes towards forced labour– the 
reasons why it should be prohibited or accepted, the capabilities of the natives as 
workers, and their duty to increase the overall wealth of the territory – they all 
shared one common idea. For them, the inhabitants were not active participants in 
their own destinies, working to maintain their families. Rather, they were treated 
as passive receivers of education, civilization, or at best, humanitarian protection 
from abuses by the stronger, be it the village chief, a private enterprise or the 
mandatory administration. 
 Many of the problems relating to labour conditions could be explained by the 
different customs of the natives and by the difficult conditions in the mandates. In 
general, Lugard maintained that the whole problem of slavery and forced labour 
derived from the undeveloped state of social organizations, and from the lack of 
written contracts and money. Whipping employees in New Guinea took place 
even though it was not tolerated. The administration found it difficult to prevent 
isolated cases. Work safety was compromised because of the natives’ lack of 
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understanding: “[t]he difficulty was that the natives often refused to use safety 
devices”.260 The work, timely payment of salaries and improvement of working 
conditions were more difficult because of the natives: “[t]he attitude of the 
employee himself, who was a gambler, anxious to participate in the rather 
interesting and amusing work of alluvial gold washing, content to take his bonus 
in good times and to wait for his pay in bad times.”261 Even malnutrition could be 
blamed on the natives. The reason for malnutrition was not lack of food, but the 
fact that the administration had not yet succeeded in teaching the natives to 
improve their diet. The PMC had to remind the different administrations that they 
should not let the lack of enthusiasm on the natives’ side prevent improvements.  
 Native customs could also be used to get around questionable practices. 
Mahmood Mamdani describes the use of corporal punishment in colonial practice. 
The British had prohibited whipping by Europeans after the First World War, the 
French after the Second. The chiefs could, however, continue the practice because 
of its customary nature. This was rather useful if labourers needed to be 
disciplined for one reason or another.262 Treating the natives as children justified 
corporal punishment.263 The convenient solution to the balancing between moral 
demands and the customary consideration of natives as minors was to let the 
native authorities give the punishments whenever possible.264 
 As with slavery, Lugard believed that the British had a lot to teach others 
concerning the fair treatment of labourers: “It is all-important that the man who 
actually handles the labourers should possess those instincts of fair-play and 
tolerance which we like to think are eminently British, and that he should have the 
knack of getting on well with his men. For the man they like, Africans will do 
double the work they will for another.”265 
 A representative from the International Labour Office (ILO) was mainly 
present at the discussions on labour issues. Director Albert Thomas of the ILO 
reminded the PMC of the duty to apply labour conventions to colonies and non 
self-governing protectorates.266 Thomas agreed that there were facts to take into 
account, even when there was an absolute prohibition of forced labour, such as 
Article 421 (of the Versailles Treaty), which required just and humane labour 
conditions.267 Theodoli, the Chairman of the PMC, and Thomas applauded the 
collaboration between the PMC and the International Labour Office, describing 
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their common object as the “noble” one of “improving the condition of the 
labouring classes, whatever their colour might be”.268 
 During the interwar years, forced labour was largely seen as a colonial 
problem.269 Reports on drastic work force conditions in a number of colonies 
brought about the idea of a legal regime to control forced labour and to give 
content to Article 23 of the League of Nations Covenant, something that had not 
been achieved in the drafting of the slavery convention.270 The rhetoric used in the 
drafting process, which was mainly shaped by colonial insiders, was similar to that 
of the mandates. Notions such as “trusteeship” and “civilization” were used and 
harsh criticism was avoided.271 The ILO also saw as its task to bring civilization 
and development to the colonies272 and Harold Grimshaw, a British lawyer and the 
director of the Native Labour Division at the ILO, was also an active participant 
in the PMC. Other ILO experts were also active in the mandatory 
administration.273 The 1929 session of the International Labour Conference in 
Geneva revealed the colonizing states’ reluctance to control forced labour. The 
Portuguese, for instance, talked of forced labour as a “benevolent tool”. What was 
finally agreed upon was that “the ILO stood firmly against forced labour, but was 
supportive of the need to civilize indigenous subjects”.274 During the time the 
mandates existed, Britain and France were the only mandatory states to ratify the 
convention on forced labour in the late 1930s.275  
 During the debates of the PMC and in the practices of the League mandates 
administration, the absolute prohibition of forced labour never gained a similar 
status as that of slavery. Much of this may be explained by the pervasive idea of 
the morality of work, where labour was seen as part of the civilizing mission and 
development. Proponents of forced labour were adamant that its use would be a 
benevolent tool to advance the goals of development. The civilizing mission was 
seen as more important than the individual freedom of the native.  
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3.5 Land Tenure 
The focus in this section is on issues of land rights and land tenure in the 
mandates. Within the colonial system, land tenure was a fundamental point of 
contention between the indigenous population and the settlers. Settler colonialism, 
as has been recognized in studies on indigenous dispossession, operated through 
the transfer of land from the indigenous population to European settlers. The issue 
of land tenure was thus a principled one, but as we shall see, very little idealism 
was present in the debates of the Mandates Commission. Instead, old colonial 
practices were continued and introduced into the mandated areas. The 
preoccupations of European colonialism, such as the introduction of private land 
ownership under the guise of development, the imposition of Western land law 
and land registries, and negative attitudes towards indigenous communal tenure, 
were rampant. Like in the British colonial administration, the PMC oversaw 
situations where the administration became the owner of the land as a trustee, 
thus in practice transferring indigenous land to European government. One of the 
economically most important issues was land tenure and the protection of land 
rights. As in the European colonies, there were tensions between the interests of 
European settlers and the indigenous populations.276  
 Under the mandates system, all B mandates included a provision regarding 
land legislation. According to the article on land legislation (which was similar in 
all B mandates):  
 
In the framing of laws relating to the holding or transfer of land, the 
Mandatory shall take into consideration native laws and customs and shall 
respect the rights and safeguard the interests of the native population. 
 
No native land may be transferred, except as between natives, without the 
previous consent of the public authorities, and no real rights over native 
land in favour of non-natives may be created except with the same consent. 
 
The Mandatory will promulgate strict regulations against usury.277 
 
The article has an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, it asks the 
mandatories to support and respect indigenous systems of land tenure, while on 
the other it imposes the so-called inalienability clause. As a result, the policy was 
very similar to those of enlightened paternalistic colonialism, where the indigenous 
peoples were in practice wards of the state or minors: protected but with limited 
rights. 
 It was the duty of the mandatory to give regulations on how land was 
administered in the mandates. In 1923 the Mandates Commission gave a report on 
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how the regulations differed in the various mandates. The conclusion of this report 
was that in the mandates examined by this report, land was administered as the 
mandates treaties required. The report aimed to determine how exactly native 
rights and customs should operate in the land system. The rapporteur, van Rees 
from the Netherlands, concluded that it was in the true interests of the natives that 
land legislation was based on Western law. Western law would protect them 
“against their own ignorance, and [safeguard] their interests in the land”, as 
opposed to native legal conceptions, which were the “result of ancient customs and 
usages”.278 Van Rees’s conclusion was that the article was not to be taken to mean 
that native customs should be applied literally, but that the mandatories needed to 
“respect such genuine native rights as had been practically demonstrated in virtue 
of their customs and uses and to guarantee their interests, both immediate and 
more remote”.279  
 The administration was not seen as a threat to native land rights, but as a 
trustee, the guarantor of “genuine native rights”. In Samoa, for instance, there was 
a provision according to which “[a]ll land in Samoa which at the commencement 
of this Act is held by Samoans by native title is hereby vested in the Crown as the 
trustee of the beneficial owners …”.280 According to the PMC, the threat to the 
lands came from the inhabitants, who could not understand the complexities of 
modern ownership. Intervention was needed “to protect a person of no capacity or 
a minor - the native - from impulses which might induce him to effect a disastrous 
alienation”. Also, without government intervention, “an occult, irregular and 
precarious right of ownership” might be constituted, “which would be a source of 
profound and lasting disturbance to public order and future colonization”.281 
Therefore, in the event that land needed to be ceded, the authorization from the 
government was always necessary. In New Guinea restrictions existed on the 
native populations concerning land sales, meaning that they could not sell land. 
McLaren noted that this was “a very necessary safeguard of the rights of native 
landowners”.282  
 Later, Jules Repiquet, the French Cameroons representative, was questioned 
about the land registration system in the Cameroons. According to the PMC, the 
system had become rather bureaucratic. Could a simpler system be applied? 
Repiquet noted that the problem was the “strong individualistic tendencies” of the 
natives. It was simply too difficult to make the natives understand the importance 
of land registration. The administration would “welcome any method of attaching 
him to the soil”.283 
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 There were worries that registration might lead to the native being 
dispossessed of his land.284 Hailey thought that land registration was in direct 
opposition to the common property of the tribe and the family,285 and Van Asbeck 
noted that one of the aims of land registry had been “freeing native property from 
the customary rules”.286 
 What was the effect of land registration? Did it lead to dispossession and 
mortgages, the latter being one of “two aspects of the same evil” along with 
money-lenders, as Van Asbeck saw it, or a safeguard leading to stability amongst 
the natives?287 Van Asbeck pointed out that one could not compare registration in 
Europe and amongst the natives. The latter were not accustomed to the liberty of 
disposing of their property and needed protection and guidance in order not to 
commit any rash acts. Europeans were needed to control their actions.288 
 Land issues were approached through ownership. Lugard understood land 
ownership as a process of “natural evolution”, that was not to be arbitrarily 
interfered with. Such a process could best be supported with a “policy of patient 
progress”, which meant that principles and laws strange to the inhabitants of 
colonies should not be introduced but rather let changing circumstances and social 
progress lead to a path of natural evolution that would finally result in private 
ownership.289 Van Rees noted in his report on the land system that the problem of 
the mandatory was that “private property and the sale of land … are conceptions 
which are totally unknown and appear to them unthinkable”.290 D’Andrade’s 
interpretation on the rights and duties regarding native land was that: “[t]he 
necessary agricultural land must be reserved for the natives, and they must be 
secured in possession, at the same time being trained by instruction and example 
to derive the utmost possible profit from the land.”291 Bonnecarrère, representing 
French Togoland, noted that the natives are getting “more and more used to the 
idea of property”.292 Besson explained an improvement in land ownership in the 
French Cameroons, where a native might become a landowner, “subject solely to 
observance of the rules of allocation and inheritance laid down by local custom”. 
There would then be a “third stage” of land evolution, where a system for land 
registration would be set up. This would enable the regulation of land “in 
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accordance with the most modern ideas”.293 Within colonial regimes privatization 
of land and the establishment of land registries were commonly seen as 
preconditions of progress and modernization.294 
 Van Rees in his report did, however, express worries that protecting the 
natives in land matters could go too far. Using Samoa as an example, he asked if 
the land provisions prohibiting any land sales by the natives and the government 
receiving the rent in the native’s name would actually take away all their 
independence.295 He also approached the question of the natives’ “right to roam” 
and “the right of gathering” and concluded that there was a genuine conflict 
between the mentioned rights and the need of a government to put all lands under 
its exclusive control. This conflict should be solved in a just manner: “… as in the 
application of every fundamental principle, the declaration of State property will 
… have to be applied not only in an equitable manner but especially with wisdom 
and humanity.”296 The members of the PMC lectured the Japanese representative 
on the differences between communal ownership and communal usage, reminding 
him that mixing these had caused considerable problems in Africa,297 as well as on 
appeal routes on land rights and the differences between a court process and an 
administrative process.298  
 Native land rights were seen at the Permanent Mandates Commission as both 
a legal and a social question, which touched upon issues of indigenous 
communalism in a similar manner as in colonial regimes.299 In Samoa, the New 
Zealand administration believed that the abolition of communal ownership of land 
would serve the development of the territory and the natives. New Zealand 
claimed that it was in the interests of the natives that native laws and customs 
would be changed. They regarded the principal disadvantage of the communal 
system to be that “the energetic individual was at the mercy of his lazier 
fellows”.300 Therefore, it was aimed to put a new system in its place. All adults 
would receive a piece of land for their own use on their eighteenth birthday, and 
each individual would have the obligation to cultivate it.301 The same 
argumentation on the problems of communal ownership was used in the A 
mandates as in the B and C mandates. As the French noted, their motivation for a 
land reform in the Jebel Druse area of Syria was to direct it “against that part of 
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the population which did the least work and against the chiefs whose continuous 
desire was to take the best-cultivated lands themselves”.302 
 The PMC paid attention to the amendment of the “Land and Native Rights 
Ordinance” (1928) of Tanganyika, which included a “right of occupancy” giving 
the natives or native community “lawfully using or occupying land in accordance 
with native law and custom”, that was however conditional in the sense that it was 
“revocable for good cause” and “for a specific period only”. The PMC noted that 
because of these limitations, the ordinance did not “confer upon a native 
community any permanent and inalienable title to their ancestral lands”.303 
 In no other issue than that of land tenure was the mandates system and the 
PMC more like European colonialism. While problems of indigenous 
dispossession had been recognized in the more enlightened colonial systems, the 
old colonial hands running the PMC were mostly blind to it. Colonialist policies, 
such as introducing fixed property rights and private ownership of lands, and 
conversely, the phasing out of communal ownership of land, were done under the 
guise of progress. The effects of these policies, such as indigenous dispossession, 
were mentioned only occasionally. Doctrines which elsewhere had proven to be 
devastating for indigenous land rights, such as the obligation to cultivate and the 
idea of vacant lands reverting to the crown, were discussed as viable policies. Like 
in the colonial settler states, the only alleviative measures to indigenous 
dispossession were the restrictions imposed on the sale of land (restrictions that in 
many settler states had only further strengthened indigenous dispossession). 
Finally, the introduction of land registries, which contributed to indigenous 
dispossession by making ownership conditional on an administrative act by the 
government often beyond the reach of the indigenous population, was promoted 
as a tool for economic progress.  
3.6 Women 
The position of women and women’s rights were a political and conceptual 
minefield for the League of Nations mandates system. The political struggle for 
the equal position of women was even in Europe on-going, and thus it was fairly 
normal and accepted that women were under guardianship or did not have the 
vote.  However, the position of women was one of the main themes of the so-called 
enlightened colonial discourse. In the following, we will see how colonialist and 
feminist themes were mixed in the way that the PMC set out to understand the 
position of women in the mandated territories. The themes of civilization and 
progress were raised as future hopes for the eradication of native customs such as 
female circumcision and child marriage, and polygamy that was repeatedly 
compared with forms of slavery.  
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 The question of women (and often interrelatedly, children)304 and their rights 
had been raised on several fronts in the League of Nations. First of all, there was 
the drafting process of the convention concerning the trafficking of women and 
children.305 The League of Nations had an Advisory Committee on the Traffic of 
Women and Children in operation from 1921 to 1936. International feminists 
could question the position of women by tackling the issue of prostitution and sex 
trafficking,306 and trafficking of women had been the subject of two international 
conferences in 1899 and 1913, while two international treaties were drawn up in 
1904 and 1910. The League took the issue under its authority and held a 
conference on the topic in 1921. The international feminists had a comparatively 
strong foothold in the Advisory Committee. Jessica Pliley has described how the 
feminist agenda changed throughout the years depending on who served on the 
Committee.307 The Committee had a larger number of female participants than any 
other Committee in the League. Apart from sex trafficking, international feminists 
sought to bring forward different aspects of female subordination and gender 
inequality, including the question of women’s nationality.  
 Secondly, in general, the question of equality between women and men had 
been raised in the League of Nations. A feminist movement that was active in 
lobbying on questions relating to women in the League of Nations existed, and the 
question of equality was a key issue. There was a campaign for an Equal Rights 
Treaty, which, however, never materialized during the League period.308 However, 
the instigation of such a treaty kept questions of gender equality alive at the 
League. In general, countries did not show much sympathy towards demands for 
equal rights at the national level. Thus, it was only natural to bring questions to 
the international level, where activists hoped that issues relating to the “rights” of 
individuals were given the form of international obligations.309   
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 Advocates of women’s rights believed that the problems encountered by 
women were shared between women around the world. They also believed that 
the “low position of women in more backward countries” hindered women in more 
“advanced” countries from gaining their rights, and therefore, international 
agreement was essential.310 Nevertheless, women’s rights continued to be regarded 
as domestic issues, which were affected by cultural and religious traditions.311 
 Women also took an interest in colonial matters. Upper class or upper middle 
class women found their vocation in promoting education for women in India, for 
instance, or campaigning to raise the minimum age for marriage.312 Barbara 
Ramusack has called these women “cultural missionaries” and “maternal 
imperialists”. According to her, these women worked as “secular missionaries for 
Western cultural forms”, as these women could never really separate from their 
Victorian backgrounds and ideals, which they then brought to their educational 
aims in India. “Maternal imperialism” meant that Indian women were seen as 
inferior, as victims to be saved from unwanted destinies and to be lifted by means 
of education to a superior level.313  
 The rights of women were not really at the forefront, and are not discussed 
(at least not at length) in most of the histories of the Mandates system. In the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, the question was most actively upheld by 
Valentine Dannevig, the only woman taking part in the discussions. The range of 
topics, or “social problems”, regarding women discussed before the PMC was 
vast. The questions reached from native customs including the payment of 
dowries, female circumcision and initiation ceremonies, to child marriages, 
polygamy, prostitution, female labour and the education of girls. These questions 
were considered by the Permanent Mandates Commission as social issues, 
problematic, but open to gradual solutions. According to the Commission, these 
solutions would come closer as European civilization spread and set an 
appropriate example.314  
 The Permanent Mandates Commission shared the need to eradicate initiation 
ceremonies involving female circumcision. Dannevig was particularly vocal in 
matters relating to initiation ceremonies: “it had not yet been possible to introduce 
improvements in the initiation ceremonies for young girls complained of by native 
women when improvements had already been adopted for those of the boys.” She 
stressed the “necessity of giving native women the training and instruments 
necessary to alleviate the sufferings of the girls until these initiation ceremonies, 
which evidently conflicted with European ideas of morality, could be entirely 
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abolished as soon as possible”.315 The Tanganyikan representative, Mr. Jardine, 
was questioned about initiation ceremonies. “The accredited representative took 
the opportunity of supplying the Commission with information concerning the 
native initiation ceremonies involving feminine circumcision. He assured the 
Commission that the Government was making every effort to cause such practices 
to cease as soon as possible.”316  
 The prohibition of child marriage was approached through the issue of 
consent. The Cameroons, for example, gave a decree in 1922 under which no 
marriage was valid without the consent of the woman. In the administration’s 
view, the decree “was hoped to bring about a gradual evolution of the native 
mentality”.317 Should, moreover, there to be a minimum age for marriage? Child 
marriages were practised by “some of the most backward of all the peoples in the 
territory, and the customs referred to were unknown among the other natives of 
South Africa”.318 However, the PMC was unwilling to draft a minimum age, as the 
matter was “of an extremely delicate character” and “the Commission could do no 
more than make a slight study of it”. The administration of British Togoland noted 
a distinction between early marriages and child marriages, as “in such latitudes, 
the ages mentioned [girls sixteen, men eighteen] were fairly advanced”.319 From 
the physiological point of view the PMC found twelve to be the usual minimum 
age for marriage. They noted that the people criticizing this low age often forgot 
that “colonial problems were different from European problems”. The PMC had 
been approached on the matter of early marriages by the International Alliance of 
Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship. United, the PMC came to the 
conclusion that they should “acknowledge the receipt of the letter” and that the 
attention of the Commission had been drawn to it.320  
 On the other hand, the issue of polygamy was not so clearly a matter of 
protection, although Dannevig wondered if the men had several wives in order to 
have more free labour at their disposal.321 In fact, the British Cameroons 
administration did not want to interfere in polygamy: “It selected its officials on 
their merits and had not up to the present noticed the fact that any official 
happened to be polygamous in any way affected his capacity for work or his 
honesty.”322 In the French Cameroons it was reported that “Polygamy was dying 
out under the influence of Christianity”.323 As the Belgian member of the 
Mandates Committee, Orts explained: “There was a general opinion that 
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polygamy should be discouraged.” He did not, however, “believe in the efficacy of 
fiscal methods [as had been suggested]. The gradual disappearance of polygamy 
must be expected, above all, from an improvement in morals.”324 Marchand, the 
French Cameroons representative, complained that “[e]ach time that a frontal 
attack was made on polygamy, failure had been the result. The sole outcome of the 
efforts made was that the institution it was desired to suppress, the evil it was 
proposed to root out, took on another form.”325 He reminded Dannevig that the 
mandatory needed to respect the native customs as long as they were not contrary 
to morality. He found polygamy “unfortunate”, but was sure that time would 
change that.326 However, in Iraq polygamy was “regarded as old-fashioned and 
looked down upon”. Some polygamy existed amongst the nomads but not in the 
cities, according to the representatives of the mandatory.327 
 There was a close tie between the situation of women and the abolition of 
slavery.328 Drawing a line between marriage and slavery was a question of interest 
for both Lugard and Dannevig. In The Dual Mandate Lugard explains the 
complexities concerning the rights claimed over the person of a woman and the 
difficulties of differentiating between marriage, concubinage and slavery. 
Concubinage was regulated by Muslim law (e.g. in Nigeria) and had different 
rules for different groups of women. Moreover, it was difficult to distinguish 
between dowries, presents, ransoms and the purchase price of a slave.329 
 Lugard was worried about the more hidden ways of slavery, e.g. towards 
women. He asked the French representative of the Cameroons about the 
possibility of a dowry constituting in some cases a purchase price for women. 
Dûchene, the representative, was unable to reply, but realized that progress had 
been made.330 However, the other members of the PMC believed that this was a 
case where local customs were to be respected. D’Andrade noted that the practice 
was common everywhere in Africa. Orts doubted whether it would be possible to 
put an end to a custom “which had lasted for many hundreds of years”. Lugard, 
however, was adamant: “if the dowry constituted in fact the purchase price of a 
woman, the Administration should put an end to this custom, even if it were 
immemorial.” Despite Orts’s hesitancy, he believed that it was possible to make a 
distinction between an actual dowry and a purchase price,331 whereas Lugard 
believed that women in Tanganyika were held in a “state of practical slavery”. 
Jardine, the Tanganyikan representative, argued that the situation was quite the 
opposite. Women in Tanganyika would rather need more restrictions, as they now 
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enjoyed a great deal of freedom. He backed this with their possibilities regarding 
divorce, their position in polygamous households, the opportunities they had to 
benefit from the results of their farming, and so on.332 Dannevig was also 
interested on the border between marriage and slavery. She had learned that in 
the Cameroons women became part of the inheritance of the husbands, and thus, 
after the husband passed away, became the property of the heirs. She noted that 
no matter how the factual situation of slavery had come about, it could not be 
tolerated by the mandate.333 Orts found it probable that such a “curious custom” 
existed to ensure the maintenance of the widow.334 Dannevig also questioned the 
administration of British Togoland whether women were regarded as chattels by 
their husbands. “Both sexes are happy and contented” was the reply that she had 
to be satisfied with.335 
 While the mistreatment of women could be explained and legitimized by local 
custom, it was also a useful ground to demonstrate the barbarism and low state of 
development of the natives. In South Africa the authorities were ready to accept a 
customary code who would place women as minors in patriarchal village societies, 
while at the same time declaring polygamy to be female slavery.336 Natal’s 
governor Pine bemoaned the fact that the wealthy natives’ riches were not the 
result of honest work but “flowed in fact from polygamy and female slavery”.337  
 The situation of women, clearly not the most important issue for the 
generation of men that acted in the administration of the mandated territories, was 
easy to brush away by referring to the customary character of their treatment. The 
improvements that had taken place were assumed to be the result of either the 
spread of Christianity or the influence of European civilization. The representative 
of Ruanda-Urundi mentioned that “Contact with Christian ideas had improved 
their [the women in Ruanda-Urundi] position still further.”338  
 Even though women’s rights and gender equality were by no means self 
evident at the time when the Mandates Commission operated, within the 
Commission it would appears that feminism and colonialism had found a common 
cause in moral imperialism. The issues of women’s rights that were dealt with by 
the Mandates Commission were little different than those that European colonial 
administrations grappled with at the same time. The response to the unpalatable 
native customs was equally one favoured by colonial administrations: moral 
concern, optimism for progress and only cautious intervention. Things like female 
circumcision were soundly condemned and local representatives were instructed 
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to deal with the matter. More problematic was the resurgence of the old colonialist 
conviction that polygamy especially in combination with the giving of a dowry was 
equal to slavery. As in many other issues, in the case of women’s rights the limits 
of the power of the PMC were easily seen. They relied on reports by rapporteurs 
and the assurances of the mandatory administrations that something was being 
done. Like in many of the other issues in women’s rights the widely held belief of 
the Commission was that the advance of civilization and progress would do more 
to alleviate the issues than orders issued by the PMC. 
 Karen Knop has differentiated freedom of religion and the prohibition of 
abuses (such as slave trade) provided for in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations from women’s rights, maintaining that the first-mentioned were “the only 
references to human rights in Covenant Article 22”, while the inclusion of 
fundamental freedoms for everyone in the trusteeship system brought new 
opportunities for women to promote equality in the trusteeship system.339 While it 
is true that the new language of human rights also changed the language in 
petitions regarding women’s issues, in practice the questions relating to women 
under discussion were the same during the mandates and the trusteeship period. 
To concrete questions, the reactions continued to be practical and managerial. It 
was believed that the improvement of the position of women would come with the 
spread of Western thought and ideas.340 Knop maintains that the trusteeships 
brought an opportunity for women’s organizations to promote women’s issues in a 
way that had not been possible earlier. However, many of the organizations acted 
during the mandates period in similar ways, regardless of the fact that there was 
no legal basis for this in official documents. 
3.7 Conclusions 
When studying the various themes in the documents of the PMC it becomes 
apparent that there were great contradictions in the motives behind, and the 
approach to, the mandates system. There was the conflict between the domestic 
needs of the mandatories and their unwillingness to give up colonial territory, and 
the influence of humanitarian ideals. For the League of Nations, the mandates 
were an experiment in internationalism. It was clear that there would be tensions. 
The Mandates Commission had to constantly balance between utilitarianism and 
philanthropy. Especially the labour conditions introduced a debate on the role of 
natives as an asset into the administration.  
 The ultimate goal of the mandates was to “stand alone under the strenuous 
conditions of the modern world”. The aim of the Mandates Commission was to 
educate and to civilize, but it often appeared to lack the belief that some peoples 
actually could be civilized. One of the aims of education was to teach the “natives” 
to be useful in their own communities. However, a willingness to improve their 
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position too much through education was disapproved of. It was not proper for 
the economic or political ambition of the “natives” to approach that of the 
European. The mandates were an answer to both a political need and 
humanitarian ideals. The language used derived from the colonial period and 
remained similar throughout the entire period of the mandates. Lord Lugard has 
called the contradiction between political needs and humanitarian ideals the dual 
mandate,341 which means that at the same time the interests of the natives were 
protected and they were given the benefits of civilization, but also the commercial 
interests of the mandatories were taken care of. There was naturally a tension 
between these two perspectives. The great contradiction was that the well-meant 
aim to educate and civilize could be seen as colonialism in itself. This tension can 
be strongly seen in the discussions between the Mandates Commission and South 
Africa on the use of the labour of natives in South West Africa.  
 The Americans strongly believed that new colonies were no longer needed. 
This, however, is not always evident in the discussion of the Mandates 
Commission. The Commission certainly did oppose the thought of annexing the 
territories to those of the mandatories, but the administrators were treated as the 
real holders of power, if not sovereign rulers. Therefore, it was not always 
apparent that particularly the B and C mandates were governed internationally. 
The Mandates Commission believed that these territories would become 
independent only after a very long time, if ever. In theory, the right of nations to 
self-determination was acknowledged: “…[T]his mission is not, in principle, 
intended to be prolonged indefinitely, but only until the peoples under tutelage are 
capable of managing their own affairs.”342 The acknowledgement lacked 
concreteness, because “the principle of self-determination could scarcely be 
applied automatically to peoples which had not yet attained an adequate degree of 
political maturity, and still less to populations devoid of any real national 
consciousness”.343 Nevertheless, the father of the system, General Smuts, regarded 
the German colonies as “inhabited by barbarians who not only cannot possibly 
govern themselves, but to whom it would be impracticable to apply any ideas of 
political self-determination in the European sense…”.344 The term self government 
in Article 22 could mean progress towards full sovereignty but did not necessarily 
mean this. 
 It was common in the discussions on the different issues to find the cause of 
problems relating to the inhabitant’s rights to be the supposedly low level of 
civilization in these territories. The PMC rarely saw fault in the conduct of the 
different administrations, but readily accepted the administrations’ reassurances 
that time, civilization and Christianity would solve the problems that possibly 
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existed. The PMC’s attitude towards South Africa was an exception, as the PMC 
continuously criticized South Africa for the poor treatment of the native 
inhabitants of South West Africa. Thus, South Africa was the given task of 
guiding the natives to act in their own best interests. But what this interest was, 
was entirely for the administrations and the PMC to determine. This is most 
evident in the aim to balance between the preservation of native cultures and to 
modernize the mandates. The task given by Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations to form a “sacred trust of civilization” for the “well-being and 
development of such peoples” was in most cases interpreted to mean the 
modernization and economic improvement of the territory. The position of the 
native inhabitants was believed to improve as the economic wealth of the 
territories would improve. Similarly, the spread of Christianity was thought to 
improve the moral status of the natives. Local customs that were found repulsive 
by the European administrators were to become history through the spread of 
Christianity and the Western values that Christianity brought with it. 
 Thus, the inhabitants were not seen as active members of society and were 
not believed to be capable of making decisions regarding their own lives. As they 
were viewed as perpetual minors, their “welfare” was to be determined by those 
who had been given the task to act as their guardians. Moreover, with the 
exception of Iraq, both the administration and the PMC discouraged any signs of 
political initiative from the mandates. Susan Pedersen has shown how in both 
Syria and Samoa local nationalist movements were repressed.345 The French 
feared Syrian nationalism and with the help of the PMC ensured that Iraq was the 
only mandate to gain independence before the war.346 The Samoans did not 
understand their own best interests, the administration convinced the PMC. The 
entire movement that in reality was supported by a large number of Samoans was 
described to be caused by a few quarrelsome malcontents who had managed to 
convince the childish Samoans to support them. According to the administration, 
there was no true understanding by the Samoans of such a cause. They were 
simply misled by a charismatic individual and failed to realize their own best 
interest, i.e. mandatory administration. 
 The belief was that the position of the individual would improve by itself as 
civilization would spread to the territories. This way of thinking liberated the 
PMC from taking into consideration the position and hardships of individuals, 
which they often encountered due to the petitions system. Rather, the PMC 
supported the administrations’ idea of a gradual and automatic change that would 
be the result of the spreading of civilization and Christianity and the passing of 
time.  
 However, the PMC found it difficult to decide what it could expect of the 
territories as time passed. It was clear that as regards the B and C mandates it did 
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not expect much to happen in a few years or even decades. Also, it was unclear 
how the different mandates should develop. Should they become societies whose 
inhabitants would resemble Europeans, or should they develop into new types of 
societies, unseen before, inhabited by “good Africans”? Penha Garcia worried that 
in the urban areas, the “European centres”, the rapid change caused by the 
influence of the white population was perhaps not always for the better. Frederick 
Van Asbeck, who took Van Rees’s place as a representative in the PMC follower 
in the PMC, confirmed that “the greatest difficulties seemed … to lie with the 
educated and advanced native”.347   
 In the advancement of the indigenous population, all achievement was 
measured against European standards. Yet the Commission did not want the local 
populations to resemble Europeans. According to Lugard, “the future of the 
Europeanized African, and the part he should play in the future of tropical Africa, 
was perhaps the most difficult problem which confronted the European 
governments”.348 Instead, the Mandates Commission used the notion of a “good 
African”. The good African was someone who did not try to imitate the Europeans 
but was able to gain knowledge from European civilization and turn that into an 
African way of being and working for the advancement of the African community. 
In fact, the mandatories were often criticized for trying to develop the natives in 
the direction of European civilization. One reason for this could be that it was 
believed that the European civilization was too high a goal for the natives and for 
that reason they should be left with the second best option, that is, to become at 
least good Africans. According to members of the Commission, a good African 
was someone who resembled the Europeans but was not a caricature of them. He 
was not Westernized. A good African was not “a half educated African who 
considered himself quite as good as, if not better than, the white man who 
governed him.”  He would make use of the best of Western civilization but would 
keep his African traditions and ways of thought.349  
 In the end, rather than being granted individual rights, the inhabitants were 
treated in a paternalistic manner. There were, however, different degrees of 
paternalism. The most benevolent perspective was represented by the Norwegian 
Dannevig. Her speech highlighted in a concrete manner the contradiction 
between belief in the development of the peoples and paternalism. As a believer in 
education, she expected patience from the mandatories and reminded them that 
teaching self-governance required the ability to wait until the next generation had 
been educated. She would thank the representative of a mandatory that his 
Government's report gave the impression that the administration was striving to 
understand the natives and treated them “like the children they were, finding in 
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them lovable, as well as barbarous qualities.”350 The British representative Lugard 
also balanced between utilitarianism and philanthropy. He believed less in the 
development of the natives but was more pragmatic. His relationship with the 
inhabitants was mainly based on the indirect model of administration used by the 
British colonialists. Indirect administration meant that the natives were given 
responsibilities in their own matters. He talked of independence as a theoretical, at 
best a very distant, possibility. However, when taking the Mandate, he believed 
the administrators had accepted the duty to aim towards the independence of the 
territories.351 Lugard also believed in the wisdom of the administrator. The 
authority of the administrator could not be lost, and thus there was a clear 
hierarchy between the governor and the governed. D’Andrade, the Portuguese 
representative, on the other hand, did not hide his view that he did not believe in 
philanthropy or in the development of the natives and their possibility of 
becoming independent. He said that this aim would never be reached, if the 
administrator for philanthropical reasons left “the natives to drink and to indulge 
in endless debates and inactivity under the pretext that they were happier in this 
mode of life and that it must be respected”.352 In his view he aimed for the equality 
of the administration and the native. He believed that this equality would be 
achieved if the native was assimilated with the governing class. If the natives kept 
their own organizations, they would always be inferior.353 
 The mandates were not a human rights institution and human rights did not 
belong to the institutional language of the time. However, through the various 
mandates instruments, Article 22 of the Covenant, the individual mandates 
agreements, the questionnaires, the petitions and the questioning of the 
mandatories, certain matters came under public discussion that had not been 
under institutional scrutiny before. These issues, the position of slaves, workers, 
women, religious freedom and land rights, would in a few decades be discussed 
under the rubric of “human rights”. The institutional change was fast and in the 
1940s a new vocabulary of human rights was developed. However, in practice the 
change was more gradual. For instance, as Karen Knop has shown, in the 
trusteeship system the rights of women and petitions concerning them were 
discussed in a similar manner as in the mandates. Also in the post World War II 
years it was believed that the position of women would improve once civilization 
would take over. It was still claimed that changes would happen by themselves, as 
time passed. Similarly, threats to individual rights would still be externalized and 
would happen elsewhere, be it due to lack of civilization, fascism or communism. 
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 4. Procedures 
4.1 Introduction 
In the following chapter I study the two processes that made the mandates system 
different from a traditional colonial governance. Firstly, at least in theory, the 
mandates were not perpetual. Even when it was widely doubted whether the B 
and C mandates would ever gain independence, there was a certain conditionality 
in the mandates: they were territories not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world.1 The temporary nature of the A 
mandates was explicit: “Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative 
advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand 
alone.”2 Through the process of independence of Iraq, the PMC was forced to 
determine what the conditions for the cessation of a mandate and granting 
independence to a former mandate would be. 
 Secondly, the petitions provided a channel through which the inhabitants 
could express their grievances to a body that did not directly govern them. 
Subjects were also able to appeal in the British colonial system, but the petitions 
went to the same administration that was also governing them. Despite the PMC’s 
reluctance to criticize the mandates, the mandates system brought a more neutral 
route for expressing grievances even when the petitions process included 
forwarding the petitions to the mandatory administration first.  
 It was not a coincidence that both processes were initiated by the British, and 
they were in line with Britain’s unwillingness to expand their colonial possessions. 
 Iraq was the only mandate to become independent during the mandates 
period. The independence process brought concreteness to some of the themes 
that have been dealt with in the previous chapter. How were the PMC and the 
mandatory to ensure that the different guarantees given to the inhabitants, and in 
Iraq, especially the minorities, would continue to be in place? Would an 
independent Iraq respect the guarantees without outside supervision? Could the 
same be demanded of Iraq (and other former mandates) than of other states? Was 
the aim to include Iraq amongst the “civilized states” or rather, merely to get rid of 
an unwilling mandate? If Iraq was considered less civilized, would there be any 
ways to continue to assist and supervise it outside the mandatory regime? In 
addition to the guarantees, the PMC also discussed whether Iraq would adhere to 
international treaties and whether it would become a member of the League of 
Nations. The central problem of a very cautious, doubtful and paternalistic PMC 
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was whether Iraq was a state comparable to other independent (Western) states, 
or whether there were other criteria for statehood that could apply in the case of 
Iraq, with a limited sovereignty and continuing supervision. 
 Also the gradual development of the petitioning system centred on the 
questions of whether a civilized state and its administration could be supervised. 
In order not to control the mandatory states too much, the PMC constantly 
balanced and limited its own supervisory powers, insisting that it did not want to 
be a court of appeals. Rather, the PMC saw the petitions mainly as a tool to gather 
information from the mandates. There was no mention of the petitions in Article 
22 of the Covenant or the individual mandates, but the entire system would 
develop when the mandates system was in operation. There was a continuing 
discussion on what the petitions were and how they should be treated and used. 
As new questions and demands were raised in individual petitions, the PMC was 
forced to continuously develop the petition procedures. The number of received 
petitions was vast, and therefore the PMC had a large amount of material from the 
mandates and different interest groups to deal with. The contents and approach of 
the petitions varied. Many of them should have been dealt with in the courts, 
others were more general demands for fairness, and many also included a demand 
for political self-determination. 
4.2 Protection of Minorities and other Obligations of Newly- Independent 
Territories 
 “This capacity of self-government is explained by the continuation of the 
sentence ‘under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. 
This means that the capacity of self-government must be able to exert itself 
smoothly under the present political, economic, commercial and other 
conditions of the modern world. It is not only the system of government, 
the stage of development of the population, the economic equipment, the 
guarantees of individual rights, the administration of justice or 
administrative ability which indicate the existence of this capacity. … It is 
the sacred right of those really capable of governing themselves.”3 
 
While reading the minutes of the PMC it is often easy to forget that the ultimate 
aim of the mandates system was to guide the mandated areas towards 
independence. The debates about the B and C mandates were so strongly coloured 
by colonial discourse that the idea of independence was almost never uttered. In 
the case of Iraq the issue arose quickly, leading the PMC to confront what kind of 
preconditions should a state meet not only to gain independence but also to be 
admitted to the League itself. The aim of this section is to examine this issue 
through the concern for the protection of religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq. 
As we shall see, the United Kingdom aimed for a swift exit from its obligations in 
                                                      




Iraq and members of the PMC were deeply sceptical of the competence of the 
Iraqi administration. A system of petitions about the rights of the minorities was 
on the agenda but the underlying problem was what kind of attitude should the 
PMC adopt. Due to the limited powers of the PMC, suggestions concerning strict 
conditions for independence and an active role for the PMC were met with 
scepticism, as were the plans to institute a comprehensive system of petitions.  
 Iraq had become a burden for Britain and in Britain there was strong support 
for Iraq’s independence. Britain’s initiative on the independence of Iraq surprised 
the League of Nations and other mandatory states. It had been believed that the 
independence of the A mandates could be realistic only in the very distant future. 
No concrete plans for the independence of any of the mandates existed and in 
Syria all nationalist movement had been suppressed. 
 Iraq was becoming expensive for Britain and Britain had planned to draft a 
bilateral treaty already before the establishment of the mandates with the Iraqi 
government, which was loyal to her. To the disappointment of Iraq, a mandate 
was however established, but this was done in the form of a bilateral treaty instead 
of the normal mandates agreement. The treaty acknowledged the sovereignty of 
the state of Iraq and gave Britain the task of giving advice and assistance.4 More 
specifically, Britain was to assist Iraq e.g. “on all important matters affecting the 
international and financial obligations and interests of His Britannic Majesty” 
(Art.4) and provide assistance and support to the armed forces of Iraq (Art. 7). 
Britain also agreed to further Iraqi membership in the League of Nations “as soon 
as possible” (Art. 6). 
 To the dissatisfaction of Iraq, the independence plan started to proceed only 
at the very end of the 1920s, when Britain received a new Labour government. 
The new government started to plan independence for Iraq for 1932. 
 Independence would not weaken Britain’s position in Iraq, quite the contrary. 
Britain still was responsible for the defence of Iraq and would have economic 
advantages as well, only without international supervision. However, the other 
mandatory states were also interested in Iraqi oil. Invoking the open door policy, 
the other mandatory states made sure that Britain could not control Iraqi oil on its 
own. The Iraqis themselves were to have little say on the distribution of their own 
oil.5 
 The British interpretation of the criteria set by Article 22 of the League of 
Nations for granting independence to mandated territories was that “a state 
should be fully self-governing, should be able to stand alone and should be such as 
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could be relied upon to observe its international engagements”.6 Thus, according 
to the British, not only one correct model for an independent state existed, and the 
League Covenant did not demand that there be an especially high-level cultural 
and political development. In the British view, the idea of the League of Nations 
was to be as inclusive as possible to new states, not exclusive. Rather, the 
membership of a state in the League of Nations would set an example to 
“backward States” and support an independent state to achieve an even higher 
level of civilization.7. Moreover, the British government had stated that Iraq had 
actually had the machinery of a civilized government, and thus it could be 
concluded that it was capable of self government.8  
 Of the other nations represented in the PMC, Germany was generally open 
to the idea of Iraq as an independent state. Germany had calculated that it would 
gain from a friendly relationship with an independent Iraq in terms of economic 
concessions. For this reason it was important for Germany that the terms of the 
independence ensured that Britain’s position in the future Iraq was not too 
strong.9 France’s stance shifted from the initial bewilderment to admiration at the 
ingeniousness of the British plan. The French had an interest in Iraqi oil and 
succeeded in securing a pipeline to the Mediterranean to be routed through 
Syria.10 Thus, in the end the French, contrary to their initial resentment, started to 
see Iraq as a model for the future Syria as well.11  
 The permanent mandates commission, however, was not convinced by the 
British views.  First of all, the PMC was not satisfied with the way that Britain 
was fulfilling its duties as the mandatory. According to Rappard, Britain was 
acting merely as a diplomatic observer, and not actively fulfilling its role. He 
reminded the British that there was a number of obligations that the British 
needed to take care of, including the minorities in Iraq.12  Therefore, the PMC 
would continue to question Britain on the advancement of Iraq, not only on the 
positions of minorities, but also on other guarantees such as legal matters relating 
to foreigners, religious freedom and economic equality.13 The PMC wished to 
reassure that there was no issue of principle in them opposing the independence of 
Iraq. Iraq was welcome as a member of the League of Nations if and when certain 
conditions were fulfilled, such as Iraq’s ability to stand alone, and assurances of 
Iraq’s willingness to observe its treaty obligations towards its minorities as well as 
towards member states of the League of Nations.   
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 At this point the PMC did not believe that Iraq was willing to take similar 
binding guarantees towards its minorities as, for instance, Albania had done.14 
Iraq’s population was comprised of several minority groups, many of which also 
had nationalist aims. The largest group was the Shia Arabs, followed by Sunni 
Arabs and Kurds. Other religious groups included Jews, Yezidis, Bahais and 
various Christian groups, of which the PMC was most concerned about the 
Assyrians. The Kurds had nationalist aspirations which, however, received no 
support either from the Iraqi government, the British or the PMC. The PMC, 
however, maintained that the Kurds had a minority position, and that their rights 
as a minority needed to be taken care of.  Even more, the PMC was uneasy about 
the Assyrians, who were Christian and had been allies of the British during the 
war.15 Admittedly, the minorities were the most difficult issue in Iraq’s 
independence. Susan Pedersen argues that the birth of Iraq helped to create the 
minorities as a category not only in Iraq but in general as well.16 Orts noted that 
“[o]ne of the reasons why Iraq was refused complete independence was that it was 
not yet considered to possess that spirit of tolerance which made it possible to 
place in its charge, without any apprehension, the fate of the racial and religious 
minorities established in the territories accorded to the country.”17 Orts blatantly 
noted that the whole question of independence would be easier if there weren’t 
minorities in Iraq: “[T]olerance had not always been a dominant virtue of these 
Levantine peoples.”18 Rappard objected to the High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir 
Francis Humphrys’ optimism and believed that the Assyrian minority had come to 
Iraq to expect protection from the British government.19  Dannevig also noted that 
she was opposed to Iraqi independence as she felt that it would weaken the 
position of women and children, which according to her had benefited a great deal 
from the British influence.20 Orts concluded: “[T]he discussion had shown that, in 
any case, the members of the Commission appear to have very little confidence as 
to the way in which the Iraqi Government would treat the minorities.”21 
 There were concrete signs that the suspicion of the PMC was perhaps 
justified. The PMC believed that Iraq’s independence would pose an actual threat 
to different minorities in Iraq. Orts noted that the different minorities, regardless 
of their religion, language and race were anxious because of the planned 
independence and they were concerned for their future. In Orts’s view, the fact 
that they considered themselves to be under threat meant that there were true 
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reasons to be concerned about the upcoming independence.22  The PMC received 
petitions from various minority groups, and contrary to petitions from other 
territories, these asked for the continuation of the mandate rather than its end. 
Others feared “disfavour and reprisals” if they would complain about their 
treatment to the PMC.23 In Rappard’s view, “it seemed … that the attitude of the 
Kurds was not so entirely unreasonable as might at first sight appear”.24 Also the 
Assyrians and the Bahais had concrete reasons to fear for their future.25 
 For example, a petition dated July 26, 1930 by a group of Iraqi Kurds asked 
for the “fulfilment of their national rights which were admitted by the League of 
Nations”. They expressed their fear that the Arab administration would worsen 
the situation of the Kurds and “will [be] worse than that of Turks if Mandate is 
ended”.26 Thus, the petitioners asked for the formation of a Kurdish government 
under the supervision of the League of Nations. The petitioners claimed that they 
had been promised self-government when the Iraqi mandate came to an end and 
that the recent Anglo-Iraqi treaty had forgotten their rights entirely.27  
 In its response to the petition Britain rejected any promises of autonomy to 
the Kurds as a misconception. The response, written in a very paternalistic tone, 
all but ridiculed the Kurds for even imagining that they would have been promised 
any type of self-government. This idea was “probably fostered by elements 
working for Kurdish independence”.28 Economically and geographically the 
British considered such a plan “wholly impracticable”, whereas politically it was 
“almost fantastic”. The list of qualities given to the Kurds was long: “they are 
entirely lacking in those characteristics of political cohesion which are essential to 
successful self-government, [t]heir organisation and outlook are essentially tribal, 
… their mode of life is primitive, and for the most part they are illiterate and 
untutored, resentful of authority and lacking in a sense of discipline or 
responsibility.”29 The British admitted that the Iraqis had not entirely kept their 
promise to keep Kurds in administrative positions or secure their language rights, 
but these shortcomings were only understandable because of the “unpromising 
material” available to fill administrative posts in Kurdish areas and the fact that 
“until recent years, Kurdish, as a language of written communication was 
unknown”.30 However, the British considered that any reason for complaint had 
now ceased to exist as the situation in the Kurdish areas had now been 
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“sympathetically examined” by a new Iraqi government.31 Similarly, the Iraqi 
government gave the assurance that their “friendly and sympathetic policy” ought 
to satisfy all “reasonably-minded” Kurds. However, if it did not, “liberty of action” 
would be assumed by Iraq.32 
 Rappard in his report did not hide the fact that he was not convinced by the 
British and Iraqi assurances. He stated that even with a new language law 
forthcoming, there would not be sufficient safeguards to which the Kurds had 
been entitled, including appointments to administration and the use of the Kurdish 
language in courts and schools. The fact that the mandates were about to come to 
an end made these shortcomings even more acute. However, the PMC rejected 
the petition giving Britain only two considerately worded recommendations: 
firstly, to put promptly into effect the legislative and administrative measures for 
securing the Kurds the position they are entitled to, and secondly, “to consider the 
advisability of providing measures” that would maintain the minority position of 
the Kurds in the event of Iraqi independence.33 
 The recommendations given by the PMC were more determined when it 
came to a petition by Captain Hormuzd Rassan, representing the various non-
Muslim minorities in Iraq. (In his petition he claims to represent the Assyrian, 
Chaldean, Jacobite, Protestant, Syrian Catholic, Armenian refugee and Yezidi 
communities).34 Like other petitioners, he pointed out that the latest Anglo-Iraqi 
treaty of 1930 failed to protect non-Muslim minorities in Iraq.35 He requested that, 
as the Iraqi mandate was coming to an end, the League Council set up an 
Commission of Enquiry to see to what extent the mandatory had set up 
recommended safeguards for minorities in Iraq.36 The British reply to the 
complaint was that firstly, there was no real dissatisfaction amongst the minorities, 
but complaints had been deliberately collected. Secondly, they claimed that the 
petition represented only the Assyrian community, not the other Christian 
communities. Thirdly, the British either disputed the facts stated in the petition, or 
undermined their gravity while accepting their accuracy.37 The PMC report was 
written by Orts, who admitted that the different minorities, both Muslim and non-
Muslim were apprehended for their future and believed that there might be good 
reasons for it. While not recommending what the petitioner requested, the PMC 
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suggested that the League Council should draw the mandatory’s attention to three 
points. Firstly, the mandatory ought not to relax its supervision over the situation 
of the minorities. Secondly, it was necessary to obtain guarantees from the Iraqi 
government with regard to the treatment of racial and religious minorities before 
the mandate ends. Thirdly, the PMC asked the Council to inform the petitioner of 
the League’s continuing support for minority rights, given that the minorities for 
their part promote the security and goodwill of the Iraqi state. In practice, this 
meant that help would be provided as long as minorities did not cause trouble.38  
 Also, the PMC and Iraq had differing opinions about what constituted a 
minority. The Interior Minister of Iraq had noted that the Kurds did not 
constitute a minority, but rather a separatist group. In Iraq’s view, the position of 
a minority implied subordination whereas the emphasis should be on the unity of 
Iraq. Rappard was worried that if there was such a difference of opinion in what 
constituted a minority, there was little hope of cooperation about minority 
questions after Iraq’s independence.39 
 However, the British reassured the PMC that the Iraqi government had 
every intention of treating their minorities well and would indeed do so.  In the 
British view, the problems that would inevitably occur would be isolated ones and 
would be rather due to individuals creating conflict and confrontation, rather than 
acts of the Iraqi government.40 Humphrys, the British representative, noted that 
“as regards tolerance, he night say, realising the heavy responsibility which lay on 
him, that he could assure the Commission that, in his thirty years’ experience of 
Mohammedan countries, he had never found such tolerance of other races and 
religions as in Iraq”.41  Humphrys gave the assurance that everything would go 
well and the PMC should trust Iraq; the Iraqi government would honour the 
treaty.42 To reassure the PMC, the British representative had told the Commission 
that it had already informed Iraq that it was likely that guarantees would be 
required for racial and religious minorities.43  
 The question of the independence of a mandated territory and the guarantees 
needed to achieve that independence were novel and such guarantees were not 
stipulated in any of the instruments on the mandates. The PMC believed that in 
order to find the right guarantees for Iraq, they needed to look into the origins of 
the mandates regime. Thus, the legal sources on which they would base the 
guarantees for Iraq were Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the 
Versailles Peace Treaty and the mandates charters. However, all of these 
documents lacked concrete guidelines, and thus, there was a need to refer to other, 
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unspecified, documents for purposes of interpretation.44 In general terms, what the 
PMC was expecting to find were “[…] obligations assumed towards Members of 
the League of Nations; Guarantees for freedom of conscience and religious 
institutions; Guarantees for the protection of minorities of race, language and 
religion, if any such exist in the territory; Guarantees for an adequate judicial 
system; Guarantees for safeguarding under the new regime the moral and material 
interests developed in the territory during the mandates regime …”.45  
 The PMC was aware that while they were now discussing the guarantees for 
the minorities of Iraq, any mandate that might gain independence in the future 
would most likely be required similar guarantees. Therefore, the work needed 
must be done carefully. “These guarantees [for minorities], which must be 
expressly laid down by law, must be solemnly proclaimed and recognised in the 
act which terminates the mandate. They must ensure internal peace in order to 
create that moral unity on which a country’s life must be based.”46 Penha Garcia 
emphasized that as long that there was such moral unity in the territory and the 
social development of the territory was not to be “in opposition with the general 
principles of human civilisation”, a new state did not necessarily need to have “the 
form of a European state”. However, he required that legislation must grant 
everyone, nationals and foreigners, “individual rights and guarantees 
corresponding to the general principles of international law”.47 
 The members of the PMC set out to draft a set of reports and declarations 
concerning the guarantees.48 
 In his report to the League Council on the termination of the Iraqi mandate, 
Penha Garcia concluded that  
 
(b) It [the League of Nations] would welcome the entry of Iraq into the 
League of Nations if and when certain conditions are fulfilled; 
 
(c) Of these conditions the principal are: That it should be apparent that Iraq 
is able to stand alone and that effective guarantees are secured for the 
observance of all treaty obligations in Iraq, for the benefit of racial and 
religious minorities and of the States Members of the League of Nations.49 
 
Van Rees presented a draft declaration concerning the minorities in Iraq that 
declared that the guarantees that the League was about to demand from Iraq 
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would constitute “obligations of international concern, and will be placed under 
the guarantee of the League of Nations”. This would mean that possible violations 
could e brought to the attention of the League Council by any member state and 
any legal or factual disagreements between Iraq and any League member would 
be considered “a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations” and could be brought before the Permanent 
Court of Justice.50 
 Orts supported the draft declaration adding, however, that eventual changes 
to the Constitution and Code of Iraq should not affect the position of minorities 
and that both instruments should be applied in the “right spirit”. He also wished to 
add the right to petition to the minorities, both as individuals and groups.51 
 Merlin, the French representative, thought that the guarantees should remain 
sufficiently general. He was opposed to the idea of introducing a reference to 
minorities and majorities, as it “would open the door to insoluble difficulties”.52 
Rather, he would have included “a corpus of laws and a judicial organisation 
enabling it to render to all elements of the population and to each individual equal 
justice regularly executed”.53 
 However, a note on minorities was to be added to the guarantees. Lugard 
wished to include “the welfare and just treatment of racial, linguistic and religious 
minorities”, and this would be enforced by the right of appeal to the Minorities 
Committee of the League of Nations Council. In Lugard’s view, the protection of 
minorities would not be efficient without the right of petition, either to the League 
Minorities Committee or to the Permanent Court of International Justice.54 
 What is noteworthy is that the PMC was not familiar with the details of the 
minority system in the League. The League had the complete machinery including 
a series of treaties for the protection of different minorities in Europe and a 
Commission to act as a supervisor. As the PMC realized that experiences from 
earlier minority treaties would be useful to take into account when drafting a 
treaty for Iraq, they invited Pablo de Azcarate, the head of the League minority 
section, to explain the system. Azcarate noted that the document drafted by Van 
Rees was an exact copy of the guarantee clauses of the minority treaties.55 
 In addition to, but also of course relating to, minority rights, the guarantees 
were also meant to ensure “freedom of conscience and public worship and the free 
exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of missions of all 
denominations subject to such measures as are indispensable for the maintenance 
of public order and morality, and good government”.56 The PMC held a discussion 
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on whether the limitations to religious freedom concerning morality could apply to 
freedom of conscience per se, or only to the working of missions. Lugard was 
worried about the consequences of such limitations to non-Muslim minorities in a 
Muslim country. Would the concept of public morality give too much leeway to 
the Iraqi government to restrict the actions of, for instance, the Bahai minority? 
Orts believed that there was a need for such a limitation as the state should in the 
last resort be able to control the missions in its territory. Thus, the limitation was 
accepted with the understanding that it applied only to the possibility of limiting 
education given by the missions.57 A similar clause existed in all mandatory 
statutes. In the case of Iraq, the PMC was for the first time confronted with the 
situation where the concept of public morality would derive from a non-Christian, 
i.e. a Muslim, worldview. Thus, a clause that existed unquestioned in all mandates 
was now seen as a possible risk to the existence of Christian minorities in Iraq.  
 The members of the PMC disagreed on whether they could demand that Iraq 
became a member in international conventions.58 Lugard noted the need to 
demand that the newly independent state would accept international legal 
obligations, such as the conventions prohibiting slave trade and the traffic in 
women and children.59 Van Rees concluded that they could not speak of 
conventions in general terms. There were certain conventions that had been 
signed by the mandatories on behalf of the territories, as had been requested in the 
individual statutes of the mandates. These would remain in force in the territories 
even after independence unless the new states denounced them. Such conventions 
included the slavery conventions, the convention on the trafficking of women and 
children, and the conventions on trafficking arms and drugs.60 On the other hand, 
“conventions providing for the extension of the benefits of general and special 
international conventions or treaties” would cease to be in force in the newly-
independent states.61 
 As Iraq was the first mandate to gain independence, it was the task of the 
PMC to determine all formalities relating to the upcoming emancipation of Iraq. 
Van Rees was hesitant whether it actually was the duty of the PMC to decide on 
the formalities.62 The Chairman Theodoli concluded that this was so, because the 
Council had given this task to the PMC.63  
 The different legal options to formulate the guarantees were by declaration or 
by treaty. Rappard did not find a declaration to be sufficient,64 but noted that “the 
Commission should confine itself to enumerating the guarantees to be furnished 
                                                      
57 Minutes 20 (1931), 182. 
58 Minutes 20 (1931), 155. 
59 Termination of a Mandate, note by Lord Lugard, Minutes 20 (1931), 202. 
60 Minutes 20 (1931), 154. 
61 Minutes 20 (1931), 199. 
62 Minutes 21 (1931), 62. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Minutes 21 (1931), 64. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
152 
by Iraq, and to stating that the act in which those guarantees were embodied 
should make it possible, if necessary, for any disputes that might arise regarding 
its interpretation or application to be brought before the Permanent Court of 
International Justice”.65 De Penha Garcia also found it necessary for the 
guarantees to be binding on Iraq. A mere declaration might suffice in the case of 
Iraq wanting to join the League of Nations, as the League could then set certain 
guarantees as a precondition for membership, but if Iraq did not want to join the 
League, a declaration was not enough to make sure that Iraq abided by the 
guarantees. Van Rees wondered who would be the parties to the treaty if such a 
binding document was to be chosen. He also noted that no more could be 
demanded from Iraq than what was already included in the states signatories to 
the League’s minority treaties. Merlin believed that the task at hand was merely to 
apply the principles formulated by the PMC to the case of Iraq. The task of the 
PMC was only to turn the League Council’s attention to the effective protection of 
minorities in Iraq.66 
 PMC’s trust in Iraq’s motivation to take care of its minorities was so weak 
that it came up with a variety of enforcement safeguards that would ensure the 
protection of the minorities.  
 Apart from not being sure whether Iraq would accept a model similar to e.g. 
Albania, Rappard worried that the Albanian model would not be sufficient to 
ensure the protection of minorities. In the Albanian model, in the case of a 
conflict, a member of the League Council would have taken the matter to the 
Council. However, Rappard feared that Iraq was geographically so distant that in 
situations of concrete infringement no one would actually react. Therefore, he 
would have rather seen a system where anyone could have petitioned on behalf of 
a minority.67 
 Another model was to set up an authority in Iraq, the duty of which was to 
ensure that Iraq kept to its obligations. Rappard suggested that a representative of 
the League of Nations would reside in Iraq to supervise the treatment of 
minorities. Another option, also suggested by Rappard, was to give the task to the 
British Ambassador. He was, of course, already in the territory and had a special 
and privileged position there. One could even consider it his duty and it was the 
least that the British could do for the sake of minority protection.68 Penha Garcia 
and Merlin also supported giving the task to the British Ambassador. In Merlin’s 
view, the Ambassador would act as an advisor to the government of Iraq, and if 
his suggestions were not followed, the said minority could turn either to the 
League of Nations or to the British government.69 Theodoli feared that if this duty 
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was given to the British, it would infringe the sovereignty of a foreign state.70 
Ruppel agreed with Rappard, but as he anticipated that the British government 
would not agree, he suggested the establishment of a specialized court where three 
British judges would judge minority questions. Unsatisfied parties could appeal to 
the League Council.71 Dannevig also supported establishing the Court.72 Lugard 
supported the right to appeal, but appeals should be made to the Minorities 
Committee of the League Council. He considered that no protection was possible 
without an effective right to petition and was also open to the idea of giving 
minorities access to the Permanent Court of International Justice.73 But, as 
Rappard pointed out, the Permanent Court was not open for complaints by non-
state actors. 
 M. Penha Garcia noted that the League of Nations still had responsibilities 
after the termination of the mandate. “Mandates are held on behalf of the League 
of Nations, and it is for the latter to make sure that the benefits and results 
achieved continue under the régime of full independence.”74 
 The British administration was opposed to sending a League representative to 
ensure the rights of minorities, nor anyone else, for that matter. The British 
representative believed that Iraq would see this as a violation of its sovereignty 
and a sign of mistrust. Iraq would have signed a treaty on the protection of 
minorities, and moreover, according to him, Muslims, Christians and Jews had 
lived in peace in Iraqi territory for centuries. Sending a representative would 
therefore be a provocative act that would reaffirm existing conflicts and cause new 
ones.75 
 Iraq was the only state to gain independence during the mandates period and 
the discussions on the impending independence reveal the PMC’s ideas of what an 
ideal society outside Europe would look like. In Europe the League had 
demanded certain guarantees from states about to become independent and these 
guarantees were not dissimilar to those required by Iraq. 
 The independence process of Iraq demonstrates how rights language was 
used to distinguish between the modern and the “other”, the West and the East. 
Iraq needed to take into account certain “obligations of a humanitarian nature” in 
order to prove that it was a “State worthy to take its place among the other 
nations”. In the League’s view, these were demands that “the civilised world has a 
right to make”.76 Thus, the question was what were the conditions which a non-
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European state needed to fulfil in order to be welcomed as part of the 
international community. Throughout the process, the PMC was suspicious about 
Iraq’s “worthiness” to act as an independent state. The main reason for the 
suspicion was a worry about the many (Christian) minorities existing on Iraqi 
territory.  
 And in hindsight, after the Iraqi army had initiated an armed attack on the 
Assyrian minority, the commentators could only note that stricter guarantees 
should have been in place, as “the respect for life is not as great in the East, 
however modernized, as it is in Western Europe”.77 The PMC was left to realize 
that even with hundreds of Assyrians killed, they had no tools left to assist the 
distressed people. The mandate had come to an end and the events were not 
within the competence of the PMC. The PMC, however, did not want to appear 
ignorant. Could they not raise the question when the final report of the mandatory 
power was examined? “There was nothing indiscreet in such a question addressed 
to an ex-mandatory Power which had recommended the admission of Iraq to the 
League, and had thereby accepted a moral responsibility which outlined the 
Mandate,” Orts insisted.78 Rappard agreed, noting that it was the PMC’s task to 
realize its own lack of competence. However, the general public might see the 
PMC as indifferent, if they only expressed “humanitarian sentiments as long as it 
was legally permitted to do so”.79 Only Palacios did not agree: “To make a will, it 
was necessary to be alive, and the Mandates Commission, so far as Iraq was 
concerned, had already ceased to exist in October 1932.”80 With hindsight 
Rappard could note that “[the PMC’s] hopes had been disappointed and their 
fears confirmed. When dealing with other territories subsequently, the Mandates 
Commission would be bound to remember what had happened in Iraq.”81 
 The independence of Iraq prompted by the decision of Great Britain to 
withdraw from its obligations as an administrator became the first and only test 
case of raising a mandated territory to a sovereign nation. While this was the 
underlining aim of the whole mandates system and its justification, the League and 
the PMC were caught off guard by the plans. Many of the members were sceptical 
about whether Iraq was truly ready for independence. Distressed signals had 
reached the PMC from the different minority groups of Iraq, who had feared for 
the future. This meant that the PMC would in this first test case mostly discuss 
limits that might be imposed upon the sovereignty of Iraq. A petition system for 
those religious minorities was demanded with numerous alternatives for the 
recipient of the petitions. The mandatory itself was strictly opposed to the 
interference by the PMC as well as to the limits to the sovereignty of the newly- 
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independent state. The British assured the PMC that all concerns of ethnic strife 
were overblown and that nothing but the continuation of religious harmony could 
be expected. They were, as the hindsight of history tragically demonstrates, wrong 
and innumerable lives were lost in the interethnic and religious conflicts that 
followed.82  
4.3 Petitions 
The system of petitions was a new innovation that was included in the mandates 
system only after it was founded. Discussions about instituting a system of 
petitions had taken place when the system was drafted, but its realization was very 
much a British innovation. The aim of this section is to trace the creation of the 
system of petitions and especially the debates over the form that it should take. 
The reason for this is that precisely these forms reveal the motivations behind the 
petitions as well as the possibilities that the system would have and whose 
interests the system would serve. 
 The United Kingdom had a petition system, the right to “petition the crown”, 
since the Middle Ages. This right was possessed by people who were affected by a 
certain legal norm. For example, in the early 18th century, petitions were used to 
demand rights to the slave trade, but by the late 18th century the practice had been 
reversed and petitions were sent to request the abolition of the slave trade.83 
Eventually the right to petition to the Privy Council had been included in the 
colonies as well.84 According to Duncan Hall, “[i]t had come to be regarded as one 
of the immemorial and vital safeguards of individual rights and liberties”.85 Also, 
inhabitants in other mandates had been accustomed to the possibility of appealing, 
such as Ottoman subjects, Samoans and the Duala in the Cameroons.86 
 The petitions were an important sign of the flexibility of the mandates system, 
as they did not originally exist in the covenant, the terms of the mandates, nor the 
constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission.87 A right to petition did 
exist in the context of the League minorities treaties.88 Originally, there had been 
plans to include petitions in the mandates. Smuts, for instance,  suggested the 
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right to petition in his plan for the establishment of mandates,89 and Wilson in his 
drafts for the League of Nations Covenant.90 
 Britain was eager to introduce a system of petitions to the mandates following 
the British model.91 The British Government had sent a memorandum suggesting 
the possibility of receiving petitions from the mandated territories. This 
memorandum had been drafted by Ormsby-Gore together with the British 
Colonial office and presented to a reluctant League Council. The League 
Assembly received the draft more favourably, having by then heard of the 
bombing of the mandate of South West Africa by its mandatory.92 The British 
initiative on petitions was discussed by the League Assembly in 1922.93  
 Being pressured by the publicity of the situation in South West Africa, the 
League Council finally agreed to consider the draft on petitions.94 The interests of 
the mandatory powers were well taken care of by giving them a chance to 
comment on all petitions.95 However, the mandatories were reluctant to accept the 
idea as they feared it would undermine their prestige in the eyes of the people to 
whom the Permanent Mandates Commission might appear to be a “tribunal 
controlling the administration of the area”.96  Despite the unwillingness of the 
mandatories, a system for petitions was finally approved on January 29, 1923 by 
the Council of the League of Nations.97  However, many questions were left open 
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and the actual procedures would evolve in the PMC during the years to come, to 
be finally codified in 1927.98 
 At the PMC, the question of “consideration of appeals or protests concerning 
the mandates” were discussed at the very first meeting at the initiative of William 
Rappard and with the support of Ormsby-Gore. Freire D’Andrade was sceptical 
about the wisdom of receiving appeals, which he believed would be considerable 
in number. D’Andrade believed that such protests would probably be settled by 
the law of the territory.99 The majority of the commission was similarly reluctant 
and agreed that “this point should not be insisted upon”.100 However, by the 
second meeting, the PMC was already receiving petitions.101 
 Because of the briefness of the 1923 League Council Resolution, the PMC 
had to start developing procedures for receiving petitions. The petitions from the 
inhabitants were to be sent to the League of Nations through the mandatory 
power, which was to attach its own comments. Also different organizations and 
other individuals could send petitions, and these were received directly by the 
Mandates Commission.102  
 The petitions had to meet certain criteria to be “receivable”. It was not clear 
whether it was required that the petitioner had exhausted all legal remedies in the 
mandate. “… [I]t should seem impossible that the Commission should assist 
persons subject to the jurisdiction to withdraw their cases from the jurisdiction of 
the territory,” Orts noted in a draft resolution relating to the petition of a certain 
Mr. Robertson.103 In general, petitions that could have been decided by local 
                                                                                                                                                          
(3) Any petition regarding the inhabitants of mandated territories received by the 
Secretariat of the League from any source other than that of the inhabitants themselves 
should be communicated to the Chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission. The 
latter should decide which, if any - by reason of the nature of the contents, or the 
authority or disinterestedness of their authors - should be regarded as claiming attention, 
and these should be communicated to the Government of the mandatory Power, which 
would be asked to furnish, within four months, such comments as it might consider 
desirable. 
(4) All petitions sent to the League of Nations in conformity with the prescribed 
procedure should, together with the comments of the mandatory Powers, be held and 
accumulated until the next meeting of the Permanent Mandates Commission. 
(5) The Commission, after discussing any petitions received, should decide which, 
if any, should be circulated to the Council and the Members of the League. The Minutes 
of the meeting at which the petitions were discussed should be attached.” 4 League of 
Nations Official Journal (1923), 200, 298. 
98 Summary of the Procedure to be Followed in the Matter of Petitions concerning 
Mandated Territories. Minutes 12 (1927), 176-78; Reproduced also in Hall, Mandates, 
Dependencies and Trusteeship, 315. 
99 Minutes 1 (1921), 29. 
100 Ibid., 30. See also Pedersen, ‘Samoa on the World Stage’, 234; Pedersen, The 
Guardians, 82. 
101 See eg. Minutes 2 (1922), 76 and Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, 200. 
102 League of Nations, The Mandates System: Origin, Principles, Application, 38. 
103 Minutes 4 (1924), 139. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
158 
courts could not be received, neither could petitions that questioned the mandate 
itself or its principles, nor those that were anonymous or repeated the contents of 
earlier petitions.104 However, Chairman Theodoli, annoyed by the reluctance of 
the French and British mandatories, readily considered petitions to be 
receivable.105 
 Lugard wrote a note on the general procedure regarding petitions, where he 
estimated that there would be two different classes of petitions. The first class of 
petitions included those that were justiciable in the local courts. The second group 
included those “which could not be dealt with by a local Court and refer to 
questions of policy or of administrative or executive action on the part of the local 
officials of the Mandatory Power in regard to which the petitioner has no means 
of redress”.106 The purpose for accepting only the latter kind of petitions was that 
“The Permanent Mandates Commission … cannot be regarded as a Court of 
Appeal in matters upon which the local Courts have already adjudicated.”107 As an 
example of the first category of petitions he mentioned land and mineral rights.108 
However, the distinction did not prove easy. It was not clear whether an issue was 
of the type which could be given to local courts to determine.109 Lugard also noted 
that the final decision on which category the petitions would belong to could not 
be left to local officials.110  The problem was that there was no guidance on which 
petitions to accept and which not. Lugard noted that the Mandates Commission 
was responsible for “questions affecting the administration of the mandated 
territory and the general policy followed by the mandatory State so far as it 
affected the welfare of the inhabitants”.111 Rappard clarified that while the PMC 
would not take into consideration appeals of decisions that had been pronounced 
by Courts in the mandatory territories, it had the authority to act if the petitioner 
had no juridical remedy because the legislation of the territory was not in 
conformity with the principles of the mandate or the petitioner had been deprived 
of judicial remedy due to lack of legislation.112 This still left the Commission with a 
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rather broad authorization to act. In effect, the authorization was so wide that 
D’Andrade believed that as there was no document to limit the Commission’s 
competence, therefore the Commission needed to examine every petition.113 It was 
also discussed whether petitions including “violent language” would be admissible, 
but the PMC concluded that it was not necessary to make a separate decision on 
that matter.114  
 The procedure was to be as follows. The inhabitants sent the petitions to the 
mandatory, who, within a six-month period, would send the petitions and its own 
observations thereupon to the PMC. The PMC adopted a procedure where one of 
the members would act as a rapporteur and deal with the petition. The PMC 
would hold a discussion with the mandatory power, come to a conclusion, and 
submit the conclusion to the Council. If the petition came from other sources than 
the inhabitants, it would be sent to the Chairman of the PMC,115 who could see 
which “by reason of the nature of their contents or the authority or 
disinterestedness of their authors, should be regarded as claiming attention, and 
which should be regarded as obviously trivial”.116 No anonymous or “obviously 
trivial” petitions were accepted.117 
 As experience increased and the PMC would face an increasing number of 
petitions, the PMC would need to rethink the procedure. In the 23rd session in 
1933, Lugard and Palacios had noted that the amount of “trivial” petitions was on 
the increase, resulting in the waste of the PMC’s time.118 Palacios had suggested 
that “the Chairman should use more extensively his right to reject, without further 
examination, petitions which were non-receivable”.119 This was suggested after the 
PMC received a flow of petitions from one single source, none of which had been 
considered receivable. The Chairman noted that his right to reject petitions 
included only those that came from outside the mandated territory. Therefore he 
suggested, “by way of experiment”, that the Rapporteur of such a petition could 
propose the rejection of a petition without further examination and if the PMC 
agreed, the said petition would be mentioned in a list annexed to the Minutes of 
the session.120 The Chairman had a rather important role in relation to petitions. In 
addition to being able to determine their receivability, he was also able to affect 
the outcome of the petitions by choosing a rapporteur whom he believed would 
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consider the petition favourably. Thus, the task of the rapporteur would circulate 
amongst a few like-minded PMC members.121 
 The Permanent Mandates Commission was divided on whether to publish 
petitions, as the Commission was anxious about a possible flood of malevolent 
petitions. Van Rees noted straight out that it “might be dangerous to publish these 
petitions”. They all agreed that “obviously ill-intended or seditious” petitions 
ought not be published, for the reason that they would encourage more similar 
ones. However, Rappard concluded that an impartial summary in the reports of 
the rapporteurs would probably not be harmful.122 Van Rees believed that the 
following principle on the publishing of petitions should be accepted: “All petitions 
of a general nature coming from a whole section of the population or from a 
community and concerned with the general administration should be published, 
but not individual petitions.”123 Palacios, on the other hand, thought that if one 
was published, then all must be published. Lugard maintained that publishing 
petitions would single out everything that had not been considered and thus 
encourage people to send new petitions.124 In the end, the PMC decided to publish 
the petitions.125  
 One of the open questions regarding the petitions were whether oral hearings 
for the petitioners would be organized. Again, opinions within the PMC varied. 
Proponents included Lord Lugard, who felt that the PMC was “competent to hear 
any one it might desire to hear” and that hearings would increase its 
impartiality.126 On the other hand, he feared that the hearings would burden the 
PMC and might generate the idea of the subordinance of mandatory powers to the 
PMC. Rappard was also in favour of the hearings, claiming that they were 
necessary “to guard against the charge of apparent partiality and to dispel genuine 
misunderstanding”.127 Rappard suggested that members of the PMC could meet 
the people who were approaching them, but that they should be informed of the 
correct procedures.128 The Italian chairman Theodoli pointed out that he had been 
approached by numerous groups and people that were coming to see him in Rome 
to talk about their grievances personally. Therefore, he wished to address the 
PMC to agree on some kind of a procedure.  He believed that it was the duty of 
the PMC to act in a way that showed how all members were serious about their 
work and thus answer any critique that the whole mandates system existed only to 
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disguise annexation.129 On the contrary, Van Rees (who stated that the PMC had 
“no legal competency”), Orts (hearings were “undesirable”) and Marlin (who 
claimed that pilgrims would march to Geneva and it would pose too heavy a 
burden on the PMC) were opposed to the idea.130 D’Andrade reminded 
representatives that the task of the PMC was delicate. If they went too far, the 
mandatory states would be upset. If they were too careful in setting the limits, it 
would be claimed that the action of the PMC was only illusory. In his view the 
PMC needed a procedure that would repel unnecessary and unfounded petitions 
and those that would malevolently try to affect the members of the PMC. 
D’Andrade agreed that the Chairman could meet people to discuss matters and 
use the information gained in the way he wanted.131 However, he feared that 
hearing petitioners would have “an indisputable influence on the minds and 
opinions of the various members of the Commission”.132 In the end, the PMC 
concluded that in exceptional cases “it might appear indispensable to allow the 
petitioners to be heard by it”.133 First it was agreed that the Chairman could hear 
petitioners unofficially,134 and in the 9th session in 1926 the PMC accepted the 
hearing of petitioners in questions where the matter would not otherwise become 
clear enough.135 Official hearings were, however, never arranged.136 The 
mandatory powers were against oral hearings, fearing that the PMC would 
become a court of law and the hearing would weaken the authority of the 
mandatory states.137 In the end, the Council did not modify the procedure to 
include oral hearings.138 
 Another controversial issue relating to the petitions were visits to the 
mandated areas. Lugard, for instance, opposed them as eagerly as he defended 
hearing the petitioners.139 Rappard was, however, prepared to consider a visit. 
Theodoli saw advantages in visiting territories in principle, but believed that the 
authorization of such a visit should come from the League Council. Similarly, Van 
Rees saw the advantages of visits from a theoretical point of view, but in practice 
found that there were difficulties, not least from the point of view of the prestige 
of the mandatory.140 Palacios, in his report to the petition from the executive 
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committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, where a request for visitation had been 
made, noted that a visit to Palestine should be taken into consideration.141 Some 
visits were made with the authorization of the League Council, partly in a private 
capacity.142 
 The mandatories were openly annoyed by the fact that they had to react to 
complaints from the mandated territories before the permanent Mandates 
Commission. “As long as the Commission took the trouble to encourage petitions, 
so long would they continue”, Sir Thomas Wilford, the representative of the New 
Zealand administration in Samoa complained.143 Of the mandatory states, France 
was the most hostile to petitions and in French Togo and the French Cameroons 
there were reports of cases where the administration had prevented the 
inhabitants from petitioning to the League. Also, other mandatories were known 
to hinder the process.144 The Permanent Mandates Commission considered the 
petitions to be mainly a source of information, and deliberately did not want to 
turn itself into a court of appeals.145 The Commission was careful in its responses 
to the petitioners. The right of petition would not “create in the minds of the 
people the idea that the mandatory power is subordinate to the League”. “Such an 
idea would be fatal to the mandatory. Agitators seeking notoriety would 
endeavour to use this right of petition in order to embarrass the mandatory.”146  
 The petitions came from many different sources. Most petitions concerned 
collective demands but there were individual pleas as well. About 3,000 petitions 
were received by the League of Nations and a great majority of them came from 
the A mandates, especially Syria and Palestine, and some organizations even had 
offices in Geneva to coordinate the petitions.147 Some humanitarian organizations 
sent several petitions, as well as missionaries and lawyers who had noted that 
rights had been violated. There were, for instance, several petitions concerning 
South West Africa by the Anti-Slavery Society.148 Duncan Hall estimates that in 
two-thirds of the mandated territories hardly any petitions were written and many 
had not even heard of such a possibility. In Africa they were mainly written by 
German immigrants, especially missionaries.149 However, concerning New 
Guinea, Australia denied that the lack of petitions was the result of the natives not 
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knowing that such a right existed, but of there not being anything to complain 
about.150 
 The petition of Kaoko-Land und Minen-Gesellschaft from November 1929 
was one of the less common cases, where the PMC did give a recommendation to 
the Union of South Africa despite having declared that the merits of the petition 
were such that the case should have been considered by local courts, not by the 
PMC. The petitioner, a German mining company, complained that a vast area of 
land that it had purchased from South West Africa natives in 1885 had been 
expropriated without compensation. The PMC had discussed the case on several 
occasions during 1928 and 1929,151 and now the rapporteur, Leopoldo Palacios, 
was starting to be weary of the case: “The question would be less complex if … the 
parties to the dispute had not introduced confusion in the form of 
incomprehensible, if not contradictory, statements.”152  
 In brief, the petitioner claimed that about 100,000 square kilometres of land 
was expropriated from the company without compensation and the title deeds had 
been cancelled. First, the company had claimed that it was too costly to initiate 
court procedures,153 but then maintained that South African courts refused to 
accept the claim stating that they had no jurisdiction as the applicant company 
was German.154 The petitioner emphasized that it was the owner of the land and 
had not received the land by a state concession. Therefore, it demanded that South 
Africa pay compensation for the expropriation as was implied “according to the 
law of all civilized countries”.155  
 South Africa confirmed that it could confiscate properties and concessions 
without compensation and that in South Africa “individuals have no remedy under 
any charter of the rights of man against laws which they consider unconstitutional 
and therefore wrongful”.156 Thus, South Africa found no reason to even try to 
claim that it ought to be regarded as a “civilized country” in this respect.157 
Moreover, as the applicant company was foreign, South Africa believed that the 
matter should be resolved by diplomatic means between South Africa and 
Germany.  
 Palacios did not entirely sympathize with the applicant’s demand for 
compensation, as he pointed out that the vast area of land “must have been bought 
from the natives for a mere song”.158 Instead of the mandatory territory (i.e. the 
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natives) paying for compensation, he would “prefer the Mandates Commission to 
follow the humanitarian ideals expressed by Lord Lugard in his book ‘Dual 
Mandate’ with reference to these original contracts”.159 Palacios noted that the 
PMC would be more than willing to declare that in a “modern state” property 
could not be expropriated without proper legal authorization and fair 
compensation. It was self-evident that such a declaration could be made even 
without referring to the “Petition of Rights of 1628 and all the solemn declarations 
of rights that have been made since that date”.160 The problem was that such a 
declaration would make no difference. To study the case and see whether the 
petitioners’ rights had been truly infringed, “we should set ourselves up as a Court 
of Justice, and we have no authority to do so”.161 There was, however, one aspect 
of the petition that Palacios said was within the powers of the PMC. The 
administration was bound by certain “principles of civilisation and law laid down 
in the Covenant”.162 It was the task of the mandatory administration to provide for 
a venue for grievances, that is, access to local courts. In South West Africa there 
was now a “certain high-handedness incompatible with the principles of the legal 
and cultural life of [a civilized] people”.163 Thus, while the PMC declared itself 
incompetent in the substantial question, it “called the attention of the Council – in 
order that the Council may call the attention of the mandatory Power – to the 
propriety of cancelling the unjust prohibition to submit complaints such as that in 
the petition … to the ordinary courts of the territory in question”.164 
 The great majority of the petitions came from Palestine and Syria, and often 
dealt with concerns of different groups and minorities in these territories. The 
petition from the Central Agudath Israel of Palestine serves as one example. The 
petitioners represented the Orthodox Jews of Palestine. They were disappointed 
because they had not been granted the possibility of organizing as a religious 
community separate from other Jews. The religious groups in Palestine had been 
organized as communities, to which certain tasks and advantages had been 
granted. Such were, for instance, the possibility of acting as a religious tribunal 
and exercising jurisdiction on a member’s personal status (including marriages, 
divorces, etc.), autonomy in internal affairs, the right to collect taxes, and 
representation in relation to the government. Knesses Israel had been granted the 
status of the official organization of the Palestine Jews. A large group of 
Orthodox Jews had however refused to join Knesses and would rather have 
formed their own organization. They claimed that the lack of official connection to 
                                                      
159 Ibid., 197. On Lugard’s critique of acquisition by treaties, see Lugard, The Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 15–18. 
160 Ibid., 198. 
161 Ibid., 198. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 




the government led to a situation where laws were passed that infringed their 
religious rights.165  
 Great Britain as the mandatory refused to give them the official status they 
were striving for, claiming to want to avoid an unnecessary precedent if other 
associations of Jews wished to make similar claims. The British also claimed that 
Jews willing to stay outside the community were free to do so and to form 
associations if they so pleased.  
 The PMC recognized that the lack of separate organizations could amount to 
discrimination on religious grounds. The Orthodox Jewry was not a small group, 
consisting of approximately 28% of the entire Jewish population. According to the 
PMC, they were in essence asked to interpret whether the mandatory complied 
with Article 2 of the separate agreement for the British mandate in Palestine 
safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 
irrespective of race and religion, and Article 15 granting freedom of conscience 
and free exercise of all forms of worship and prohibiting discrimination on the 
grounds of race, religion and language. The PMC concluded that the petitioners 
had prima facie a strong case as they had been treated differently from other 
religious groups. However, they wanted to look at the obligations as a whole, and 
here political obligations stepped in. One aim of the mandate was to establish a 
National Home for the Jewish people, and the Jewish minority did not wish to 
see the Jewry divided for this reason. Thus, the aim to build a National Home had 
to override feelings of discrimination, no matter how real they were. The PMC left 
the conclusion open, and informed the mandatory that while it would not give any 
recommendations based on the petition now, it would continue to follow the 
matter.166   
 Contemporary authors approached petitioning on two levels. First and 
foremost, it was an important means for the PMC to gather information that 
would not have otherwise been available to it.167 Yet, information was not seen as 
the only task for petitions. Rather than seeing the PMC merely as a passive organ 
which just processed information, it was also seen to have an active role in 
advancing the welfare of native inhabitants. Petitions could be seen as a “means 
whereby those concerned may state their grievances and secure redress for any 
wrongs done them”.168 
 Similarly, Quincy Wright recognized that one cannot take too strictly the 
division between petitions for purposes of information, and other complaints for 
which a local court should be addressed, as “[t]he courts of the mandatory may 
violate the mandate themselves in giving a decision either through 
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misinterpretation of the law or because the law is in conflict with the mandate”.169 
Thus, while information was the “primary object” of petitions, they also ensured 
that “grievances will receive careful consideration” and in case of violations, 
provide remedies.170 
 James Hales, writing in 1939, saw an even broader meaning to petitions: “For 
the first time in colonial history, the administrators are made to answer challenges 
from those whom they administer, before an independent Commission,”171 he said. 
“[The rules concerning the petitions] marked a stage in the progress towards open 
dealing in colonial administration.”172  
 In retrospect, the right to petition has been considered by some authors to be 
the most important human rights feature in the mandates system and as such, was 
applauded by several authors writing immediately after the Second World War. 
Hersch Lauterpacht, for instance, called the right of petition a “natural right”173 
and a “fundamental right”,174 and maintained that the “right of petition was 
regarded as a natural concomitant of the system established by the Covenant”.175 
In his view, the hearing of petitions was one of the main features of the mandates 
system.176 Lauterpacht, however, was not describing the meaning of petitions in 
the mandates (and the League minority treaties) as such. Instead he was arguing 
that the human rights clauses in the United Nations Charter will never serve their 
full purpose unless a similar right to petitions was inserted.177 Similarly, William 
Rappard included petitions in his list of features relevant to the protection of 
human rights. He, however, viewed petitions mainly as a source of information. 
According to him, the contribution of the mandates system to the protection of 
human rights was (apart from the guarantees given to the inhabitants) in the 
information elicited from the mandatory governments, gained from the petitions 
and other oral information received from the Mandates, the communication of this 
information to the League of Nations organs and the publishing of the information 
to the general public. Rappard writes, “I doubt very much whether any flagrant 
and persistent violation of any of the clauses of the Mandate could have escaped 
the vigilance of the Mandates Commission”.178 
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 Duncan Hall considers petitions to be “one of the main and most interesting 
innovations of the mandates system”, calling it a “natural right”.179 In Hall’s view, 
the value of petitions was theoretical rather than practical.180 Chowdhuri also 
treated petitions similarly: “The right of petition, which is one of the fundamental 
human rights, is one of the most important factors in the operation of the 
Trusteeship system.”181 However, he found a great difference between petitions in 
the mandates system and the trusteeship system. In the former he saw them 
mainly as a source of information, whereas in the latter, it was one of the most 
important features of the entire system.182 
 What is common to these authors was that they did not claim in retrospect 
that petitioning brought a human rights feature into the mandates period, but they 
were aware of its potential in the new era of human rights. Lauterpacht argued for 
the right to petition in the United Nations, while both Hall and Chowdhuri saw 
the theoretical possibilities of petitions, Chowdhuri giving it a greater importance 
in the trusteeships. Rappard would not have even started to think about petitions 
from the point of view of human rights had he not been given the specific task of 
doing so. 
 Concerning more recent accounts, Susan Pedersen maintains that the 
meaning of petitions was in the fact that they forced the responsible 
administration to reveal the logic of the system and the petitions and their 
treatment revealed the authoritarian structures of the system and racial 
hierarchies.183 Using Samoa as an example, Pedersen has described how meagre 
the effects of petitions on the lives of the inhabitants of a mandated territory were, 
at least initially.184 Pedersen has noted that the attitude towards petitions in the 
PMC reveals that the Commission believed in formal rules, paternalistic ideals and 
the authority of the administration, and for petitioners it was a difficult route to 
get their voices heard.185 However, in some mandates the petitions were a useful 
method of revealing grievances to the Permanent Mandates Commission, which 
was mainly dependent on the reports of the mandatories for information. In some 
cases, like the Samoan petitions, they in the end initiated processes that otherwise 
would have not taken place.186 On the other hand, Aleksandar Momirov has seen 
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the petitioning procedure in a more positive light, emphasizing accountability,187 
the novelty of contact between individuals or interest groups and the 
“international community”188 and the inclusiveness of the right, as there was no 
requirement of a citizenship, residentship or even physical presence on the 
territory.189  
 The institution of petitions from mandates was a late invention in the 
operation of the PMC and their form and function were a source of much concern 
within the PMC. It was a matter of debate whether the PMC could or should be a 
Court or a recipient of appeals, who would be able to appeal and what possibilities 
would the PMC have to act on these petitions. Like much of the operation of the 
PMC, the system of petitions was a compromise. As there was no organization 
representing the inhabitants beyond the administration, the right to petition was 
granted to both individuals and groups. The petitions were, however, presented to 
the mandatory who would then be required to forward them to the PMC. The 
PMC would in turn consult the mandatory power and a rapporteur would be 
appointed. Balancing between the desire not to antagonize the mandatory powers 
on the one hand, and building a purposeful process on the other hand, proved 
difficult. As the system would become operational, it was felt that too many of the 
petitions were trivial and the PMC members wished to restrict so-called trivial 
petitions. In all of these debates it is clear that basic elements of legal proceedings 
such as granting a hearing to petitioners were still not settled. Though the system 
of petitions was fairly limited in its extent, it nevertheless managed to annoy the 
mandatories. Many of the petitions were drafted by European philanthropic 
organizations or Christian missions. What was even more troubling was that in 
fairly many areas no petitions at all were brought forward, leading to questions 
whether petitions had been suppressed. In its discussions the members of the 
PMC were often less than understanding about petitions. Many were disparaged 
and thought to be trivial, in others the members would reflexively side with the 
administration. Thus while the first historians of the system of petitions hailed the 
system of petitions as a virtuous guarantor of human rights, the reality was much 
more mundane. While the system of petitions allowed the PMC to gain 
information about grievances and issues in the administration, for the most part it 
had very little effect in the lives of the inhabitants of the mandates. 
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 5. The Emergence of Rights Language and the South West Africa 
Cases of the International Court of Justice 
While the relevance of the League of Nations ended with the founding of the 
United Nations and the League mandates it had established were turned into UN 
trusteeships, the mandates continued their relevance in international law through 
the International Court of Justice Mandates cases.1 
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the reinterpretation of the mandates 
system by the International Court of Justice, especially through the interpretation 
of the idea of self-determination and its implications in the era of decolonization. 
In this process the discussions are expressed increasingly through the language of 
rights. Of the three sets of cases,2 I will limit my examination to the cases 
concerning South West Africa (later Namibia). In these cases, the ICJ revisits 
several times the meaning and content of the mandates, finally approaching them 
through the language of human rights. The cases demonstrate the slow realization 
of the Court to the political realities of the decolonizing world. While the 1950 
case sought to reaffirm the continuation of the obligations of South Africa as a 
mandatory and, by extension, to reject the aims of annexation by South Africa, the 
later cases were about protecting the rights of the inhabitants of the mandate and 
ultimately about the system of apartheid practised by South Africa. In the first 
1950 advisory opinion, sought by the United Nations General Assembly, the 
Court outlined that the obligations of the mandate continued to bind South Africa. 
In the cases of 1962 and 1966, the Court was faced with numerous claims from the 
applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia, but the bulk of the proceedings were about the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The case never entered the merits phase, where issues 
such as whether South Africa would be violating the rights and liberties of the 
inhabitants of the mandate would have been discussed. When the Court rejected 
the case in 1966 based on strict formalistic argumentation, there was an uproar, 
especially from the developing world. As a consequence, on the suggestion of 
Finland, the Security Council made a new request for an advisory opinion to the 
Court. In its advisory opinion in 1971, the Court reversed its position and found 
                                                      
1 Syria and Lebanon, both part of the former Syrian mandate, became independent in 
1946. 
2 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia). Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, 240; Case concerning the Northern Cameroons 
(Cameroon v. United Kingdom) (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 2 December, 1963: I.C.J. Reports 1963, 15; International Status of South 
West Africa, Advisory Opinion: I.C.J. Reports 1950, 128; South West Africa Cases 
(Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 
21 December, 1962: I.C.J. Reports, 1962, 319; South West Africa, Second Phase, 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, 6; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, 16. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
170 
South Africa to be in violation of its obligations as a mandatory. In this chapter, 
the aim is to discuss not only the evolution of the reasoning of the Court, but 
equally the changes in the legal and political landscape and its implications for the 
understanding of human rights and colonialism.  
  Within the mandates system, the continued presence of South Africa and its 
willingness to annex it was an anomaly after the Second World War. Most of the 
A mandates (Syria and Lebanon, Palestine) had become independent immediately 
after the war, while most of the mandates in Africa first became UN Trust 
territories and then gained independence along with the French and British 
African colonies in the early years of the 1960s (British and French Cameroons, 
British and French Togo, Tanganyika, Ruanda-Urundi). The Pacific mandates 
(New Guinea, Nauru, Samoa, and the South Pacific Mandate) were transformed 
into UN trusteeships with the ultimate goal of self-government and independence.  
 Even though the stated objective of the mandate system had been to guide the 
mandated areas towards the goal of independence, that had been considered 
merely a theoretical possibility with regard to many of them, especially the 
mandates of Africa and the Pacific. Those calculations changed dramatically due 
to the rapid unravelling of the European colonial empires after 1945. The 
independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 and Indonesia in 1949 began a wave 
of decolonization that swept first Asia and then Africa. The 1955 Asian-African 
Conference of Bandung solidified the movement against colonialism. Anti-
colonialism was a rare movement during the Cold War as it was supported by the 
US, the Soviet Union, as well as the non-aligned countries. By the end of the 
1960s, the only remaining colonies in Africa were Angola and Mozambique held 
by Portugal, and ruled by a military dictatorship, and South West Africa held by 
South Africa. The second consequence of the decolonization was the entry to the 
UN by the former colonies, changing the balance of power in the General 
Assembly.   
 The foundation of the UN and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights were a tremendous boost to the prominence of human rights. While their 
emergence may be seen as reactions to the horrors of totalitarianism and the 
Second World War, such as the Holocaust, they became equally important in the 
Western self-understanding during the Cold War and the perceived 
totalitarianism of the Communist regimes. In the US, the civil rights movement 
had long advocated against racial segregation, especially in the South. With 
judicial victories like the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education,3 the idea of equal rights 
began to take hold. Against this background, the fact that South Africa, which had 
long practised racial segregation, began in 1948 to implement a policy of 
comprehensive segregation based on race called apartheid, was another anomaly. 
The apartheid system was an antithesis to the idea of equal rights, mandating 
segregated education, health care and even residential areas. It even deprived the 
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non-white population of citizenship and political rights. Through forced removals, 
millions were relocated into so-called segregated neighbourhoods and Bantustans. 
From the beginning, the apartheid system caused international protest and led to 
different sanctions against South Africa, gradually turning it into a pariah state. 
Like the separate but equal laws used in the US, the apartheid laws enforced a 
segregation based on ethnicity and race. Like in the US, the system was perfectly 
legal under national law. Due to wide resistance and protests, maintaining 
apartheid led to the formation of a police state and the use of terror against 
dissenters. The issue of apartheid was one of the most blatant contradictions 
between the ideas of universal human rights and national sovereignty.  
 The United Nations took shape in a series of meetings and documents, all 
having varying relevance to the growth of human rights, self-determination and 
the independence of colonial states. 
 The Atlantic Charter of 1941, a declaration signed by Theodore Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill on issues relating to peace and future relations between 
states, did include a mention of self-determination to all peoples, as well as “the 
assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear 
and want”.4 The Charter has, however, received contradictory interpretations on 
its meaning concerning the development of human rights. Arguing for a minimalist 
interpretation, Samuel Moyn does not consider it a human rights document, 
noting that it did not include the phrase “human rights”.5 On the other hand, Seth 
Mohney maintains that Moyn ignores the real impact of the document by 
concentrating his attention on the verbal formulations of the document. In his 
view, the meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill “produced one of the most 
influential, non-binding human rights documents in history”.6 
 In the autumn of 1944 the allied states of World War II met at Dumbarton 
Oaks to negotiate the setting up of a new international organization. Initially, the 
participants were the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, while 
China, being excluded from the preliminary negotiations of the Conference, would 
join the discussions at a later stage.7 
 Human rights did not play a great role in the discussions, but internationalists 
were keen to see them included. Roosevelt had favoured a universalistic 
interpretation of the Atlantic Charter, and was prepared to include some reference 
to human rights in the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations as well.8 Roosevelt, who was 
torn on the domestic front between internationalists and isolationists, suggested a 
clause giving each state the task to respect human rights and fundamental 
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freedoms, while at the same time protecting domestic sovereignty.9 However, the 
British and the Soviets feared that a mention of human rights opened an 
opportunity to criticize members of the new organization.10 At the same time, the 
Chinese suggested including a clause on the principle of equality of all states and 
races, which was, however, not acceptable to the other participants.11 In the final 
document a mention of human rights was included, but it was buried under 
“arrangements for international economic and social cooperation”:  
 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the 
Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social 
and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.12  
 
Thus, the task to safeguard human rights was moved from states, as Roosevelt had 
initially suggested, to the United Nations. The role of human rights in the final 
document remained insignificant.13 Moyn states that the purpose of the conference 
was to balance the great powers, not to create a moral code for the international 
community. According to him, human rights had not yet obtained such a role in 
international language that they could be used to justify an international 
organization. Rather, their task was to promote the organization to the general 
audience.14 However, public opinion and many governments were critical towards 
what was achieved in terms of human rights at Dumbarton Oaks, and especially 
the Americans could not ignore such critique without further consideration. The 
final United Nations Charter would thus feature human rights in a more 
prominent way.15 
 A large role has been given to initiatives by Latin American countries as well 
as by American NGOs, for including a broader reference to human rights in the 
UN Charter, as compared to the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations.16 Latin American 
                                                      
9 Ibid.; Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 392. 
10 Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 391. 
11 Ibid.; Burgers, ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in 
the Twentieth Century’, 474; Lauren, ‘Human Rights in History Diplomacy and Racial 
Equality at the Paris Peace Conference’, 9–13. 
12 Washington Conversations on International Peace and Security Organization. October 
7, 1944. Chapter IX 1. 
13 Burgers, ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century’, 474; Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 
391; Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 56. 
14 Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 56–57. 
15 Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 392; Mohney, ‘The 
Great Power Origins of Human Rights’, 341. 
16 Mohney, ‘The Great Power Origins of Human Rights’, 841; Burgers, ‘The Road to San 
Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the Twentieth Century’, 475. 
The Emergence of Rights Language and the South West Africa Cases of the ICJ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
173 
countries had held a conference at Chapultepec, Mexico, where they had decided 
to promote the inclusion of human rights in the Charter as well as a declaration of 
human rights.17 The US delegation to the San Francisco Conference in the spring 
and summer of 1945, on the other hand, had decided to include several NGOs in a 
consultative role. The United States was careful not to repeat the previous 
embarrassment when the US Senate would not accept the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, and was willing to accept suggestions by the NGOs to support a 
broader inclusion of human rights to the United Nations Charter.18 In order to 
secure domestic support, the United States needed to take the general opinion of 
the American audience into account.19 
 While smaller states now at the San Francisco Conference had an 
opportunity to participate by working in various drafting committees, the great 
powers still dominated the negotiations.20 The number of references to human 
rights increased from the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations, to be now included in 
several articles of the United Nations Charter: 
 
Preamble:  
[…] to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of 
nations large and small […] 
 
Chapter I. Purposes and Principles  
Article 1.3  
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of 
an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;[…] 
 
Chapter IV. The General Assembly:  
Article 13.1 The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make 
recommendations for the purpose of: 
[…] 
b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, 
educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
                                                      
17 Burgers, ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century’, 475; Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, 
168–170. 
18 Burgers, ‘The Road to San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Idea in the 
Twentieth Century’, 476. 
19 Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 392. 
20 Mohney, ‘The Great Power Origins of Human Rights’, 842. 




Chapter IX. International Economic and Social Co-operation 
Article 55  
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
the United Nations shall promote: 
[…] 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
Article 62 
1. The Economic and Social Council may […] 
2. … make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and 




The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic 
and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other 
commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions. 
 
Chapter XII. International Trusteeship System 
Article 76 
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the 
Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present 
Charter, shall be: 
[…] 
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to 
encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world;  
[…] 
 
The preambular clause was suggested by Jan Smuts from South Africa, which 
shows that he did not believe it to be contradictory in any manner to South 
Africa’s practices.21 Despite the added references to human rights, the great 
powers ensured that the emphasis on domestic jurisdiction remained strong. 22 
 
                                                      
21 Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 61. 
22 Mohney, ‘The Great Power Origins of Human Rights’, 844–845; Mazower, ‘The 
Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 393; Lauren, The Evolution of International 
Human Rights: Visions Seen, 187–188. 
The Emergence of Rights Language and the South West Africa Cases of the ICJ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
175 
Article 2.7  
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not 
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. 
 
The powers also made sure that none of the human rights clauses were directly 
enforceable. Thus, they could be sure that they themselves could not be criticized 
based on such articles.23 
 Moyn maintains that the UN Charter was merely a repetition of the 
Dumbarton Oaks Agreement. In his view, the meeting at San Francisco was 
concentrated on the issues of the balance of power and national sovereignty, and 
human rights were left a marginal role in legitimizing the new international 
organization and bringing support from the general audience. Thus, he sees the 
human rights notions in the Charter as merely symbolic, stressing also the 
insignificant role of the Economic and Social Council.24 However, this minimalist 
view may be seen as exaggerated if one takes into account the pervasive nature of 
the human rights language in the founding documents.    
 There was naturally a continuation from the mandates system to UN 
Trusteeships that were established in the UN Charter.25 After all, all mandates, 
with the exception of South West Africa and Syria were turned into trusteeships 
as the League and its mandates system ceased to exist. Like the mandates system, 
the trusteeship system was similarly based on the idea of a “sacred trust”, as can 
be found in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.26 US President Roosevelt 
had suggested the trusteeships. His idea was to put all colonial possessions under 
international governance until they became independent. Churchill objected to the 
plan, and accepted only a limited system of trusteeship. This meant that he would 
accept only the former mandates to be placed under the trusteeship system. 
Finally, the five permanent members of the United Nations all suggested their 
own formulations for the trusteeships. The Assembly of the League of Nations 
terminated the mandates in its last meeting of April 18, 1946. The trusteeship 
agreements were approved on December 13, 1946.27 
                                                      
23 Mazower, ‘The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950’, 394.; Lauren, The 
Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, 188. 
24 Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 59–62. 
25 Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations, 1887. The first United Nations 
preparatory document to include the idea of a Trusteeship System was the Protocol of 
Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, signed by Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Winston Churchill on February 11, 1945. 
26 Toussaint, The Trusteeship System of the United Nations, 10. See also Rappard, ‘Mandates 
and Trusteeships’. 
27 Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, 1844-1845. 
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 Yet, there were great differences between the two regimes, the most 
important being the composition of the organs that supervised the system.28 The 
Permanent Mandates Commission had consisted of independent experts, who, at 
least on some occasions, took pride in their neutral handling of the territories and 
their administration. However, the UN Trusteeship Council consisted of members 
representing their governments, and half of the members represented the 
administering nations.29 At the same time, the United Nations General Assembly, 
the task of which was to approve the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of 
their alteration or amendment and act as an authority for the Trusteeship 
Council,30 was becoming flooded with new members. The number of member 
states in the UN had increased from 51 to 99 between 1945 and 1960.31 Many of 
these new members were former colonies, and it was understandable that their 
relationship to the trust territories differed from the administering nations, most of 
them being old colonial powers. 
 Not all colonies became trusteeships, but the system applied only to former 
mandates, territories that had formerly been a part of enemy states, and areas that 
were voluntarily placed under the system. Thus, the colonial powers were able to 
keep their colonies regardless of a new mode of colonial administration. The 
Charter allowed the designation of certain territories as “strategic areas” and to be 
placed under the auspices of the Security Council, where the permanent members 
were thus able to exercise control over them. This possibility was readily used by 
the US, as Carolina, Mariana and Marshall Islands were designated as “strategic 
areas”.32 
 To the administering countries issues such as self-government, the underlying 
goal of the trusteeship system did not necessarily mean a promise of 
independence. The British historian Duncan Hall describes this as an 
improvement in the mandates system, where independence was explicitly 
recognized in the A mandates. According to him (and the administering states), it 
was better to support a true self-government that could take a variety of forms 
rather than independence, which could lead to instability in the form of a puppet 
government or at worst a dictatorship. He maintained that the world was too 
fragmented and would benefit from cooperation rather than division.33 On the 
other hand, the newly independent states claimed that independence had been 
                                                      
28 Goodrich, ‘From League of Nations to United Nations’, 18–19; Sayre, ‘Legal Problems 
Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship System’, 265–268. 
29 Murray, The United Nations Trusteeship System, 119. 
30 United Nations Charter, Article 85. 
31 http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-
1945-present/index.html. Accessed May 13, 2016. 
32 Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen, 187. 
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promised to the mandates already during the League period and there was no 
reason to diverge from this.34 
 A similar division was apparent in a range of matters relating to the 
trusteeships. The colonial powers were hostile to a suggestion that trust territories 
could send their own (native) representatives to the Trusteeship Council. 
Similarly, ideas differed on how self-government would be realized and how the 
inhabitants of trust territories would be given the chance to voice their wishes.35 
The administering states were opposed to suggestions on how the UN could 
follow the processes towards independence, or the need to set a time limit for 
independence. However, the General Assembly required the administering states 
to give an estimate of all actions that were done to advance the independence of 
the trust territories and how they were advancing. 
 The division between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly led 
to the fact that many decisions concerning the trust territories were bounced back 
and forth between these organs. Matters important to the new states of the 
General Assembly could be pending for a long time, as the Trusteeship Council 
would disregard it or consider it inappropriate.36 As the General Assembly had no 
means to enforce its decisions, it could only continue giving resolutions over and 
over again concerning the same matters. 
 The basic objectives of the trusteeship system were to “promote the political 
advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories, and their progressive 
development towards self-government or independence”.37 The same questions 
about rights would follow from the mandates to the trusteeships. The local 
inhabitants would still petition on issues such as local lands being given to the use 
of foreigners.38 Also discussions concerning slavery, forced labour and the position 
of women would continue into the trusteeship period. Moreover, despite the new 
specific articles on human rights in the trust territories, discussions relating to 
these “social matters” were to some extent similar to those in the mandates. For 
instance, as Karen Knop has shown, the position of women was discussed in the 
Trusteeship Council as something that would evolve gradually, due to increased 
contact with civilization and the European model.39 
                                                      
34 Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study, 53; 
Murray, The United Nations Trusteeship System, 41. 
35 Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume 2, 143. 
36 Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume 2, 121-122, 127. 
37 United Nations Charter, Article 76. Meredith Terretta considers the trusteeships to be 
central to the connection between human rights and decolonization. Terretta, ‘We Had 
Been Fooled into Thinking That the UN Watches over the Entire World’, 358. 
38 Chowdhuri, International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems: A Comparative Study, 278. 
39 See discussion in section 3.6 above. 
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 A conference of non-aligned states of the third world was held in Bandung, 
Indonesia, in April 1955.40 The initiative had been made by Indonesia, and the idea 
was to gather states from Asia and Africa to a common conference, and thus to 
bring them closer together. 
 The Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference (also called the Afro-
Asian Conference) discussed issues such as economic and cultural co-operation, 
but also human rights, self-determination and, more generally, the problems of 
dependent peoples.41 
 In later accounts of the conference much emphasis has been put on the stress 
placed on human rights and the rights to self-determination at the conference. 
Roland Burke, for instance, has maintained that human rights reached their 
highpoint in third world countries during the conference.42 According to him, 
human rights were central in the discussions in Bandung as it was through human 
rights that the participants could articulate matters that they were striving for. 
The participants accepted the Universal Declaration as an existing normative 
standard and, at least in principle, human rights were declared as universal, 
though there was much debate on the details.43 For some of the participants the 
struggle against colonialism was a struggle for human rights.44 Burke maintains 
that even when there was much emphasis on the sovereignty of states, a majority 
of the speakers did not see a contradiction between sovereignty and human rights. 
Human rights were perceived as a tool with which colonialism could be 
challenged, and thus human rights and self-determination were seen to support 
each other.45 Instead of criticizing human rights as a Western creation, the 
participants supported them as useful for their own purposes. Thus, Burke 
concludes, some of the important achievements of the Bandung Conference were 
that especially small Asian states gave their support to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as the discussions on human rights, including individual 
rights, freedom of religion and democratic governance.46 
 However, Burke’s view has been criticized as one-sided. Samuel Moyn, for 
example, notes that in Bandung, self-determination was seen as the primary 
human right, to which other rights were subordinate.47 Thus, in order for other 
                                                      
40 Generally on the Bandung Conference, see Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of 
the Bandung Conference of 1955; Lee, Making a World After Empire. 
41 Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference of Bandung (24 April, 1955). 
42 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 14–15. 
43 Ibid., 19, 21. 
44 Ibid., 20. 
45 Ibid., 25–26, 34. 
46 Ibid., 33. 
47 Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. See also Bandung Final Communiqué 
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rights to materialize, self-determination would be required. According to Moyn, 
the participants of the Bandung Conference did not mean individual rights by 
human rights. This also explains why human rights and national sovereignty did 
not seem to contradict each other. If by human rights one means the right to self-
determination, an emphasis on sovereignty naturally follows.48 
 Jan Eckel has also noted that post-colonial states used the language of human 
rights to strengthen their demands. Therefore, self-determination and racial 
equality were presented as human rights.49 He pointed out that at Bandung, 
human rights were only one theme amongst many others, and one should not 
exaggerate their importance. He also stressed that human rights were defined to 
mean one, politically convenient purpose: self-determination. According to Eckel, 
expressing colonial experiences using a novel international language gives a clear 
example of how the idea of human rights is redefined according to anticolonial 
principles.50  
5.1 The Continuation of the Mandate Without the League: The 1950 
Advisory Opinion on the International Status of South West Africa 
While the other mandates were transferred to the UN trusteeship system after the 
Second World War, South Africa had informed the United Nations of its plan to 
annex South West Africa. This would only have required the approval of the 
United Nations. The General Assembly did not approve of the plan and demanded 
that the mandate be changed into a trusteeship. South Africa refused. It sent one 
more annual report to the United Nations but then began strengthening its policy 
of apartheid also in South West Africa.51 The fate of the territory produced 
numerous resolutions from 1946 onwards in the General Assembly and the 
Security Council of the United Nations.  
 The aim of this section is to discuss the first legal response by the UN to the 
South African plans for annexation. In 1949 it requested an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding whether the mandate 
obligations continued and whether the provisions of the new trusteeship system 
would apply. Lastly, it requested the Court to clarify the international status of 
South West Africa. The response of the Court ensured that not only would the 
issue of South West Africa remain on the international agenda, but also it laid the 
foundation for the interpretation of the mandate system through the language of 
rights. It found that the mandate and its obligations continued despite the fact that 
the League of Nations, the contracting party in the mandate, ceased to exist. 
Secondly, it redefined the concept of sacred trust through the concepts of non-
annexation and development, granting the UN not only the powers of supervision 
                                                      
48 Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, 96, 108. 
49 Eckel, ‘Human Rights and Decolonization’, 117. 
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of the protection of the rights of the mandated territories, but also enabling it to 
receive petitions. Finally, it defined the international status of South West Africa 




In its 1949 request, the General Assembly asked the Court to clarify three 
questions. Firstly, does the Union of South Africa continue to have international 
obligations under the mandate of South West Africa, and if it does, what are those 
obligations? Secondly, are the provisions of Chapter XII of the United Nations 
Charter, concerning the newly-established trusteeships, applicable to the territory 
of South West Africa? Thirdly, does South Africa have the competence to modify 
the international status of South West Africa, and if it does not, who can 
determine and modify the international status of the territory? 
 The Court found two important principles to apply to the mandate, namely 
the principle of non-annexation and the well-being and development of peoples 
forming a “sacred trust of civilization”.52 According to these principles it was clear 
that it was not acceptable to cede any territory or transfer any sovereignty to 
South Africa without violating the mandate. South Africa had used private law 
analogies to support its claim that due to the lapse of the mandate it was free to 
annex the South West African territory into its own. The Court, however, noted 
that the mandate was regulated by international rules. These rules exceeded any 
such contractual relations that would be regulated by national law. Therefore, no 
national law analogies would be relevant to the outcome of the case. Moreover, 
the international rules were created “in the interest of the inhabitants of the 
territory, and of humanity in general … with an international object - a sacred 
trust of civilization”.53 Thus, a lot more was at stake than mere norms and 
interpretation of various national forms of mandate. The Court confirmed that the 
mandate was different from anything that had existed before. An entirely new 
concept, a new regime even, had been created and was completely regulated by 
international law. Therefore, South Africa could not claim any rights because of 
some other, earlier private law concepts of a mandate. Also, the Court noted that 
South Africa’s authority was based on the mandate. Therefore, if the mandate 
lapsed, the authority of South Africa would lapse as well.54 
 The Court found that based on the mandate, South Africa had obligations 
directly relating to the administration of the mandate and obligations relating to 
the duty to submit to the supervision of the League. Obligations relating to the 
administration of the mandate the Court described as both general and particular. 
The general obligations meant that the mandatory had to promote the material 
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and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the mandated 
territory. The source of these obligations was both in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations (Art. 22) and in the individual Mandate of South West Africa (Art. 2-
5). The particular obligations had been called “guarantees” during the League 
period and included, for example, prohibition of the slave trade, limits on forced 
labour, freedom of conscience and religion, and the rights of missionaries.55 The 
Court also noted that the counterpart to such obligations was the right of the 
population to have the territory administered in accordance with these 
obligations.56  
 In the Court’s view, these obligations were the purpose of the entire existence 
of the mandate, “the essence of the sacred trust of civilisation”.57 For this reason, 
their fulfilment did not depend on the existence of the League. Moreover, the 
Court concluded that this finding was emphasized by the intention of the drafters 
of the UN Charter to “safeguard the rights of States and peoples under all 
circumstances and in all respects, until each territory should be placed under the 
Trusteeship System”.58 Also, South Africa had declared that it would continue to 
administer territory according to the obligations of the mandate (until the moment 
when the territory would be recognized as an integral part of the Union of South 
Africa).59  
 The second group of obligations were those relating to the duty to submit to 
the supervision and control of the League, including the rendering of reports to 
the League Council.60 As with other duties, the Court found that the necessity for 
supervision continued to exist even when the organs formerly responsible for the 
supervision disappeared. Also, the United Nations had an organ performing 
similar functions that could be used for this purpose.61 The Court also believed 
that the intention of the drafters of Article 8062 of the United Nations Charter 
must have been to provide for supervision in order to ensure the real protection of 
the rights of mandated territories.63 Supervision also included the receiving of 




58 Ibid., 134. 
59 Ibid., 134-135. 
60 Ibid., 136. 
61 Ibid. 
62 “1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under 
Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such 
agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself 
to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of 
existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may 
respectively be parties. 
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or 
postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and 
other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.” 
63 International Status of South West Africa (1950), 136-137. 
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petitions from the mandates.64 As General Assembly resolutions on the former 
mandates presupposed that the United Nations took over supervisory functions65 
and the General Assembly would have sufficient competence to do this, the Court 
declared the General Assembly legally qualified to exercise supervisory functions 
and South Africa to be under obligation to submit to supervision.66  
 The next question was whether the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter 
(on International Trusteeships) were applicable and, if so, in what manner, to the 
Territory of South-West Africa? Was there an obligation to place the mandate 
under trusteeship? The Court answered no. In the Court’s view, Articles 7567 and 
7768 of the United Nations Charter would have been worded explicitly if such an 
obligation had been intended.69  
 Finally, the General Assembly asked whether the Union of South Africa had 
the competence to modify the international status of the territory of South West 
Africa, or, in the event of a negative reply, where the competence rested to 
determine and modify the international status of the territory. As the Court had 
noted earlier in its decision, the territory of South West Africa had an 
international status and was regulated by international rules. Also, according to 
the mandate itself (Art. 7) “[t]he consent of the Council of the League is required 
for any modification of the terms of the present mandate”. Therefore, South Africa 
did not have the competence to modify the international status of the territory by 
itself. The Court concluded that as the organ mentioned in Article 7, the Council 
of the League of Nations, was the same as was responsible for the supervision of 
the mandate, it was natural that the organ responsible for the supervision of the 
mandate in the United Nations, the General Assembly, would be responsible for 
the modification of the mandate. Moreover, the General Assembly approved 
amendments to the trusteeships, and therefore, by analogy, would be the 
competent organ to approve amendments to mandates as well.  
 The terminology used by the Court in describing the mandates and the duties 
relating to them derived from the League period. This was even more emphasized 
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez, who noted that South Africa had in its 
hands, not just any territory, but a sacred trust of civilization.70 South Africa’s task 
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was “honorific”, “disinterested” and “for the benefit of certain populations”. 71 
Alvarez believed it was entirely possible that the local populations of South West 
Africa would never reach such a level of civilization that it could administer itself 
“without a protector or a guide”.72 
 In his separate opinion, Judge Read, while emphasizing the importance of 
South Africa’s duties and the rights of the inhabitants, did not elaborate on the 
more particular content of them but noted that they are mainly found in Article 22 
of the League Covenant.73 The case shows that the Second World War had 
changed very little for the mandates. As the Court based its decision on League 
documents, it continued to use the same language as had been used in the League 
period. This language had its origins in the establishment of the mandates and had 
been developed in the numerous sessions of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission.74 It was still common to all parties with the only difference that the 
international community was now represented by the United Nations, not the 
League of Nations.75 
 The interpretation of the Court was thus very much along the lines of the 
original intent of the mandates system. However, it is clear that the Court 
emphasized how the UN was to continue as the supervisor of the mandate and as 
such, opened the door to the emphasis that the UN would in all its actions place 
on human rights. The second main change was the setting up of the trusteeship 
system in which self-determination and human rights were explicit aims. Though 
the Court rejected the possibility that the trusteeship rules should apply to the 
mandate of South West Africa without the approval of South Africa, these would 
become the standards upon which the sacred trust would in the coming cases be 
evaluated.  
5.2 The Persistent Objector to Human Rights: The South West Africa Cases of 
1962 and 1966 
The issue of South West Africa had been discussed at length in the UN after the 
1950 advisory opinion, but the legal development continued only in the 1960s, 
when Ethiopia and Liberia sent their applications to the Court.76 In these 
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applications, they brought the language of human rights to bear on the 
interpretation of the mandatories’ obligations. Though they began their claims 
with the findings of the 1950 advisory opinion about the existence of the mandate 
and the obligations it brought, the violation of these obligations was seen as a 
violation of UN human rights standards.  
5.2.1 The Plea for Self-government 
In this section, I will first discuss the different ends, strategies and means of the 
parties to the case of South West Africa, i.e. Liberia and Ethiopia as applicants 
and South Africa as the respondent. I will then continue to explore how struggles 
between different regimes, especially between law and politics, morality and 
humanitarianism, can be seen in the case.77 Another struggle is between old and 
new approaches in international law, i.e. formalism and strong state sovereignty 
on the one side, and a teleological approach with support for human rights on the 
other. 
 The South West Africa cases of 196278 and 196679 were the result of 
repeatedly failed attempts to agree on the fate of South West Africa through UN 
procedures either in the General Assembly or the Security Council. Frustrated by 
the UN’s inability to secure South West Africa a place outside the sovereignty of 
South Africa, Ethiopia and Liberia, the two African countries that had from early 
on been members of the League of Nations, attempted a solution through the 
Court. But the cases were not only about South West Africa. The cases were 
                                                                                                                                                          
“(a) Is the following rule on the voting procedure to be followed by the General Assembly 
a correct interpretation of the advisory opinion of the International Court Justice of 11 
July, 1950: 
“‘Decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to reports and petitions 
concerning the Territory of South-West Africa shall be regarded as important questions 
within the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.’”? 
“(b) If this interpretation of the advisory opinion of the Court is not correct, what voting 
procedure should be followed by the General Assembly in taking decisions on questions 
relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa?” 
The Court replied in the affirmative to question (a) and found no need to reply to 
question (b). 
In the Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa 
(Advisory Opinion of 1 June, 1956: I.C.J. Reports 1956, 23), the Court was asked “Is it 
consistent with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 11 July, 1950 
for the Committee on South West Africa, established by General Assembly resolution 749 
A (VII) of 28 November 1953, to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to 
the Territory of South West Africa?”. The Court replied that “it would not be inconsistent 
with its Opinion of 11 July, 1950 for the General Assembly to authorize a procedure for 
the grant of oral hearings by the Committee on South West Africa to petitioners who had 
already submitted written petitions”. 
77 See e.g. Pomerance, ‘Case Analysis: The ICJ and South West Africa (Namibia): A 
Retrospective Legal/Political Assessment’. 
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simultaneously a critique of apartheid in South Africa, and a plea for self-
determination for former colonies and other dependent territories. The main 
motivation for referring the case of South West Africa to the ICJ was to have the 
Court review the legality of apartheid. Therefore, even though the actual case was 
about South West Africa, practices in South Africa were on trial as well.80 As the 
mandate of South West Africa included a clause (Art. 7) on taking conflicts on the 
interpretation of the mandates to the Court, the applicants believed this to be an 
effective route to condemn apartheid in South Africa as well.81 The applicants 
thought it would be easy to reach a judgement confirming their views. After all, 
the only thing that the Court needed to do was to confirm its decision from 1950.82 
Also, apartheid had been condemned on several occasions by other organs of the 
UN, by both General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.83 Had the 
applicants succeeded, they would have enabled a legal judgement also on South 
Africa, South Africa being out of the reach of the Court. At the same time, the 
Court would have strengthened the norms of self-determination and non-
discrimination.84 On the other hand, South Africa believed that if other nations 
had more knowledge on apartheid, they would understand its importance.85 This 
time, however, the Court did not agree, but maintained that there was no legal 
way to reach what the applicants were asking for. According to the ICJ, the case 
was about politics, not law. There was yet no sufficient legal case to convince the 
Court of the necessity to declare that South West Africa had a right to decide on 
its own fate. 
 In 1961 Ethiopia and Liberia both sent identical applications, where they 
asked the Court to declare:  
1. that South West Africa was still under a mandate and that the mandate was still 
a treaty in force,  
2. that South Africa was bound by the obligations set by Article 22 of the League 
Covenant,  
3. that the supervisory functions had been transferred from the League Council to 
the United Nations General Assembly,  
4. that South Africa still had an obligation to submit petitions from the territory 
and reports,  
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5. that South Africa had one-sidedly modified the terms of the mandate,  
6. that South Africa failed to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of the 
territory,  
7. that the practice of apartheid violates the mandate,  
8. that South Africa violates South West Africa’s right to self government and 
United Nations human rights standards. 
 The applications of Ethiopia and Liberia were thus clearly developed from 
the 1950 case but had distinct differences of approach.  
 In their written memorial of April 15, 1961 to the International Court of 
Justice, the applicants, Ethiopia and Liberia, used rights language in two ways. 
Firstly, they listed all the United Nations documents concerning the human rights 
situation in South West Africa. Secondly, they argued that the policy of apartheid 
violated the duty to take care of the well-being of the inhabitants as determined in 
Article 2 of the mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant.  
 In their interpretation of the foundation of the mandates, the concept of 
“sacred trust” and “tutelage”, they came close to giving them a rights-based 
meaning: “Extension of these doctrines to international practice and principle 
reflected a maturing sense of international responsibility for the dignity and well-
being of the individual person.”86 Later in their applications, the applicants gave a 
more explicit human rights-based reading of Article 2 of the mandate and Article 
22 of the League Covenant combined: “[The Union] may not subjugate the 
majority of the inhabitants of the Territory in the interest of a minority. It may not 
act in disregard of human rights so basic and so fundamental that without them 
the rules of social intercourse must always be determined by force.”87 They 
supported this reading with standards from Chapters XI, XII and XIII on 
trusteeships of the United Nations Charter, which according to them, offered 
guidance for the interpretation of the League of Nations documents and which 
South Africa had accepted when becoming a member of the United Nations.88 
Thus, a concrete reference to human rights (Art. 76 of the United Nations 
Charter) also derived from such a combined reading of these articles. In essence, 
what the applicants were intending to claim was that in a charged situation and 
world, more recent norms ought to be taken into account to aid in the 
interpretation of the older norms (thus referring to teleology as an interpretational 
method). In the applicants’ view, the discrimination of “native” inhabitants 
inherent in the policy of apartheid signified that the mandatory had not promoted 
“the material and moral well-being, the social progress and the development of the 
people of South West Africa”,89 including also the “protection of basic human 
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rights and fundamental freedoms of such persons”.90 In their later observation they 
elaborated their ideas on the interpretation of the mandate, citing Hersch 
Lauterpacht, who had maintained that when making an interpretational decision 
between the national sovereignty of individual states and giving full effect to the 
purpose of the obligations at hand, the latter must prevail.91 Thus, as Article 7 of 
the mandate of South West Africa was “embodied in a humanitarian instrument” 
and the purpose of the mandates was the well-being and development of the 
inhabitants, the nature of the entire instrument was humanitarian. Therefore, all 
interpretation ought to serve the humanitarian aim.92 The rules of interpretation 
needed to be chosen in such a way that made the instrument serve its purpose 
most effectively.93 
 South Africa’s reply was based on the lack of jurisdiction on account of 
Ethiopia and Liberia having no locus standi, meaning that they lacked a sufficient 
legal interest in the matter. For this they stated four reasons. Firstly, because of 
the dissolution of the League of Nations, the mandate for South West Africa was 
no longer a treaty in force; secondly, that neither Liberia nor Ethiopia were 
“another Member of the League of Nations”, as was required by Article 7 of the 
mandate for South West Africa; thirdly, there was no legal “dispute between 
Liberia and Ethiopia on the one hand and South Africa on the other hand, 
particularly because the first mentioned states lacked material interest in South 
Africa’s view; and fourthly, the issue was not a “dispute” which “cannot be settled 
by negotiation” as was required by Article 7 of the mandate for South West 
Africa. South Africa later amended the first part of their submissions, maintaining 
that the mandate for South West Africa had never been a “treaty or convention in 
force”, as was required by Article 37 of the Statute of the Court.94 
 While South Africa was not making rights claims, it did answer some of the 
rights-based claims of the applicants. Most importantly, it claimed that the South 
African administration in South West Africa did not affect the aim of the mandate 
as a “sacred trust” in any way. On the contrary, it claimed that a closer connection 
with South Africa and the benefits of a larger community was actually in the best 
interests of the natives of South West Africa.95 South Africa gave assurances that 
it continued to administer the territory “in the spirit of the mandate”, observing 
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the “sacred trust”.96 In South Africa’s view, it was also the wish of the inhabitants 
of South West Africa to be incorporated into South Africa.97 
 On the other hand, South Africa denied that even if international law did 
provide some rights to individuals, South Africa would have to have consented to 
such rights in order to be bound by them. It stated that “there is nothing to 
indicate that rights in International Law vis-à-vis the Mandatories were intended 
to be conferred upon them”.98 In concrete issues relating to mandates, this applied 
to the right to petitions as well, as there was no agreement or provisions on them 
in the mandatory agreements.99 Also, such a “right” would have been dependent 
on a supervisory body, and after the cessation of the League of Nations there was 
none.100 South Africa found no need to answer whether “sacred trust” or “tutelage” 
fell within the realm of international law, domestic law or morality, as the 
mandate, and thus, any possible obligations relating to it, had ceased to exist.101 
 In its resolution, the ICJ described the essential principles of the mandates 
system in a more or less similar way as they had in 1950, only worded in slightly 
broader terms. According to the Court, the principles included the recognition of 
certain rights of the peoples of underdeveloped territories, a regime of tutelage for 
such peoples, “a sacred trust of civilisation”, the object of such a trust being to 
promote the well-being and development of the peoples in the territories, fortified 
by safeguards for the protection of the rights of such peoples.102 
 South Africa’s first objection had been that the mandate for South West 
Africa “has never been, or at any rate is since the dissolution of the League of 
Nations no longer, a ‘treaty or convention in force’ within the meaning of Article 
37 of the Statute of the Court… .”103 The Court, however, concluded that the 
mandate was a treaty, because it “in fact and in law, is an international agreement 
having the character of a treaty or convention”. As proof, the Court mentioned the 
preamble of the mandate. In the preamble, “the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers agreed to confer the mandate upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised 
on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa … in the following 
terms … with the following provisions …”.104 However, the Court emphasized the 
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distinctiveness of the mandate as a legal instrument, declaring it a “special type of 
instrument” and a “novel international regime”.105 
 South Africa claimed that even if there once had been a treaty, it was not in 
force after the League of Nations was dissolved. The Court denied the mode of 
thought of South Africa relying on similar argumentation than it had done twelve 
years earlier. The Court pointed out that there were two types of obligations 
relating to the mandate, those relating to the actual administration of the territory 
and those relating to the mandatory’s duty to report and to be subject to 
supervision and the entire machinery of implementation. South Africa admitted 
the existence of the first type of obligations but denied the existence of the latter. 
With the outcome of the Advisory opinion of 1950 in mind, the Court noted that 
“[t]o exclude the obligation connected with the Mandate would be to exclude the 
very essence of the Mandate”.106 
 In its second objection, South Africa claimed that Liberia and Ethiopia were 
not “another Member of the League of Nations”, as was demanded by paragraph 
2 of Article 7 of the mandate of South West Africa.107 South Africa maintained 
that as the League had been dissolved, there could no longer be any members and 
thus the applicants could not bring a case to the Court as “another Member of the 
League”. Again, the Court disagreed. It noted that judicial protection was an 
essential feature of the “sacred trust”. There had been several organs in the 
League of Nations to ensure the performance of the trust, including the Council, 
the Assembly, the Permanent Mandates Commission and the member states, each 
with their own roles. Rules of unanimity were in place in the Council, and as 
mandatory states were also members of the Council, it was necessary to give a role 
to other member states as well, in order to ensure protection in a situation where a 
mandatory state would vote against a certain measure: “[G]ranting all members an 
access to the Court would secure the supervision of the mandate.”108 At the time of 
the dissolution of the League, all members of the League agreed to continue the 
different mandates by also maintaining the rights of the League members.109 
Therefore, members of the former League would continue to have the right to 
invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, as they had had before the 
dissolution of the League.110 Also, South Africa has accepted the fact that its 
obligations concerning the mandate would continue to exist, which the Court 
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interpreted to include its obligations under Article 7 of the mandate.111 Finally, the 
Court found that it was necessary to take into consideration the circumstances in 
interpreting “another Member of the League”. “Literal objections are not 
meaningful,” it said.112  
 South Africa’s third objection was that the dispute was not a dispute in the 
meaning of Article 7 of the mandate. South Africa maintained that the “generally 
accepted meaning” of a compulsory jurisdiction clause would be “a disagreement 
or conflict between the Mandatory and another Member of the League 
concerning the legal right and interests of such other Member in the matter before 
the Court”. However, the Court did not make any distinctions between the rights 
of individual League members and other rights relating to the mandate. (This 
interpretation would eventually change in the Court’s decision four years later.) 
Rather, the Court found that the compulsory jurisdiction could be invoked to 
protect both the material interests of the League members or their nationals, or the 
well-being and development of their inhabitants.113 
 In its final objection South Africa pointed out that Article 7 of the mandate 
required that such a dispute could not be settled by negotiation. As several 
negotiations on the position of South West Africa had been ongoing in different 
organs of the United Nations, the Court found it unlikely that any further 
negotiation would lead to a settlement.114 The Court thus dismissed all South 
Africa’s preliminary objections.  
 The 1962 decision on the preliminary objections had proved to be promising 
from the applicant’s point of view. The Court had clearly denied all of South 
Africa’s arguments, and it was now to be expected that the Court would move on 
to the merits of the case.115 The Court had accepted, based on the decision made in 
1950, that the mandate was still in force and that South Africa was responsible for 
the well-being and the development of the inhabitants of South West Africa. 
Moreover, the Court accepted that the jurisdictional clause in Article 7 of the 
mandate was sufficient to grant Ethiopia and Liberia a legal interest to bring 
South Africa’s alleged violations of the mandate to the Court. The Court stressed 
that Article 7 applied similarly to questions relating to the well-being and 
development of the inhabitants as it did to disputes concerning material interests 
of nationals of the applicant states.116 Before the Court’s 1966 decision, it was 
generally believed that the members of the League of Nations could bring disputes 
concerning the mandates to the PCIJ in all cases where diplomatic means were 
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not sufficient. This would include any situation where the mandatory had violated 
its duties towards the inhabitants of the mandated territory.117 
 The lengthy joint dissenting opinion of Sir Percy Spender and Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice would anticipate the turn that the South West Africa case would take 
in its second phase. Spender and Fitzmaurice criticized the fact that the majority 
opinion was not based on legal reasoning. In their view the majority had 
submitted the “various considerations of a non-juridical character”, such as “social, 
humanitarian and other”, which they had not, however, specified.118 Their own 
approach, apparent in the second phase a few years later, can be summed up in 
their own words: “They [i.e. non-juridical considerations] cannot be allowed to 
deflect us from our duty of reaching a conclusion strictly on the basis of what we 
believe to be the correct legal view.”119 These two dissenting judges believed that 
the matter that would need to be decided in the merits phases was of such a loaded 
nature that it was crucial that everything would require objective definitions in 
order to be decided in legal terms.120 They believed, moreover, that where 
sufficient objectivity could not be reached with the issues at hand (the well-being 
of a certain population and other humanitarian concerns), a judicial court was not 
the right forum for such decisions. “Progress” and “well-being” were subjective 
concepts open to various interpretations. They could not be defined in an objective 
manner, and because of the values behind them, they were better suited for a 
political organ.121 Spender and Fitzmaurice accused both the applicants and the 
Court of applying a “principle of hindsight” and “some doctrine of ‘subsequent 
necessity’ quite unknown to international law”. They also claimed that a provision, 
unimportant in the original mandatory system (i.e. Art. 7 of the mandate of South 
West Africa), was used purposefully because of “recent events”, meaning a 
political agenda of advancing self-determination in former colonies and in South 
West Africa.122 According to the two judges, this was “understandable, but it is not 
a valid legal argument”.123 Yet, according to them both, the case should not 
proceed to the merits phase. They agreed with the preliminary objections of the 
respondent, as they would later in the 1967 decision as well. Their main 
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arguments were that the mandate was not a treaty, but rather an act of an organ of 
an international organization and was thus not in force as a treaty;124 that the 
applicants did not have a legal basis to invoke Article 7 of the mandate of South 
West Africa;125 that there was no dispute between the applicants and the 
respondent;126 and even if there had been a dispute, it was not one that could be 
settled by negotiation, as Article 7 would have required.127 
 The applicants’ victory in the 1962 case was only a temporary one, since the 
ICJ had only discussed the preliminary objections of South Africa. In preparation 
for the merits of the case, the applicants started to modify their arguments 
gradually, emphasizing the discriminatory nature of apartheid. They maintained 
that international standards or an international norm of non-discrimination existed 
which would grant the Court a legal avenue to judge the actions of South Africa in 
South West Africa, particularly the practice of apartheid.128 Their optimism 
proved to be misguided. What they did not anticipate was the changes in the 
composition of the Court that would result in it taking a completely opposite 
approach, one formulated largely by Fitzmaurice and others sharing his formalist 
way of thinking.   
 In the applicants’ view, as apartheid was a discriminatory practice it violated 
Article 2 of the mandate, promoting “to the utmost the material and moral well-
being and social progress of the inhabitants”.129 Moreover, in the application the 
applicants maintained that South African regulations suppressed the rights and 
liberties of the inhabitants in their way towards self-government. According to the 
applicants, such rights and liberties could be found implicitly in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations, the terms of the mandate, and were currently accepted as 
“legal standards”, to be found in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.130 In the oral proceedings, the applicants 
proposed an even stronger norm to support their claim of South Africa violating 
the mandate, namely that the mentioned rights and liberties of the inhabitants of 
the mandate were not only “legal standards”, but possibly an “international legal 
norm, or both”.131 
 South Africa, on the other hand, maintained that if it was still bound by the 
mandate, it had not given its consent to any changes in the terms of the mandate 
and thus would not accept any meanings that did not exist at the time of the 
drafting of the mandate. South Africa relied on its statement that the whole 
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mandate had lapsed on the dissolution of the mandate, or, alternatively, that the 
respondent’s obligations had lapsed upon the same event and had not been 
replaced by other obligations. South Africa also denied having violated its Article 
22 obligations.132  
5.2.2 Human Rights as Law or Morality? 
The Court found the existence of the mandate to be a secondary question, to be 
addressed in the merits phase of the proceedings if the case ever went so far.133 
From the Court’s point of view, the main question was whether Ethiopia and 
Liberia had sufficient legal interest in South Africa’s actions in South West Africa 
in order to proceed to the merits of the case. Thus, despite denying South Africa’s 
preliminary objections in 1962, the Court noted that the question of jurisdiction 
was still to be resolved. 
 In viewing whether the applicants had a sufficient legal interest in the case, 
the Court looked into the provisions of the mandates, finding two different kinds 
of obligations written in them. The first type the Court called “conduct” 
provisions. These were defined as the “articles defining the mandatory’s powers, 
and its obligations in respect of the inhabitants of the territory and towards the 
League and its organs”.134 Such obligations would include any conduct of the 
mandatory towards the inhabitants of the territory, including the mandatory’s 
duty to ensure the “guarantees”, for example the duty to abolish the slave trade, to 
guarantee fair labour conditions, etc. 
 The second type of obligations were “special interests”, meaning rights related 
to the mandated territory that individual members of the League of Nations could 
claim in favour of their own nationals.135 The Court found there to be numerous 
such rights in the A and B mandates relating to commerce, establishment and 
navigation, and to be found in treaties between the states. However, the Court 
concluded that in the C mandates the only “special interests” provisions were 
those on the freedom of missionaries to enter into, travel and reside in the 
mandated territories. 
 The Court found the dispute to be only related to the former, the “conduct” 
provisions and formulated the question thus: “whether the various mandatories 
had any direct obligation towards the other members of the League individually, 
as regards the carrying out of the ‘conduct’ provisions of the mandates”.136 
 In its resolution the Court reversed its earlier ruling with a jurisdictional 
resolution, effectively bringing the case to a close. The change of heart had much 
to do with the changes in its composition. The election of new members and the 
                                                      
132 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 16-17. 
133 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 19, para. 7. 
134 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 20, para 11. 
135 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 20, para. 32. 
136 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 22, para. 14. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
194 
unexpected absence of some of the members (due to disqualification, illness and 
death), and the election of Spender as President, resulted in the formalists gaining 
a 7-7 tie with the vote of the President being decisive.137 The dissenters of 1962 
now formed the majority opinion. The Court did not find Liberia or Ethiopia to 
have a sufficient legal interest to bring the matter to the Court. According to the 
Court, the mere existence of a “sacred trust” was not sufficient to result in a legal 
right or interest. The Court emphasized that the tutelage of the inhabitants of the 
mandates was exercised on behalf of the League, not in the capacity of individual 
states. Also, the mandatories were trustees for the League, not for its individual 
members.138 The Court emphasized the importance of using the period of 
establishment of the mandates system as the starting point, i.e. looking at the 
drafters’ intentions in the interpretation of the mandate.139 The setting of that 
particular period would give the content to the various mandate instruments and 
therefore reveal the juridical meaning of the “sacred trust of civilization”.140 The 
Court argued that individual League members had no role in the supervision of 
the mandates, but the mandatories needed to satisfy the League Council with their 
reports.141 Thus, the mere membership in the organization was not sufficient to 
derive rights relating to mandates to individual members.142 The Court found that 
in order for any individual rights to exist, they should be clearly written into a 
legal text or instrument, which had not been the case.143 
 Thus, the “sacred trust” did not form a “legal interest” for the League 
members. Instead, the Court declared “sacred trust” to be a moral ideal.144 The 
Court could take into consideration moral ideals only to the extent that they were 
formulated in a legal format. The Court noted that throughout the case there had 
been suggestions that “humanitarian considerations” would have sufficient legal 
validity that the Court should take them into account in its decision. They 
concluded: “The Court does not think so. It is a court of law, and can take account 
of moral principles only in so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal 
form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely for that reason it 
can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline. Otherwise, it is 
not a legal service that would be rendered.”145 The role of such “humanitarian 
considerations” was to act as an “inspirational basis” for drafting legal rules. 
Therefore, the role of the preamble of the UN Charter, including its human rights 
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references (“… to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small…”)146 “constitute the moral and political basis for the specific 
provisions thereafter set out”.147 If such moral ideals were to be thought of as legal 
rights and obligations, they would have to be formulated in a legal form, such as 
the trusteeship system or the UN Charter Chapter XI on non-self-governing 
territories.148 
 Thus, the Court would not answer whether a right to equal treatment (if such 
a right existed) and apartheid were in contradiction with each other. Did such an 
international norm exist through which one could determine whether there was a 
right to equal treatment? Would it have been possible for such a right to be 
included in the “sacred trust”?  
5.2.3 Judge Fitzmaurice, the Formalist Jurist 
The turn towards a strict formalistic argumentation and the legalism behind it was 
presumably the work of judges Spender and Fitzmaurice, who had expressed 
similar views in their earlier dissent. They rejected the teleological argumentation 
that would have taken into account later changes in the circumstances, such as the 
rise of the decolonization and human rights movements. According to 
Fitzmaurice, the unilateral revocation of the mandate was in contradiction to the 
fact that the C mandates were close to the sovereignty of the mandatory and that 
these would never have accepted the unilateral revocation of the mandates. The 
way he interpreted treaties was an example of the strictest version of textual 
interpretation, where the intentions of the parties was the main aid if the text itself 
could not provide an answer. In the case of the mandates, the text of the 
agreements was the starting point, and it was to be interpreted in its context, that 
is, according to the travaux préparatoires, indicating the original intent of the parties.  
 An important issue for Fitzmaurice was the question of propriety. In his view, 
the court could not make a decision that would endanger its neutral position as a 
court of law. A court ought to examine its decision making, taking into account 
whether an intended decision was compatible with its status as a court of law. 
Propriety safeguards the integrity of a court so that it does not become 
subordinated to political actors. In the South West Africa cases, Fitzmaurice 
believed that the intention of the applicants and the forces behind them was to use 
the court as a means to a political end, namely the independence of Namibia.149  
 The originalist interpretation of the mandates first presented by Spender and 
Fitzmaurice and later continued by Fitzmaurice demonstrated how much political 
relevance could a purely formal legal argument have. To their critics, the 
                                                      
146 United Nations Charter, preamble. 
147 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 34, para. 50. 
148 South West Africa, Second Phase (1966), 34, para. 51. 
149 Merrills, Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the Discipline of International Law, 38–40. 
From the League of Nations Mandates to Decolonization 
__________________________________________________________________ 
196 
formalistic argument appeared to be conservative, favouring colonialism. For 
those who wanted to change the world for the better, claims that one should 
follow the original intent of the 1920s were hopelessly backwards. The strict 
separation of law, politics and morality as argued by Fitzmaurice were seen as 
judicial conservatism.150 
5.2.4 Judges Jessup and Tanaka and the Critique of Formalism 
The President of the Court, Judge Spender, whose vote had been decisive in the 
outcome151 wrote that it was not the duty of the court to start speculating what the 
outcome would have been if the case had continued to the merits phase: “…it 
would hardly be justifiable for such a judge [in a separate opinion] to proceed 
further into the merits, expressing his views on how he thinks the Court should or 
would have pronounced upon the whole complex of questions centering around 
different provisions of the Mandates … had the Court not reached the decision it 
actually did.”152 Many of the judges, however, did think that that was the duty of 
the Court. 
 Had the case proceeded to the merits phase, the Court would have needed to 
decide what legal duties the mandates treaty would have provided and how they 
were to be interpreted. Would they have had the content that they had during the 
time of their drafting? Or should the Court have taken into account the standards 
that existed at the time of the judgment? South Africa naturally agreed on the 
former interpretation, believing that the only standards according to which the 
Court could have acted were those that were set by the League of Nations in 1920. 
The latter standards would have included questions such as human rights, the 
problems caused by apartheid, and so on. The applicants believed that this was the 
starting point of interpretation, but did not give a more detailed account of what 
they considered the relevant rights were. They believed, however, that the 
mandate was a “constitutional type of document”, evolving over the years.153 In his 
dissenting opinion Jessup also emphasized the importance of changing values in 
the determination of a legal meaning to well-being: “The law can never be 
oblivious to the changes in life, circumstance and community standards in which it 
functions.” 154 
 Of course, had the Court come to such a conclusion, it would have needed to 
determine the rights that South Africa would have violated. What (human) rights 
would have been applicable at the time of the court’s proceedings? As South 
Africa consented to none, did such rights have a sufficient customary basis in 
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1966? Judge Jessup concluded that they did. Both the existence of the “norm” 
and the “standard”, as claimed by the applicants, would have prohibited “official 
government allocation of status, rights, duties and privileges upon the basis of 
membership of a group, class or race, without regard to individual merits, capacity 
or quality”.155 Therefore, the applicants believed that apartheid violated Article 2 
of the mandate as a matter of law, giving the court a legal standard to assess the 
actions of South Africa in South West Africa.156  
 The applicants demanded that the Court determine that either a norm or a 
legal standard prohibiting discrimination existed. The case was novel in that the 
prohibition of discrimination or other (human) rights had hardly existed in 
international legal cases, or been implemented in many national courts.157 Basing 
its decisions on procedural and technical reasoning, the court avoided commenting 
at all on apartheid in South Africa, which was quite internationally known at the 
time. The Court distanced itself from the rights language and took a formalistic 
approach to the question. Throughout the decision, examples can be found of how 
the Court differentiated between the moral and the legal, stressing its own task in 
safeguarding the legal. The vocabulary of rights was not yet used by the majority 
of the Court members, but was still seen as a political and moral vocabulary. The 
majority in the decision was slight and the decision was made by the President’s 
vote. Even so, in the dissenting opinions of the minority the (human) rights of the 
inhabitants of the mandates were rarely mentioned. The dissenters, however, did 
often mention humanitarianism in connection with the mandates, but this came 
close to the wording of the majority. Of course, because of the president’s 
warning, it is possible that some dissenting judges refrained from commenting on 
the possible outcome of the merits. But it is also possible that the judges believed 
that (human) rights were not applicable as a law or an explicit treaty did not exist 
and there was no such customary law that South Africa had consented to. Thus, a 
sufficient consensus on such values did not exist in order for them to become part 
of international law and as such, applicable by the Court.158  
 The two exceptions were the dissenting Judges Jessup and Tanaka, who 
differed from each other in their reasoning, although both came to the conclusion 
that human rights were applicable in the case. Both of them believed that the 
purpose of the mandates, both “moral well-being” and “social progress”, should be 
interpreted according to the values that prevailed at the time of the court’s 
decision, as standards had changed from the time of the drafting of the mandates.  
 Jessup believed that legal processes to protect human rights were relevant 
when determining the duties relating to “sacred trust”. He believed that human 
rights were a source of interpretation, not a binding legal norm as such. In finding 
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such standards, the United Nations acted as one possible source: “The virtually 
universally accepted description of other legal characteristics of this actual modern 
world is written in the Charter of the United Nations.”159 Thus, the issue was not 
only political or humanitarian, but also justiciable. He maintained that standards 
of administration and values had changed from the 1920s. There was no binding 
norm through which the Court could have directly applied human rights to the 
mandate of South West Africa. Changing standards, however, affected the ways 
the Court should interpret the mandate agreement. Therefore, the agreement 
should be interpreted in a manner that favoured human rights, meaning that 
South Africa should take the human rights of the inhabitants into consideration in 
its administration. Such a standard would help in determining whether South 
Africa had violated the duties of the mandatory. In Jessup’s opinion: “The law 
abounds in examples of standards or criteria, which are applied by courts as tests 
of human conduct.”160 
 Tanaka’s evaluation was much more radical. He believed that South Africa 
could not continue to be a persistent objector to human rights, preventing their 
application. In his view, the mandate had received a new content through the law 
that had developed after the Second World War, as values had changed. Tanaka 
maintained that human rights were independent of such treaties, where they were 
formulated. Human rights had always existed, independent of states and 
ideologies. They merely existed, as a natural law of sorts and as higher values, as a 
kind of a secular religion, without the limitations of earthly laws. Of course, such 
rights would require a certain concreteness in order for the Court to be able to 
apply them. Tanaka believed the mandate to be a legal relation and means to a 
humanitarian end.161 In his view, the only relevant relation was that between the 
administration and those administered.162 But as material and moral well-being 
was political by nature, they could not be determined in a legal manner. Thus, 
what was needed was a (legal) agreement that renders legal the political and 
moral. The administrator had the possibility to choose how it acts in order to 
achieve its goal. There was, however, a legal limit to his freedom to decide, and 
this limit was the norm/standard whose existence was claimed by the applicants. 
Thus, the mandate had aims that were social and moral by nature and the 
respondent had a duty to fulfil them. South Africa could do this according to its 
choice, only limited by the norm/standard of non-discrimination. As the means of 
choice of the respondent was apartheid, the legal limitation had to be applied, as 
apartheid was against the norm/standard.163 Tanaka maintained that the UN 
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Charter was relevant for finding a norm of non-discrimination. There was no 
definition nor any other guidance for the application of such a right in the Charter. 
Tanaka found that the right was not binding because of the Charter, but that the 
norms in the Charter were binding without them to be drafted as such. Tanaka 
listed all the instruments where apartheid was denounced, and concluded that the 
right to non-discrimination was international customary law.164 This was 
supported by the fact that such laws existed in almost all national legal systems.165 
Moreover, the rights to non-discrimination and human rights were not only 
customary, but in his view ius cogens:166 “Human rights which require protection 
are the same; they are not the product of a particular juridical system in the 
hierarchy of the legal order, but the same human rights must be recognized, 
respected and protected everywhere man goes.”167 Tanaka found that natural law 
and ius cogens related to each other, although he acknowledged that referring to 
natural law might cause some critique. He lifted international general principles as 
an international legal source above other law, seeing it as natural law, which also 
bound those who denied its existence. Therefore, the principle of non-
discrimination was binding in the mandates because it existed in the constitutions 
of all “civilized states”; it was an international legal principle and, as such, natural 
law.168 Tanaka’s argument was novel, especially as ius cogens was introduced in 
international law only in 1969 by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.169 
5.2.5 Disappointment  
Apartheid was not yet an issue discussed in the 1950 advisory opinion. In 
Ethiopia’s and Liberia’s application for the ICJ in 1962, the applicants noted that 
“the Union, […] has practised apartheid […]; that such practice is in violation of 
its obligations as stated in Article 2 of the Mandate and Article 22 of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations; and that the Union has the duty forthwith to cease the 
practice of apartheid in the Territory”.170 By 1966 the applicants asked the Court 
to declare that there was an international norm or standard of non-discrimination 
or non-separation, and thus asked the Court to denounce South Africa’s practice 
of apartheid.  
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 South Africa admitted that discrimination was against the mandates 
agreement but claimed that apartheid was differentiation rather than 
discrimination.171 According to South African reasoning, apartheid was a political 
necessity, and in a way, a continuation of mandatory principles. The “natives” 
would act as wards to the white population, who would protect them from abuse 
and exploitation. Thus, the natives would benefit from apartheid and a better 
quality of life.172 The applicants suggested separating the terms by maintaining 
that “differentiation in the Mandate was protective, whereas apartheid is 
coercive”.173 Thus, differentiation according to a membership in a group was 
allowed in the case that one would be free to leave the group at will.174  
 Many United Nations members would have wanted to see the ICJ give a 
decision that would have had a real effect on apartheid.175 The decision from 1950 
was only advisory and there was an urge to find a legally binding way to put 
pressure on South Africa. Article 7 of the mandate agreement could serve as such. 
Alexander Pollock claims that by 1966 the majority of the United Nations 
members saw apartheid as a crime against humanity, suggesting that General 
Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) from 1966 was proof of this view.176 The United 
Nations had also been willing to have South West Africa as a trusteeship. Thus, 
apartheid would have been an inroad through which South Africa could have 
been legally obliged to change the position of South West Africa.177 Also, it was 
hoped that the judgement would have led those commercially engaged with South 
Africa, especially Britain and the United States, to put pressure on South Africa to 
give up apartheid.178 
 The judgement revealed the gap that was now appearing on how the 
International Court and the rest of the world saw apartheid, human rights and the 
position of peoples still living in colonies.179 The Court’s decision on South West 
Africa was seen as a sign that the Court would set state sovereignty and a strict 
adherence to the requirements of consent before human rights and the inhabitants 
of state parties.180 This was also the criticism of the dissenting opinions to the 
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Court’s decision, namely that the Court did not have enough courage to have an 
impact on the human rights situation in South West Africa. South Africa was still 
out of reach, but the mandate in South West Africa could have provided the legal 
means. Rosalyn Higgins, who was herself later to become a judge at the ICJ, 
wrote immediately after the decision that “[t]he protection from intervention 
which the Charter affords states on matters of purely domestic policy (though a 
limited exception is to be found in the human rights provisions of Articles 55 and 
56) has made it extremely difficult to mount effective international opposition to 
apartheid in South Africa. But specific international obligations attach to the 
South West Africa Mandate, and it was seen as a possible inroad into the whole 
question of apartheid.”181 
 Much of the legal critique on the decision concentrated on the different 
theories of interpretation applied by the different court members. Alexander 
Pollock emphasizes the notion of international community, maintaining that this 
community existed even when the League of Nations ceased to exist. The 
conservative approach of the formalists would have granted South Africa the 
permission to act according to how it determined the well-being of the inhabitants 
of the mandate. However, the language used in relation to the mandates, i.e. as a 
“sacred trust” of civilization, revealed that the idea had not been to let one party 
determine the content of this trust, but the task was instead given to the entire 
community.182 Thus, when the League of Nations was dissolved, it was only 
natural that the United Nations would represent the community, just as the 
League had done before.183 The purpose of the mandate was to promote the well-
being and social progress of the inhabitants, with the community as an active 
participant in fulfilling this task. Therefore, according to Pollock, any member of 
the community, including Liberia and Ethiopia, would have sufficient interests to 
safeguard the fulfilment of the mandates.184 He also maintained that the concepts 
of “moral well-being” and “social progress” were such that would necessarily 
change over time. The standards of the international community were evolving, of 
which the various UN resolutions condemning South Africa’s actions in South 
West Africa were proof.185 According to Pollock, by 1966 recognition of human 
rights as law had evolved to a point where the majority of the members of the 
United Nations saw apartheid as a human rights violation.186  
 John Dugard criticized the importance given to the travaux préparatoires in the 
formalistic interpretation of the mandate. According to him, the original intentions 
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of the drafters of Article 7(2) of the mandate of South West Africa were not 
visible in the preparatory works, and thus it was impossible to reach any 
conclusions based on them. Moreover, as Jessup had reached a completely 
different outcome reading the same preparatory works, it was clear that an 
interpretation of the mandate could not be based on them. Had there been a clear 
intention expressed by the drafters, this could have changed the situation in that 
the “natural and ordinary” meaning of the text could have been ignored. But as 
this was not the case, it was to be taken as the starting point of interpretation, in 
addition to a “rule of effectiveness”, which, according to Dugard, had been 
accepted “as an essential feature in the dynamic development of international 
law”.187 The way the Court contrasted law and humanitarianism was, according to 
Dugard, in contradiction with the Court’s own decision in the Corfu Channel 
Case.188 Dugard also believed that the ideas of the international community had 
evolved to a point where it was entirely feasible to examine the legality of 
apartheid in the light of the human rights articles of the United Nations Charter, 
which provided a legal basis, and the relevant General Assembly resolutions, 
which provided interpretational assistance.189  
 Richard Falk also criticized the decision as the “triumph of judicial 
conservatism”, emphasizing the role of sovereign discretion in the majority’s 
outlook. He contrasted the importance that the 1966 majority gave to the role of 
sovereign discretion in the formation of legal obligations to the legal relevance that 
the minority gave to the evolving interpretations of the international community. 
In his view, if the Court found that there was an international consensus on the 
interpretation of a legal rule having evolved from the time when they were 
created, the Court should, by evolving its own legal criteria, give a decision that 
was acceptable to the international community.190 In Falk’s view, the true legacy of 
the decision was to be found in the dissenting opinions of Tanaka and Jessup.191 
Yet he also pointed out that even when the court made a distinction between law 
and morality as well as law and politics, it still did not mean that the Court would 
have sympathized with South African apartheid policies.192 Falk believed that for 
the sake of enforceability, it would have been better if the Court had confirmed 
South Africa’s administrative obligations, rather than the more dramatic 
humanitarian obligations.193  
 There was a furious reaction to the decision of the Court. Especially many of 
the new member states of the United Nations saw the decision as proof that the 
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Court was a “white man’s court”, not interested in the grievances of the people of 
the former colonies.194 Many saw that the fact that the Court was unable to give a 
legal decision on the fate of South West Africa meant that the matter had to be 
resolved by political means.195 As the Court had refused to take a stance on the 
merits of the case, Dugard anticipated that a new advisory opinion on the question 
of South West Africa was about to follow.196 Rosalyn Higgins has pointed out that 
the parties had invested a considerable amount of time and expense to receive a 
decision from the Court. As the Court now had declined to give one, there was a 
true risk concerning the prospects of the use of the Court.197 Rather than deciding 
on the merits, the Court satisfied itself with a very narrow, processual approach.198 
 Higgins mentions that the Court had on a different occasion noted that if the 
question put in front of the Court was legal, there was no reason for the Court to 
discuss the possible political motives behind it. Thus, such motives did not turn 
the issue into a political question which the Court would not have been able to 
address.199  
5.2.6 Conclusions 
The Court’s ruling in 1966 was a watershed. In it the Court showed itself to be a 
white man’s court, sticking to the formal interpretation in favour of colonial 
doctrine. In 1966, at a time when most of the African colonies had gained 
independence, and the international political focus was on the cultural and 
political rise of Africa, the decision caused widespread outrage. In its reasoning, 
the Court, led by Fitzmaurice, had resorted to formalistic originalism deriving 
obligations from the original intent of the parties in the 1920s. It thus saw no 
rights for the applicants and completely avoided the issue of apartheid. The Court 
was, however, split and the more modern view was expressed in dissent. Judges 
Jessup and Tanaka presented a teleological interpretation of the obligations 
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stressing the primacy of human rights in the United Nations framework. Thus, in 
Tanaka’s thinking, the universal nature of human rights meant that there could 
not be persistent objectors to them or the obligations that they presented. In 
comparison, the defence of South Africa to the claims that apartheid was a 
violation of its obligations, was the resort to the language of colonial paternalism, 
where the natives were seen as wards to the white man. In the context of 1966, 
this formulation was breathtakingly out of touch with political realities of the 
decolonization movement.  
5.3 The Court Redeems Itself: 1971 Advisory Opinion on the Legal 
Consequences for States concerning the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia 
The initial outrage grew into sustained criticism that led to questions being raised 
about the legitimacy of the Court itself. The issue of Namibia had begun to 
threaten the legitimacy of the UN. Numerous resolutions by the General 
Assembly and the Security Council had called for South Africa to withdraw and 
had sought to terminate the mandate. The aim of this section is to discuss the 1971 
advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence 
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), in which the issue was brought once more to the 
ICJ, whose composition had once again changed. In it, the Court reversed its 
previous ruling and rejected the formalistic and static interpretation and instead 
argued that even the Covenant of the League of Nations should be subject to an 
evolutionary interpretation which took into consideration legal and social changes. 
Accordingly, the Court would reaffirm the right of self-determination and find 
South Africa to be in breach of its obligations. The UN had, of course, already 
terminated the mandate in 1966 with the General Assembly Resolution 2145 
(XXI).  
 The issue was brought to the Court not by individual member states, but by 
the Security Council itself, which had in its resolution declared South Africa’s 
continued presence in South West Africa, which was increasingly called by the 
name Namibia, illegal. The request for an advisory opinion was presented by 
Finland, which was considered to be a neutral country and not part of the Cold 
War alliances. The question that was posed to the Court was completely different 
than had been discussed before. The task given to the ICJ was to answer, “what 
are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of South Africa in 
Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970)?”. This 
resolution declared the presence of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal.200 
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 According to the Court (repeating its old decisions), the nature of the 
mandate was a trust that was intended for the benefit of the peoples concerned. 
These peoples, the Court now emphasized, had interests of their own and a 
potentiality for independent existence.201 Thus, the object and purpose of the 
mandate was the same as in the A and B mandates (contrary to what South Africa 
had claimed), namely the eventual independence of all mandates.202 One of the 
greatest differences in the Court’s reasoning as compared to 1966 was that the 
Court now declared that its interpretation was to take into account subsequent 
changes in international law (in the United Nations and various declarations), 
including also customary law, as well as the shift from a colonial era to a post 
colonial one.203 The Court noted that the concepts of Article 22 of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations were not static, but were by definition evolutionary. 
Therefore, the Court could not interpret Article 22 according to the law and ideals 
of the 1920s, but had to take the subsequent legal and societal changes into 
consideration. According to the Court, “[The Government of South Africa] puts 
too much emphasis on the intentions of some of the parties and too little on the 
instrument which emerged from those negotiations.”204 The Court declared that 
the ultimate objective of “sacred trust” was self-determination, and thus 
accordingly, independence should be possible in Namibia as well.205 The idea 
forwarded by South Africa that Namibia would be annexed to its territory was 
declared unacceptable. It was unthinkable that after World War II, in an era of 
post-colonialism, a mandate would revert to a colony, when this had been ruled 
out already in the 1920s.206 
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 The Court based its legal reasoning mainly on South Africa’s breach of 
obligations as a mandatory. As a starting point, the Court used the extensive 
number of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions concerning South 
Africa’s presence in Namibia. The first General Assembly resolutions date from 
the 1940s, including a General Assembly resolution from April 18, 1946 on the 
continuation the mandates and General Assembly resolution from December 14, 
1946, where the General Assembly did not accept the incorporation of South West 
Africa into South Africa and recommended that South West Africa be turned into 
a trusteeship. Between 1946 and 1956 trusteeship was recommended in several 
other General Assembly resolutions as well. From the point of view of this case, 
the most relevant General Assembly resolution was GA Res 2145 (XXI) from 
1966, where the General Assembly declared the mandate of South West Africa to 
be terminated.207 The cause of termination was South Africa’s failure to fulfil its 
obligations to ensure the moral and material well-being of the indigenous 
inhabitants.208 The Court referred to its 1962 decision, where it had noted that the 
mandate had been a special type of instrument and an entirely novel regime. As 
the legal ground, according to which the instrument could now be terminated, the 
Court used the breach of obligations clause in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties209 and customary international law. The Court noted that there was a 
right to terminate a relationship in the case of a deliberate and persistent violation 
of obligations which destroys the very object and purpose of that relationship.210 
In this case, the obligation was to ensure the moral and material well-being of the 
indigenous inhabitants that South Africa through the use of apartheid had 
violated, and therefore, the General Assembly had the right to terminate the 
mandate. South Africa, for its part, had stated that as the mandate was silent on 
the questions of termination, there were no legal grounds to terminate the 
mandate. This the Court however denied.211 South Africa had also complained that 
the General Assembly was not competent to act as a non-juridical organ. The 
Court pointed out that in 1966 it had declared that the matter belonged to political 
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organs, that is, to non-juridical organs. This was still valid, as someone must have 
competence to terminate the mandate.212 In addition to the General Assembly, the 
Security Council had given several resolutions to implement the General 
Assembly resolutions. Security Council resolutions 245 (1968), 246 (1968) and 
269 (1969) called South Africa to withdraw from Namibia. The most important 
one, the interpretation of which was now under the Court’s consideration, was 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). In this resolution the Security Council 
declared South Africa’s presence and actions illegal and called upon the states to 
refrain from any dealings with South Africa. 213  The Security Council’s authority 
for its decision was based on the maintenance of peace and security,214 and thus, 
according to Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter of United Nations, were binding on 
all member states. As a conclusion, the Court declared that South Africa had an 
obligation to put an end to the illegal situation and that all member states were 
under an obligation to recognize this illegality and to refrain from rendering any 
support to South Africa.215 
 Even though the Court based its decision mainly on South Africa’s treaty-
based obligations and the violations thereof, for the first time the human rights of 
the inhabitants and human rights language were used in the ICJ as a legal basis 
for its decision on South West Africa. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI) 
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1966 declared that “the Mandated Territory by South Africa has been conducted 
in a manner contrary to the Mandate, the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. South Africa denied this, claiming that 
the continuation of the sacred trust and the benefit and desire of the inhabitants 
(as well as its original conquest and long occupation) were the very reasons for its 
right to annex the mandated territory.216 The Court strongly disagreed and noted 
that “no factual evidence is needed to determine whether apartheid is in violation 
of South Africa’s international obligations”.217 “Under the Charter of the United 
Nations, the former Mandatory had pledged itself to observe and respect, in a 
territory having an international status, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to enforce, 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds 
of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of 
fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of 
the Charter.”218 Thus, human rights now appeared to give a content and meaning 
to the “moral and material well-being” of the inhabitants of Namibia. In its 1971 
decision the Court finally entered the world of decolonization.  The instruments 
that the Court claimed South Africa to have violated, the mandate, the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, were not 
new. All of these sources would have been available when the Court gave its 
decisions in 1963 and 1967.219 This time the Court gave an explicitly legal meaning 
to the mandate.  
 Judge Fitzmaurice, however, brushed away the questions of 
“humanitarianism” at the beginning of his dissenting opinion. He positioned 
himself as a “jurist”, placing himself in opposition to the rest of the Court. Once 
again he maintained that the fact that South Africa’s conduct, i.e. apartheid, was 
detrimental to “the material and moral well-being and the social progress” of the 
inhabitants of South West Africa, had not been determined legally. He was not 
ready to accept that it could be merely deduced from South African laws that 
apartheid was harmful to the inhabitants.220 Rather, the Court should have 
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investigated the claims in order to be legally able to make this point. In essence, 
Fitzmaurice criticized the Court for intellectual laziness, and failing to delve 
deeply into the matter as a proper jurist should.  
 However, according to Fitzmaurice, this was all beside the point and 
secondary to the fact that the mandate was interpreted incorrectly. Calling his 
own method of interpretation “orthodox”, he wished to emphasize the “intentions 
of those concerned at the time”. According to him, the Court had an “alien 
philosophy”, as it used the intentions and aims of institutions of a different era, 50 
years after the establishment of such institutions. “This,” he said, “is not a legally 
valid criterion… .”221 If the resolution drafted by Fitzmaurice and Spender had in 
1966 appeared as conservative and old fashioned, now the formalism of 
Fitzmaurice showed him as a man of the past, unable to accept the obvious. 
 With its ruling, the ICJ cautiously accepted international human rights as a 
guiding principle in its interpretation. Such teleological argumentation extended 
the validity of these principles even to the interpretation of much earlier 
obligations and treaties, such as the mandates. The Czech human rights lawyer, 
Egon Schwelb, maintained in a commentary of the case that in its decision the 
Court showed that the United Nations Charter included binding human rights 
obligations. According to him, the Court had terminated the mandate because of 
human rights violations, i.e. violations of the Charter’s human rights provisions.222 
Schwelb’s comment relates to a broader discussion that was going on about 
whether the UN Charter’s human rights provisions provided for binding 
obligations on all UN members. While it is true that the Court refers to the human 
rights articles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is 
noteworthy that the Court declared the actual violation by South Africa to be a 
violation of its duties as a mandatory, i.e. a violation of the mandates agreements. 
When the Court referred to the source of South Africa’s obligations, it referred to 
Article 22 of the League Covenant and the South West Africa mandate agreement. 
The Court terminated South Africa’s tasks based on the League Covenant and the 
mandate, using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as an 
interpretational tool, since the first mentioned agreements were silent on 
termination. The Court referred to South Africa’s Charter-based human rights 
duties only as a response to South Africa’s claim that its policy of apartheid was 
“directed in good faith towards the purpose of promoting to the utmost the well-
being and progress of the inhabitants”.223 The Court was not willing to delve 
deeply into the matter of apartheid, but concluded that South Africa’s policies of 
apartheid were a violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter. 
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 Natalie Hevener has described the advisory opinion through its liberal 
interpretation of customary law. She notes that the Court referred to both the 
United Nations Charter and also actual events (namely de-colonization) as 
relevant in the emergence of new law, and also that the period during which this 
law evolved was rather brief.224 She also refers to the discussions on whether the 
human rights norms of the United Nations Charter could be seen as binding law, 
noting that the Court’s approach “expands the limits of the law in a juridically 
legitimate fashion, but in opposition to those who propound a narrower definition 
of these obligations”.225 Thus, the division within the Court between the more 
formalistic approach to the legal relevance of human rights norms and the 
teleological approach was still visible in the decision and the dissenting opinion, as 
can be seen in Fitzmaurice’s opinion. She concludes that while the teleological 
approach is only implicit in the judgment, it seems that the Court wished to 
confirm human rights issues as being part of international law: “it must have 
seemed wise to explicate its reasoning with the firmest traditional bases 
possible”.226 
 Dugard also approaches the case as a victory for the progressive 
interpretation of international law, seeing it particularly fitting for treaties of a 
humanitarian nature.227 In his view, the Court, by accepting teleological 
interpretation as  “recognized and accepted for legal reasoning”, acknowledged 
that there are uncertainties and controversies relating to humanitarian matters 
that nevertheless do not change their position as valid law.228 
5.4 Conclusions on the South West Africa cases 
Read one after the other, the cases of the International Court of Justice on South 
Africa’s governance in South West Africa, form an incoherent picture on what the 
Court saw as its role in safeguarding human rights. Yet, the South West Africa 
cases are often grouped as one single case when given as an example of the ICJ’s 
development of self-determination and human rights law. Rosalyn Higgins has 
described the Court as a “forerunner in recognizing self-determination as a legal 
right”.229 Bruno Simma refers to both the negative (the South West Africa decision 
of 1966) and the positive (the Namibia advisory opinion) outcomes in terms of 
self-determination and human rights.230 Gentian Zyberi notes the Court’s 
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contribution in both defining the aim and scope of the right to self-determination 
and linking it to fundamental human rights.231 However, the language of all the 
cases is different and they span over a period of more than two decades, 
highlighting how human rights were mainstreamed by the Court only in the 1970s.  
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 6. Conclusions 
The stated purpose of this research has been to trace the emergence of rights 
language in the League of Nations mandates system. I have followed the debates 
regarding the mandates system from its inception in the aftermath of the First 
World War up to the 1971 decision of the ICJ regarding the application of a 
cautious human rights standard in Namibia. Through the discussions among 
international lawyers and the proceedings of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission, I have followed not only how the mandates were conceived, 
conceptualized, and administered but also how they have been interpreted after the 
League itself ceased to exist.  
 Philip Alston has asked whether it matters if rights have a genealogy. Is it 
necessary to trace human rights centuries back? Alston himself has answered the 
question by not having interest in pinpointing the emergence of a phenomenon to a 
certain exact moment. However, he has maintained that ideas and phenomena are 
not born in a vacuum. Human rights are a complex phenomenon and the discussion 
of their history have been partly limited because of debates on how to define them. 
One cannot look at them from just one point of view without getting a distorted 
picture.  
 I have not been looking for precedents or antecedents of human rights, but 
rather for reasons and developments, using the discussions of the Permanent 
Mandates Commission as my case study. As many have noted, the language and 
terms one uses affect the results of a study. I have used terminology in an open- 
ended way, tracing those discussions in the Permanent Mandates Commission that 
have later had a meaning within the human rights phenomenon. The open 
endedness naturally leads to the danger that anything can be seen as a precursor of 
human rights. To counter this, I have aimed to find concrete issues that have been 
later deliberated within the context of human rights and studied the ways they have 
been discussed during the interwar period. The discussions have shown that there 
exists no tidy lineage of rights talk or that rights would have gradually developed in 
a predictable fashion in order to culminate in a human rights revolution after the 
Second World War. 
 In this study I have described broadly the language and deliberations of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission. I have been able to find continuities in language 
and notions from earlier decades predating the mandates system, but I have also 
found discontinuities. On the other hand, the discussions have shown that changes 
in the language of rights as compared to those that have taken place after the 
Second World War have been rather small. In questions relating to mandates and 
colonies in general, there is no such change in language that would justify talking 
about a human rights revolution immediately after the war. The change took place 
more than two decades later, when the postcolonial era had already begun. 
 Certain principles relating to the mandates, such as self-determination and 
non-annexation, emerged already in the establishing phases of the system. The 
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interpretation of self-determination in particular had an important role throughout 
the history of the mandates system, even if it had only very little practical meaning 
in the interwar period. Principles such as “material and moral well-being”, 
“development”, “tutelage” as a means to achieve these principles, and “sacred trust” 
were written into Article 22 of the League Covenant and were central to the 
decisions concerning the mandate of South West Africa in the International Court 
of Justice in the 1960s and in 1971.  
 The interpretation of the concepts of trust and tutelage are closely linked to the 
possible rights-based interpretation of the mandates. The concept of “sacred trust” 
was not established, but was affected by the period of interpretation and the 
ideologies of the interpreter. In the early years of the mandates, Lord Lugard saw 
these concepts in the light of the colonial period: they were the “latest expression of 
the conscience of Europe”.1 Thus, they were an improved version of traditional 
colonialism. The mandates were to serve as a model for colonial administration and 
as such the responsibility of superior civilizations towards inferior ones should be 
apparent in their execution. This responsibility was conceived to be both material 
and moral. “Sacred trust” was widely seen as a moral and ethical concept, a 
humanitarian obligation without a legal meaning.2 A similar approach was 
maintained by the ICJ. In its advisory opinion of 1950, the ICJ described the 
“sacred trust” through the wording of the League of Nations as an international 
institution in the interest of the inhabitants of the territory and humanity in general, 
giving certain obligations to the mandatory. In its 1966 decision on South West 
Africa, the Court clearly pointed out that it believed the “sacred trust” to be a moral 
ideal, unsuited for legal interpretation. Such “humanitarian considerations” could 
be used as an “inspirational basis” for drafting legal rules, but did not have a legal 
content as such. In the 1971 Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for 
States concerning the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, the Court 
would finally give a legal meaning to the “sacred trust”. First of all, the Court 
confirmed both the continuing existence of the “sacred trust”, now including all 
territories under a colonial regime, and the evolutionary nature of it. According to 
the Court, the ultimate object of the “sacred trust” was self-determination and 
independence of the peoples of non-self-governing territories. Thus, the meaning 
the Court gave to the concept of “sacred trust” was not one of human rights as 
such, but rather related to the duty to grant the peoples of Namibia the right to 
independently decide of their own future.  
 The mandates system had many features that were common to contemporary 
colonial policies. It was based on old ideas of the superiority of European culture 
and the “white man’s burden”, and the responsibility to raise inferior cultures to a 
higher level of civilization. The mandatories mainly treated the mandates as if they 
were their colonies. There were differences, but these related to differences in their 
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other colonial policies as well. Similarly, the discussion of the PMC show that they 
saw their role towards the natives as civilizers, and themselves as culturally 
superior. It was rather clear that they would not encourage the mandates to become 
independent and they lacked the belief that the mandated territories could actually 
act as independent nations. Even if the independence of the A mandates had 
already been conditionally accepted, the independence process of Iraq showed that 
the PMC did not genuinely believe that the inhabitants of Iraq had achieved a 
sufficient level of civilization to justify independence. As with contemporary 
scholarship on international law, Europe was the measuring stick for civilization 
and from the point of view of the PMC, the mandates were considered to be too far 
behind to even be given independence some day. Lord Lugard’s thinking, for 
instance, showed his old colonial ideals. On the other hand, of the PMC members 
William Rappard believed that colonial administration could be transferred to 
international control through the mandates system and that the League of Nations 
brought order to international relations. One could, in fact, expect something novel 
and better of the mandates system.  
 The practicalities of the mandates system, the discussion, reports, petitions, 
and so on, gradually started to have a life of their own. Through petitions, the 
inhabitants were able to express their grievances. The petitions did not come evenly 
from all territories, but their number was vast and through them the PMC had 
access to such information that had never been discussed in old colonial 
administrations. Most petitions would not lead to concrete actions, but they were 
discussed and they gained publicity, and thus entered into a broader awareness. 
Moreover, while it would be an exaggeration to say that the petitions dealt with 
individual rights, through them the concerns and grievances of individual 
inhabitants came to the knowledge of the PMC and were discussed before it.  
 In this study I have examined several of the “safeguards” granted by Article 22 
of the League Covenant and the individual mandates agreements, all of which 
reveal something about the relationship between the administration and the 
inhabitants, the PMC being included in this relationship. By drafting a 
questionnaire, the PMC developed a standardized format with which it could 
require information from the mandatories. It also specified the questionnaire a few 
years later after it noticed that the information it received from the mandatories 
was not specific enough.  
 It was common to all “safeguards” that the PMC considered its own role and 
the role of the administration to be that of a protector. In contrast to modern 
human rights thought, the threat to the “rights”, or rather to the welfare of the 
inhabitants, were the inhabitants themselves or other local groups. The task of the 
administration was to ensure that the inhabitants would not harm themselves or 
others with their primitive ways. This was especially apparent in questions relating 
to slavery and the position of women. The PMC repeatedly observed that the 
situation would improve by itself, as the level of civilization would rise. The 
advance of civilization would teach the natives to take better care of themselves. 
They would also develop more modern concepts of labour, ownership and the 
 Conclusions  __________________________________________________________________  
 
215 
positions of women. Also in matters relating to land usage, it was the task of the 
administration to determine both what the “rights” and interests of the inhabitants 
were and to guarantee the realization of these rights.  
 A contradiction between protection, preservation of cultural values and 
modernization was apparent in the discussions on the “safeguards”. Material 
development and new infrastructure required labour, but at the same time the 
inhabitants needed protection from exploitation. Yet, there were members in the 
PMC who believed that labour was the ultimate means for civilization and 
education and the civilizational task was more important than the protection of the 
inhabitants. There were also traditions concerning land usage, but, on the other 
hand, modernization required that the inhabitants understood the concept of 
ownership. Local religions were to be protected in the name of religious freedom, 
and yet, they included practices that the PMC found appalling. The same applied 
to the position of women.  
 The “safeguards” were closely related to the standard of civilization. The idea 
of a superior European civilization meant that Europeans had a duty to guarantee 
certain “rights”, such as freedom of religion. Similarly, the prohibition of slavery 
had already in the 19th century been a means for Europeans (and especially the 
British) to show their moral superiority. Fighting slavery would justify colonial 
administration. In the mandates system the idea of a standard of civilization was 
highly visible in the PMC distrust of Iraq’s ability to take care of its minorities. The 
PMC feared that once European supervision would end, the minorities in Iraq 
would be under immediate threat.  
 Of the different “safeguards”, the abolition of the slave trade has most often 
been linked to human rights and their development. However, freedom of religion, 
labour laws and the various conventions regarding the position of women have 
found a place in histories of human rights. Yet, as is quite apparent from the 
manner in which these issues were treated by the PMC, during the mandates 
period they were not seen as individual rights, not to mention human rights, and 
they had very little resemblance to the human rights thought of today. The PMC 
was more concerned with the development of the society at large, expecting that 
changes in the position of individuals would not interfere with this development. 
Yet, many members of the PMC did show a genuine benevolent attitude towards 
the native inhabitants and a sense of morality in their discussions. Of course, this 
did not mean that they could be considered to have a human rights sensibility, but 
rather a paternalistic attitude towards the inhabitants. 
 Anne Orford has written that a lawyer has a different outlook on the origins of 
legal phenomena than a historian. In her view, a lawyer does not necessarily get 
acquainted with the origins of a concept or a norm only to explain the past, but also 
to find support for interpretation and application of the concepts.  Lawyers should 
at least be self-conscious about the method of interpretation they aim to use. In the 
cases in the International Court of Justice on the position of South West Africa this 
has been visible in the discussion on the nature of the mandates and the different 
methods of interpretation. For reasons mentioned by Orford, a lawyer does not 




always need to be afraid of anachronism, as a certain degree of anachronism is 
inherent in the application of law.  
 The formalistic interpretation of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and the entire mandates system in the decision of the ICJ in 1966 would 
leave no room for human rights to enter the mandates system even in hindsight. As 
the interpretation of the Court was based on the original idea of the League of 
Nations of the nature of mandates, it was quite natural that any references to 
human rights would have been anachronistic. Finding support for interpretation 
from the travaux préparatoires gave little support to the right to self-determination 
and no support for including a broader interpretation based on human rights in the 
mandates system. However, the dissenting opinions showed that there were other 
possible ways to interpret the relationship between mandates and human rights. As 
Orford notes, lawyers can throw aside their fear of anachronism and search for 
assistance in interpreting the object and purpose of a treaty. They can consider that 
their duty is to interpret the material from the perspective of present-day values 
and norms. In 1971, the ICJ determined that the ultimate objective of the “sacred 
trust” was self-determination. Similarly, the Court maintained that Article 22 of the 
League Covenant obliged South Africa to take care of the moral and material well-
being of the indigenous inhabitants of South West Africa. Even here the Court was 
cautious in making an interpretation based on human rights. It maintained that due 
to a treaty violation, that is, a violation of the duty to ensure the moral and material 
well-being of the native inhabitants by its policy of apartheid, the mandate could be 
terminated. In the Court’s reasoning, the human rights clauses of the United 
Nations Charter gave content to the notion of “moral and material well-being”. 
Apartheid was a violation thereof. With this decision, the ICJ, albeit still very 
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